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Abstract
The virtues are central to our understanding of character-based morality and in the
Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition at least, prudence is considered the first of all
cardinal virtues – vital and necessary to the virtuous life. Similarly, the claim of this
study is that prudence is a central feature of Proverbial wisdom and, as such, the
book of Proverbs is a useful biblical source to allow Scripture to enrich our
understanding of the virtuous life and of prudence in particular. In this vein, this
thesis engages in a correlative study between an understanding of prudence informed
by Thomistic thought and prudential wisdom found in the book of Proverbs. Part of
this correlative study also takes in the broader context of the virtuous moral life,
including notions such as the natural law and the virtues in general. This study
highlights that wisdom as portrayed in the book of Proverbs can inform
contemporary theological understandings of prudence, especially those with their
roots in the Thomistic tradition. Further, the Thomistic understanding of the virtue of
prudence provides a useful heuristic approach to interpreting Proverbs.
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General
BHS

Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia
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The New Revised Standard Version
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Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics
Aquinas, Thomas. Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. Translated
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De veritate Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate
Aquinas, Thomas. The Disputed Questions on Truth. Translated by
Mulligan, Robert William, Schmidt, Robert W. and McGlynn, James V.
Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954.
SCG

Summa Contra Gentiles
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Contra Gentiles. Translated by English
Dominican Fathers London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1924.
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Abbreviations for the Works of Aristotle
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Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Irwin, Terence. 2nd ed.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999.
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The Holy Bible: New Revised Standard Version. Nashville: Thomas Nelson
Publishers, 1989

Transliteration
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For Biblical Studies and Related Disciplines, (Second edition). Atlanta, Georgia SBL
Press, 2014.
Note: transliterations that form part of direct quotations maintain the formatting of
original source where possible.
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1. Overview: Moral Theory, Scripture and Virtues
1.1 Scripture and the Moral Framework of Virtue Ethics
1.1.1 Overarching Approach to Scripture and Morality
Though the Second Vatican Council was not called in response to specific polemics
or specific moral predicaments of the day, the Council Fathers nevertheless called for
the renewal of moral theology that has helped shape moral enquiry significantly in
the decades since. Part of that call was that greater stress be given to role of Scripture
in moral theology.1 This is most notably expressed in Dei Verbum2 and, even more
explicitly, in Optatam Totius which stated that moral theology should be ‘nourished’
by scriptural teaching as indeed the Bible sits as the “soul of all theology.”3 This
leaning has continued through to more recent times where, for example, the
Pontifical Biblical Commission’s document The Bible and Morality reminded
theologians that “Holy Scripture is not only a source of revelation on which to
ground one’s faith, it is also an indispensable reference point for morality.”4
An immediate question follows: how and in what manner can Scripture serve moral
theology? This question is especially complex as any contemporary and reasonable
analysis of Scripture quickly ascertains that the bible does not provide any ‘clean’
systematic moral construct or a tidy synthesis of principles and precepts.5 As such,
the appropriate and beneficial use of Scripture in moral theology is not always as
straightforward as it may seem. Further, the historical-critical scholarship of biblical
literature has highlighted the distinct gap between our modern issues and contexts
and that of both the Old and New Testaments. As the Pontifical Biblical Commission
1

As Curran notes, the greater stress on Scripture in moral theology was a movement that pre-dates the
Council. Nevertheless, Vatican II brought such sentiment into even greater focus in the Catholic
context and the endorsement of the Council is regarded as a key moment in Catholic moral theology.
Charles E. Curran, "The Role and Function of the Scriptures in Moral Theology," in The Use of
Scripture in Moral Theology, ed. Charles E. Curran and Richard A. McCormick, Readings in Moral
Theology, vol. 4 (New York: Paulist Press, 1984), 179.
2
Second Vatican Council, "Dei Verbum: Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation," in The
Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott (New York: Guild Press, 1966), §21.
3
Second Vatican Council, "OT," §16.
4
Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Bible and Morality: Biblical Roots of Christian Conduct
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2008), preface (p. 5).
5
Josef Fuchs discusses this notion in relation to the call of the use of Scripture by Vatican II. See
Human Values and Christian Morality, trans., M. H. Heelan et al. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970),
28-29. Curran’s discussion on the use of Scripture in moral theology highlights this issue substantially
in "The Role and Function of the Scriptures in Moral Theology," 178-212.
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indicates, even a casual reading of Scripture illuminates the difficulties in applying
biblical writings to contemporary moral situations given that they “were redacted at
least nineteen hundred years ago and belong to epochs in which life conditions were
very different from those of today.”6
The response to such issues in regard to the use of Scripture in moral theology starts
with an appreciation for the need of sound exegetical scholarship which helps one to
navigate the Scriptures and to understand them in their own situational contexts.
Certainly, many scholars interested in the field of Scripture and morality note such a
necessity.7 As such, a significant part of this project will utilise such tools of modern
scholarship. However, it will not remain there. The aim is not simply to unpack
historical data on selected texts as such, but to allow Scripture to illuminate truths
that can help shape understandings of at least certain aspects of the moral life.8
To do so, however, one needs to ask a further question. The question on the use of
Scripture in this or any other work of moral theology is not simply how a moral
theory can use Scripture but, more accurately, what paradigm is witnessed in
Scripture (in whole or in part) and, thus, able to most fruitfully speak to the moral
life. In this sense, often the use of Scripture is bound to the prior paradigm of moral
understanding that one brings to its reading. For example, one commonly understood
paradigm is essentially deontological and sees Scripture providing certain
articulations on moral norms and rules. Certainly under the heavily legalistic model
employed by the ‘moral manuals’ between Trent and Vatican II, the use of Scripture
was primarily in proof text fashion to support arguments on the sinfulness or
otherwise of particular acts. 9

6

Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Bible and Morality, preface (p. 6). See also Servais Pinckaers’
discussion on application of Scripture to ethical issues of today, "Scripture and the Renewal of Moral
Theology," in The Pinckaers Reader: Renewing Thomistic Moral Theology, ed. John Berkman and
Craig Steven Titus (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 59-62.
7
The aforementioned Fuchs being an example, Human Values and Christian Morality, 27.
8
This follows Pinckaers who notes that both a ‘positivist’ method of exegeses, which focuses on
“facts” of historicity and related data, and the more interpretive “truthfulness” of the text itself are
needed if Scripture is to engage successfully with moral deliberation, Servais Pinckaers, The Sources
of Christian Ethics, trans., Mary Thomas Noble, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 73-74.
9
See Curran, "The Role and Function of the Scriptures in Moral Theology," 179-180. On the
development of the ‘moral manuals’ see John Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology: The Study
of the Roman Catholic Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 1-36.
It should be pointed out that I do not want to suggest that Scripture cannot or should not be used for
articulating moral norms or precepts but, rather, exclusively doing so, particularly in a strictly
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More recently, other moral frameworks have come to the fore including virtue or
character-based ethics. The revival of virtue-based ethics is often marked by the
writings of such figures as Elizabeth Anscombe and various critics such as William
Frankena, Philippa Foot and Alasdair MacIntyre 10 while figures such as Stanley
Hauerwas11 and James Keenan12 have performed a similar role in the more overtly
theological context. They themselves base much of their understanding on Aristotle
and Aquinas. Under such influence, many moral thinkers have found value in
changing the fundamental basis of moral reflection away from acts as a means to a
‘utilitarian’ end or in considering the purity of the particular act itself (typical of
deontological ethics) to the broader concept of character and virtues – a movement
that focuses on the “kind of person one’s actions exhibits and requires one to be.”13
Within such a framework, there is a greater acknowledgment that actions do not sit
as isolated and independent entities apart from the context of the fuller motivations
and lived experiences of the agents who perform them. Such a paradigm holds that
morality is better understood as one ‘being’ good rather than simply ‘doing’ good.
As Klaus Demmer states in his defining of the moral life:
First and foremost, morality concerns the reality of our being good; in
this sense, any good action represents a derivative dimension, the
expression of a more fundamental condition … Moral theologians are
increasingly aware of the fact that actions are grounded in personal
attitudes, that there exists something like permanent dispositions for
whose cultivation the agent bears a particular responsibility.14

deontological framework, is not the fullest means in which the Scriptures can be utilised to inform the
moral life.
10
The impetus for such philosophers to return to virtue-based ethics was essentially in response to
dissatisfaction with the condition of modern moral philosophy built primarily on deontological or
utilitarian frameworks. Harold Alderman, "By Virtue of Virtue," in The Virtues: Contemporary
Essays on Moral Character, ed. Robert B. Kruschwitz and Robert C. Roberts (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth, 1987), 47. MacIntyre in particular brought this dissatisfaction into sharp focus in his
seminal work After Virtue where he illustrates the limitations of attempting to resolve moral dilemma
based on competing rational arguments in the contemporary context. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue:
A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 6-22
and passim.
11
Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Notre Dame: Fides
Publishers, 1974), this being a seminal publication, though many more have followed since.
12
His first work being: James F. Keenan, Goodness and Rightness in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa
Theologiae (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1992).
13
Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Malden, MA; Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
2002), 115.
14
Klaus Demmer, Shaping the Moral Life: An Approach to Moral Theology, trans., Roberto Dell'Oro
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 2, 53.
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It is in this context that an understanding of virtues (and corresponding vices) are
framed, namely it is those traits that constitute the character of a person. They are
classically understood, in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas, as being dispositions
which express the “pattern of choices an individual makes.”15 As such, a particular
virtue not only renders good outcomes but “makes good he who has it.”16
This understanding of morality resting in the character of a person with their virtues
and vices is one that is most suited to the Scriptures in general and to the wisdom
literature in particular. In this vein, despite the traditional reliance on Scripture to
articulate a deontological framework, particularly in the use of certain parts of the
Hebrew Scriptures, 17 the revival of virtue-based morality finds a corresponding
renewal in biblical scholarship in general and wisdom literature in particular.
William Brown makes the point that “concern for ethical character runs throughout
the Bible … but finds its most immediate home within a frequently neglected part of
the biblical canon, the wisdom literature.” 18 So though wisdom literature may
struggle to supply “hard and fast principles” or codified laws on which moral norms
can be based, it does supply “characterisations of character, that is to say, profiles of
character embodied in certain lives of virtue.”19 Similarly Rodd, in his discussion of
Proverbs, notes that as moral discussion is able to move beyond concepts such as that
of the Kantian categorical imperative and the utilitarianism of Mill, so are we able to
better capture the ethical framework of the Hebrew Scriptures more broadly. Rodd

15

William P. Brown, Character in Crisis: A Fresh Approach to the Wisdom Literature of the Old
Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1996), 9. This sentiment is tied to
notion of ‘habits’ to describe the enduring quality a person exhibits. The term habit is itself taken from
the Latin habitus and Greek hexis and denotes more than mindless repetitive activity which the
contemporary use may imply. The classic source for such understanding is found in Book II & III of
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans., Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,
1999). (Hereafter NE). Thomas Aquinas’s discussion on the same can be found in his Summa
Theologiae, trans., English Dominican Fathers (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), I-II, 49-54.
(Hereafter ST). See also brief discussion in 3.3.1 below.
16
Jean Baechler, "Virtue: Its Nature, Exigency and Acquisition," in Virtue, ed. John W. Chapman and
William A. Galston, Namos, vol. 34 (New York: New York University Press, 1992), 27.
17
Baumann, for example, notes the tendency of studies in Old Testament morality to focus on Israel’s
confessions (the Decalogue or Law in general) or the prophetic texts. Gerlinde Baumann, "Wisdom
and Ethics: The Contribution of Sapiential Ethics for Old Testament Ethics," Verbum Et Ecclesia JRG
30, no. 1 (2009): 16-17.
18
Brown, Character in Crisis, viii.
19
Brown, Character in Crisis, 19. Citing Richard Bondi, "The Elements of Character," Journal of
Religious Ethics 12, no. 2 (1984): 205.
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states categorically that “the Greek concern for virtue, which seems to be receiving
renewed interest among moral philosophers, is closer to the Old Testament ethics.”20
With the above in mind, the aim of this project is to draw on two traditions and bring
them into dialogue in a particular area of study – the teaching of Proverbial wisdom
on the one hand and the virtue tradition informed by St. Thomas Aquinas and his
interpreters on the other. As such, this project follows Aquinas himself who
suggested that just as “other moral teachings of the Old Testament centred on the
Ten Commandments and on their purpose, so it was appropriate that later books of
the Old Testament should instruct us on the activity of prudence, which is about the
things serving this purpose.” 21 Of these “latter books” that Aquinas refers to, the
current study’s specific concern is the book of Proverbs. Naturally the wisdom
tradition is broader than this one work and one could draw on wisdom genre found
throughout the Hebrew Scriptures. Nevertheless, Proverbs is the primary work of
focus and its concerns help provide a boundary to this project. Proverbs is chosen for
two reasons. Firstly, it is regarded as a foundational piece of the wisdom tradition;
well organised and extensive in its focus and influence. 22 Moreover, and this
represents the central proposition of this thesis, there is an expression of morality
within Proverbs that most readily speaks to a contemporary discussion on the virtue
of prudence and its moral framework as found in the Thomistic tradition. What
follows is an unpacking of this position.
1.1.2 Recent Approaches to Virtue-Based Ethical Exploration in Proverbs
and the Virtue of Prudence
As alluded to above, attention given to the role of biblical wisdom in contemporary
moral theology has increased in recent times, but is still relatively thin especially
when compared to focus given to other parts of Scripture. The previously cited
Biblical Commission’s The Bible and Morality is a reasonable illustration of this. In
its second chapter which focusses on the Hebrew Scriptures and “the norms of
human conduct,” the wisdom books are treated as somewhat of a footnote (covered
in §39-40) to the broader discussion which itself is centred on the covenantal
20

Cyril S. Rodd, Glimpses of a Strange Land: Studies in Old Testament Ethics (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 2001), 277.
21
ST, II-II, 56.1 ad 3.
22
Roland E. Murphy, The Tree of Life: An Exploration of Biblical Wisdom Literature, 3rd ed. (Grand
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2002), 15.
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relationship between God and humanity (§14-38).23 Further, the sections referring to
the wisdom books use Qoheleth and Ben Sira as their illustrative sources and
Proverbs is given only a passing comment. 24 This is so because the Biblical
Commission’s document, as with many other examinations of Old Testament
morality, tends to focus on the covenantal expressions of the Torah and the prophetic
traditions which back them up. Proverbs, in this regard, struggles to have a natural
influence as it has very little reference to Israel’s national or cultic traditions. 25
Nevertheless, theological focus on Proverbs and related material has certainly
increased in recent times. For example, Richard Clifford opened his Book of
Proverbs & Our Search for Wisdom with a discussion on the lack of regard for
Proverbs,26 but within a decade of its publication most major scholarly commentaries
had published significant works (or reworkings) on Proverbs.27 In addition, over the
same period “an embarrassment of riches” of articles and monographs on the wisdom
genre including Proverbs has emerged.28
With renewed interest in Wisdom literature in general and Proverbs in particular,
there has naturally been a greater focus on the moral framework therein. As will be
noted throughout this thesis, much scholarship has identified Proverbial wisdom with
‘practical wisdom’ which itself is akin to prudence as it is understood in the
Thomistic virtue tradition. Nevertheless, there has been relatively little explicit
exploration of this notion. There are some notable exceptions to this that, though not
23

Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Bible and Morality, Part 1, Ch. 2, §14-40.
It should be pointed out that, by its own admission, the Biblical Commission had no intention of
presenting a complete biblical moral theology (Pontifical Biblical Commission, The Bible and
Morality, §3.), and where specific criteria are referred to, they are “representative rather than
exhaustive” (p. 9). Nevertheless, it does illustrate how a significant discussion on biblical moral
theology can be had with little reference to wisdom literature in general and to Proverbs in particular.
25
An introduction to this is articulated in Tomas Frydrych, Living Under the Sun: Examination of
Proverbs and Qoheleth (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 1-3. See 1.2.3 and 2.2.2 below for fuller discussion.
26
Richard J. Clifford, Book of Proverbs & Our Search for Wisdom (Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press, 1995), 1-2.
27
For example: Raymond C. Van Leeuwen, "The Book of Proverbs: Introdction, Commentary and
Reflections," in The New Interpreter's Bible (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997); Michael V. Fox,
Proverbs 1-9: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible, vol. 18A
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Michael V. Fox, Proverbs 10-31: A New Translation with
Introduction and Commentary, The Anchor Bible, vol. 18B (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2009). Catholic scholars responsible for reputed commentaries include Richard J. Clifford, Proverbs:
A Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999); Roland E. Murphy, Proverbs, Word
Biblical Commentary, vol. v. 22 (Dallas: Word Books, 1998). Such works are obviously invaluable
to this present study and will be frequently drawn upon.
28
James L. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom: An Introduction (Louisville: Westminster John Knox
Press, 2010), 2. Crenshaw provides a comprehensive list of contemporary scholarship on biblical
wisdom; Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, 1-3. See also R. N. Whybray, The Book of Proverbs: A
Survey of Modern Study (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995).
24
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addressing prudence in the context of the Thomistic tradition explicitly, comes close
to doing so or at least approaches Proverbs from a perspective that allows for direct
correlation with the Thomistic notion of prudence. Two works of note are the already
cited William Brown’s Character in Crisis, which sees the moral dimension of
Proverbs being essentially “a book of virtues” intent on forming the character of the
young in particular,29 and Ellen F. Davis who draws a direct dialogue between the
work of Proverbs and the virtue of prudence as expressed in Thomistic thought.30
Davis’ work, though not extensive, bears the most correlation to the study presented
here. In her essay she articulates the resurgence of virtue-based moral thought, its
value to theological deliberation in general and, most notably, the value in drawing a
virtue-based morality from the book of Proverbs in particular.31 In so doing, Davis
notes the virtues of prudence and temperance are those given the most attention in
the book of Proverbs,32 and it is the former that is due particular attention due to the
conceptual relationship discernible between the ‘wise one’ of Proverbs and the virtue
of prudence (and their opposite vice of folly). Davis, albeit briefly, expounds on this
notion and draws some particular references and understandings from Proverbs that
express notions of prudence as found in the Thomistic moral tradition. Various
notions are touched on including an understanding of prudence that moves beyond
‘self-referential care’, as well as classical notions of docilitas and sollicitudo.33 These
later notions are taken directly from Thomistic thought and are identified as key
elements of developing true cognisance of reality, what can be termed ‘truthful
vision’34 and, thus, prudential living.
Similarly, the regard for ‘truthful vision’ or ‘seeing reality rightly’ is the heart of
Davis’ deliberations suggesting that the moral life is built on an ability to
comprehend and participate in the created order as has been laid down by God and
which is perceptible in creation itself. She does so by drawing on various parts of
29

Brown, Character in Crisis, 22-49.
Ellen F. Davis, "Preserving Virtues: Renewing the Tradition of the Sages," in Character &
Scripture: Moral Formation, Community, and Biblical Interpretation, ed. William P. Brown (Grand
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2002).
31
Davis, "Preserving Virtues," 183-189.
32
Davis, "Preserving Virtues," 186-187.
33
Davis, "Preserving Virtues," 190-192.
34
A term drawn from Paul J. Wadell’s Becoming Friends: Worship, Justice, and the Practice of
Christian Friendship (Grand Rapids: Baker Publishing, 2002), 120-130. It pertains to seeing reality
(in the broadest sense) rightly. It is a notion discussed in section 3 below. See also ST, II-II, 51.3;
53.4.
30
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Proverbs, but most specifically on the cosmological expressions of 3:19-26 and in the
words of ‘Woman Wisdom’ in chapter 8. Davis notes, for example, that “Virtue …
entails seeing ourselves as part of the pattern that God has woven into creation, and
valuing ourselves accordingly.” 35 Thus, the teaching of Proverbs includes
encouraging the reader to properly grasp the majestic reality of creation and to
prudently act (in the particular circumstances of the day) in accordance with such
vision. According to Davis, this has direct correlation to the classical understanding
of prudence stating that “prudence means investing ourselves properly in creation,
making decisions that demonstrate steady reflection on what God has done.” 36
Conversely, citing Proverbs 14:8, Davis notes that the heart of folly is deception.37
Deception, or more specifically a poor grasp of reality in its broadest sense, is the
heart of imprudence in particular and immorality in general. Similarly, Aquinas
states the danger of ‘false prudence’ which is evident “when the purpose of reason is
directed to an end which is good not in truth but in appearance … or in order to
obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses means that are not true but
fictitious and counterfeit.”38 Thus, according to both Proverbs and Aquinas, though
one may have certain skills or abilities akin to prudence, such as shrewdness
(astutia), unless one is able to hold ‘right vision’ of both the ends and the particulars
of given circumstances, then one’s character is prone to fall to folly rather than
prudence and thus to sin rather than to the healthy moral life. This notion will be
revisited more closely later, particularly in section 3.1, but it is worth noting that
Davis provides some key themes that will be taken up below.
Stepping away from prudence specifically, mention should also be made of studies in
the linking of proverbs with virtue-based morality more broadly. In this regard,
Christopher B. Ansberry recently published article is of significant value.39 Ansberry
references recent scholarship in virtue-based approaches to interpreting proverbs,40
but draws special attention to virtue-based ethics in the Greek moral tradition and
particularly as expressed by Aristotle. Ansberry does so by first examining a key
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work in this field produced by Michael V. Fox.41 Fox notes a correlation between
Platonic moral concepts and that expressed in Proverbs on three levels; 1) virtue is
knowledge, 2) no one does wrong willingly, and 3) all virtues are one.42 Ansberry,
however, notes that a more fruitful hermeneutical approach is found in drawing
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics into dialogue with the writings of Proverbs.43 The
heart of Ansberry’s article asks the question concerning the degree to which
Aristotle’s approach to ethics compares with the ethics of Proverbs.44 The outcome
of which is that “Nicomachean Ethics serves as a useful heuristic guide for
understanding the moral vision of Proverbs. Similar to Aristotle’s ethical theory,
character and intellect are fundamental to the ethical vision of Proverbs.” 45
Moreover, Ansberry notes that, unlike Fox’s use of Plato who equates knowledge to
virtue, 46 Aristotle articulates that the morally sound person needs more than
‘knowledge of the good’ in and of itself. As Ansberry states it, Aristotle emphasises
an:
Organic relationship between moral and intellectual virtues … Virtue is
an activity that includes a person’s moral and intellectual capacities:
moral virtue identifies the goal, while practical wisdom determines the
means for achieving the goal of virtuous activity in a particular
situation.47
Similarly, Ansberry notes, Proverbs articulates that the acquisition of wisdom (as
knowledge) is a pre-condition for virtue, but must be accompanied by a ‘virtuous
disposition’.48 The finer detail of Ansberry’s study is not taken up at this point, but it
is an important essay on two accounts. Firstly, though Ansberry does not tackle
Thomistic prudence in particular, the reliance of Aquinas on Aristotle in building his
moral framework provides for relevant material for the proposed study. Secondly, the
heuristic model of comparing Aristotelian virtue-based ethics to Proverbs provides a
valuable methodological insight for the current study of comparing Thomistic virtue
41
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of prudence with Proverbs. In simple terms, whereas Ansberry asks the question of
the degree to which Aristotle’s approach to ethics compares with the moral theology
of Proverbs, this thesis will be asking the question of the degree to which the
Thomistic virtue of prudence and the underlying moral framework compares with
that of Proverbs.
Given that, and returning to the starting point of this section, this comparative
relationship between the wisdom of Proverbs and the virtue of prudence, as indicated
above, hopes to provide a viable outworking (among many) on how Sacred Scripture
might nourish moral theology, but it also helps build a bridge between earlier
Thomistic thought that many have felt needed abandoning in the Post-Vatican II
environment and scripturally nourished moral thought that has been encouraged
since. There are a number of reasons why this has occurred at least in some circles.
Most notable among them has been suspicion of the centrality placed in the role of
natural law in Thomistic moral theology. More specifically, the particular
understandings of natural law that has tended to marginalise the virtues on the one
hand while exaggerating the notion of voluntarism and divine command theory (and
a subsequent overemphasis on precepts and moral laws) on the other has tended to
dominate such concerns. Further, there has been another level of suspicion of moral
deliberation in the Thomistic tradition particularly in a theological context, that being
that it leaves little room for particular Christian notions including, for example, the
role of grace and revelation. These concerns, as will be demonstrated, are unfounded
and are taken up presently. Doing so also opens up an overarching comparative
framework between the virtue of prudence and the teachings of Proverbs (interpreted
in the manner noted above).
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1.2 The Virtues in the Thomistic Tradition and a Comparative Look
at Biblical Wisdom
1.2.1 The Backdrop to Virtues: The Premise of Natural Law and
Providential Creation
The aim of this section is to be able to identify the broad framework in which the
virtue of prudence sits. To do so we need to trace, albeit briefly, the context, that
being the notion of natural law, within which the notion of virtues in the Thomistic
tradition sits. As will become apparent, this is not only useful for understanding
prudence in itself, but gives a comparative basis for the teaching of Proverbs; both its
cosmological and anthropological foundation on which right living and wisdom is
based.
As alluded to above, in the post-Vatican II era, there was a sense that Thomistic
moral thought, built primarily on a particular scholastic notion of natural law, needed
to be abandoned if one was to engage fully with the broader resource of Christian
revelation and speak intelligibly to our contemporary times. It is for this reason when
entering into a discussion on moral matters that includes natural law, particularly that
shaped by a Thomistic heritage, one needs to offer some clarification. Primarily this
is so because there has been a shifting understanding of natural law theory built on
the Thomistic tradition over time and, on this basis alone, one needs to explicate
what one means by natural law theory – what are the main tenets one is holding
when engaging with the notion. This ‘shifting understanding’ is chiefly so because
there has been a highly refined engagement with Aquinas’s notion of natural law
developed through the scholastic period and then the enlightenment period and, in
many circles, a subsequent rejection of such notions on many counts. This rejection,
as scholars such as Porter would suggest, is based on a limited utilisation and, at
times, a misreading of Aquinas’s concept of natural law such that, for many, it has
become a rather suspicious notion.49 Typical of these suspicions is the idea that there
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is a universal, ubiquitous and essentially unchanging notion of human nature from
which the conception of the moral good can be derived. This rigid notion of the
human person in the abstract sense with little or no reference to the dynamism of the
person in history and in culture is one that concerns many moral theorists,
theological and otherwise.50 Further, in a specifically Christian context, Porter also
highlights the issue that many have with this ‘traditional’ reading of natural law
theory that leaves little room for key Christian notions, this critique is found most
prominently in the post-reformation Protestant tradition which “tended to view the
doctrine of the natural law as an expression of human pride, an effort to establish
human righteousness apart from God’s law and God’s grace.”51
Porter refers to Karl Barth’s strong position on such but also to more recent thinkers
such as Stanley Hauerwas.52 The latter provides a particularly noteworthy perspective
on the ‘rejection’ of Thomistic natural law theory. As Boyd discusses, Hauerwas’
critique of natural law is not based on the theory in its entirety or on Aquinas’s
formation of it but, rather, on “its Enlightenment (post-Grotius) manifestations.”53
More specifically, Hauerwas’ critique is based primarily on two notions, firstly that
morality must be understood within the particularity of the communities in which
people live and the virtues they aspire to rather than precepts based on a universal
rationality typical of Enlightenment thinking. Secondly, that if natural law is truly
universal and a self-sufficient theory of morality, then it leaves no room for
particular notions of grace.54 The fear being that if we understand natural law to be
entirely discernible through the power of human reason then morality, so developed,
becomes an exercise bereft from any theological position properly speaking.
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Moreover, and for Barth this was particularly so, such a position is untenable as it is
hubris to suggest that our human capacity to reason is sufficient without revelation or
grace to recognise the truly good which only God knows. It is this approach that sees
moral philosophy as a self-contained human enterprise that is Barth’s (and thinkers
that follow him) primary concern.55
It is useful for this project to deal with the latter point here. Though some approaches
to natural law (and speculation on moral matters more broadly) based on Aquinas
have developed, by certain counts, as an exercise dominated by practical reasoning in
and of itself apart from any theological context,56 it is erroneous to suggest that it is,
firstly, necessarily the case and, secondly, the position held by Aquinas in his
construal of morality and natural law. It is true that Aquinas holds that the ‘law of
nature’ cannot be removed from the human person, and this is so because it is
intrinsic to the very created being of humanity itself.57 However, he still holds that
sin impacts the human person in the “particular action, in so far as reason is hindered
from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of
concupiscence or some other passion.” 58 Further, “because human nature is not
altogether corrupted by sin” the person can do some good, however “it cannot do all
the good natural to it.”59 As Aquinas goes on to say, “thus in the state of perfect
nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength.” 60 As
McInerny simply puts it, in Thomistic thought, “Grace builds on nature, but without
grace nature’s ability to attain its end is severely impaired.”61 A fuller discussion on
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the engagement between grace and nature will be had below,62 but suffice to say here
that moral theology within the Thomistic tradition certainly holds an elevated vision
of nature when compared to Barth, but not to the extent that the full expression of the
human good and moral speculation that aids it necessarily excludes God’s grace.63
Given that, rather than seeing human nature apart from any theological context and
deriving the notion of the moral from that philosophical standpoint on the one hand,
or reverting to an entirely theistic image of the good on the other (leading to a rigid
divine command theory for example), it is more useful to hold a correlative image of
how theology relates to the understanding of nature that underpins Thomistic natural
law. As Porter argues, it is this which characterised the scholastic approach to moral
enquiry, an approach that was able to understand the possible overlap of Christian
and secular morality without collapsing one into the other and, moreover, still remain
fundamentally theological. As she notes, the idea that a sound theological account of
morality will necessarily be a distinctively or uniquely Christian form of morality:
Has often been confused as if distinctiveness and theological soundness
come to one and the same thing. They do not. It is true that the scholastic
concept of the natural law implies continuities and areas of overlap
between Christian morality and different forms of secular morality. Yet it
does so precisely on theological grounds, including a commitment to the
doctrine of creation and correlatively an insistence on the essential unity
of revelation in the two Testaments. It is difficult to see how someone
could argue for the uniqueness of Christian ethics without falling into
corresponding theological errors: that is, failing to take the doctrine of
the creation with full seriousness and truncating the scriptural witness to
God as the one who creates and sustains the natural world.64
Similarly, Leo Elders when discussing the link between philosophical enquiry and
theology notes that in Thomistic thought, “faith is non-evident knowledge which
uses concepts of the natural order to signify supernatural realities. This is possible,
for there is an analogy between both orders, because God is the author of both.”65
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This analogous relationship between the natural order allows us to speak intelligibly
about and from within our nature while also holding a thoroughly theological notion
of the human moral good.
With that in mind, a certain framework of understanding nature (of human and
creation as a whole) and its relationship to right reason becomes apparent. One is
able to come to some sense of the moral right in keeping with human nature through
reflection on created realities and with the power of reason. However, this is only
possible if one is able to hold the telos of the human with God on the one hand and
also recognise that the goodness which serves that end is discernible in the created
world precisely because the notion of divine wisdom runs through it.
1.2.2 Morality in the Thomistic Tradition: The Place of the Virtues and
Prudence
Touching on the notion of natural law sets the scene in a broad sense, but there is
another common understanding of Thomistic thought that is worth examination to
help understand the moral framework in which this thesis is working. As stated
above, from the Renaissance until the middle of the 20th century, moral legalism
predominated in both reformed and Roman Catholic moral theology. Catholic moral
thought in particular employed a notion of natural law of sorts, but did so in such a
manner that tended to sideline the place of the virtues in the fuller sense that modern
scholarship has revisited (not to suggest that the virtues were sidelined all together,
many Catholic scholars and particularly some religious orders maintained an ongoing
and vibrant focus on the virtues).66 Reference has already been made to the concerns
of the likes of Barth who see natural law as essentially marginalising theological
matters. However, there is another movement related to Thomistic thought, that
being voluntarism, that is worth reflecting on particularly as it forms a contrast to the
virtue-based morality which concerns this thesis.
The virtue-based morality that this thesis considers sits on the retrieval of an
alternative convention to simple obedience to precepts in the categorical sense which
became highly influential, in part at least, due to the significant contribution of the
voluntarists during the late scholastic period. Among them is Francisco Suarez
66
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whose work in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries came to influence the later
course of moral theology significantly.67 Though Suarez did place an emphasis on
the place of God in relation to the created order and acknowledges the place of the
virtues in a certain sense, he did so in a manner that shifted the emphasis particularly
to the role of the will as opposed to intellect within the conception of the moral good
of rational creatures.
To briefly expound this notion, I will follow the work of Thomas Hibbs who unpacks
Aquinas’s teaching by comparing it to moral thinkers who followed, in particular
Francisco Suarez and, to a lesser degree, Immanuel Kant. 68 In doing so, what is
illuminated is a moderated concept of moral obligation than that expressed by
Aquinas. As Hibbs states, “Throughout his writings, Thomas subordinates the
questions of duty to the questions of ends perfective of and naturally pursued by
human beings.”69 Hibbs proposes that this is discomforting to Suarez who suggests
that theory of moral obligation is necessary to conceiving the morally sound life,
something essentially not present in Aquinas’s work.
Suarez in a voluntarist mode (based on De Legibus, II, VI) suggests that one can
have knowledge of a precept that is natural and good, but its obligation to obey can
only derive in God’s will apart from any natural conception. As such Suarez makes a
distinction between the knowledge of the good and the source of obligation,
suggesting that judgement of reason regarding the good does not impose obligation.70
Hibbs suggests that Suarez has Aquinas’s view in mind, for “Aquinas held that this
judgment [of reason, imperium rationis] was a sufficient basis for the imposition of
an obligation. Suarez thinks it insufficient.”71 It is insufficient for Suarez because
commending an action, which the intellect can grasp in the natural, is not the same as
commanding to action. Moreover, Hibbs states that:
Suarez couples his analysis of command with the supposition that an
obligation has some sort of efficacious force attached to it. In contrast to
67
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Thomas, who conceives of action primarily in terms of the final cause,
Suarez construes human action in terms of efficient causality.72
To illustrate the point, we can suggest that the command theory of Suarez and, by
certain extension, the deontological Kantian categorical imperative that would
develop later, works in compelling the person by pushing them towards a good,
while Aquinas, who holds no distinction between the obligatory and the good, sees
the teleological image of the good as the final cause which pulls the agent towards
right action. One is drawn to good (and thus to right action) by an internal disposition
towards the good and for the perfective of the agent. This approach to morality is
important to hold as Proverbs similarly does not seem to rest on command to action
on God’s behalf, but a recognition of the good (both in a theological and natural
sense, a notion that will be analysed later in this project) which the agent is called to
respond to.
Returning to Aquinas, he posits such a position based on a key feature of his
conception of natural law which sets the metaphysical and anthropological
foundation for his position. Aquinas famously remarked that the “natural law is a
participation of the eternal law.”73 As Hibbs notes, this notion is itself Augustinian in
origin74 where he argues that “the eternal law is the rational pattern in the divine
mind of all created things.”75 Further, the eternal law, according to Aquinas, is the
locus of divine providence:
Granted that divine providence rules the world, … it follows that divine
reason governs the entire community of the universe. The pattern itself of
the governance of things, which exists in the divine mind as in the source
of the universe, has the nature of law.76
This providential law is described as “the pattern of divine wisdom, as moving all
things to their appropriate ends, has the nature of law.”77 However, as Hibbs states,
divine causality does not erase or supplant secondary causality. Rather,
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God moves creatures by creating them and by endowing them with
inclinations to ends congruent with their nature: “All things participate
somewhat in the natural law, insofar as from its impression they receive
inclinations to appropriate acts or ends.”78
As such, in the Thomistic framework, natural law is not construed in a propositional
or deontological sense; rather, it is defined in terms of natures and inclinations. These
inclinations provide at least some trustworthiness in determining the good because,
fundamentally, creation itself and persons as rational creatures have been created by
God (the Good) with the good as its proper end.79
However, as Porter’s reflection on the same passage from the Summa Theologiae (III, 91.2) illustrates, natural inclinations in themselves are not enough, the notion
simply lays the ground work, as it were, of a fuller understanding of how and why
the human person can live the moral life in the broadest sense. As Porter states:
As this passage indicates, the claim that the natural law represents the
distinctively human mode of participation in the eternal law implies that
it is also an expression of the principles of action, or the natural
inclinations, proper to the human person. However, these must be
pursued in a properly human fashion: that is, in accordance with reason
or virtue.80
In Porter’s later work, Nature and Reason, she notes that human persons as rational
creatures have a particular expression of natural inclination that is mirrored in the
providential nature of God himself,81 i.e. it is not determinate as it is for non-rational
creatures. As Porter states, inclinations of the human person:
Can be expressed in ways that undermine the agent’s attainment of her
good, as well as in ways that promote it. If the inclinations are to function
in such a way as to promote the agent’s true good, they must be directed
by appropriate dispositions toward action – and that is precisely what the
virtues are.82
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Importantly for our purposes it is prudence that has a particular place in respect to
this. As Keenan states it, “prudence functions to perfect a person’s natural
inclinations through integrating them into a coordinated way of acting and living in a
right manner.”83
How this is achieved within the particular virtue of prudence will be unpacked
below. However, what is important to note here is that the virtues, and the virtue of
prudence in particular, provide a bridging of a cosmological concept of order that
underpins Thomistic morality, captured in the notion of natural law as discussed to
this point, with the anthropological context of moral reasoning as persons experience
it. Prudence relates to the whole life of a person and, exercised well, recognises the
true nature of creation and the ends which humans are naturally inclined. As Aquinas
states, “prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man’s entire life, and
the end of human life.”84 Prudence recognises the end that is the moral good to be
achieved, but, more importantly, brings that end to realization through virtuous
activity within the lived reality of the moral agent. In this sense prudence as a virtue,
simply put, is the virtue by which the other virtues can be acquired and exercised as
virtues. It is in this vein that prudence is often placed as the first of the four
classically defined cardinal virtues. As Pieper in his eminent work on virtues notes,
the primary place of prudence among the virtues is no accident as “prudence is the
cause of the other virtues’ being virtues at all. For example, there may be a kind of
instinctive governance of instinctual cravings; but only prudence transforms this
instinctive governance into the “virtue” of temperance.”85
As such, when discussing the virtue of prudence in the Thomistic tradition at least, in
the background sits a conception of the created order within which the virtues
necessarily operate.86 Indeed, the heart of the virtue of prudence and its chief feature
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lies in recognising the truth of things such that one can recognise how the virtuous
life might rightly operate. Pieper notes:
The intrinsic goodness of man – and that is the same as saying his true
humanness – consists in this, that “reason perfected in the cognition of
truth” shall inwardly shape and imprint his volition and action. In this
fundamental principle of Thomas Aquinas is summed up the whole
doctrine of prudence.87
More importantly, as Pieper goes on to state, this notion of ‘reason’ being perfected
in the cognition of truth is all encompassing, not simply an intellectual apprehension
in its most simplest form (though it would include that). Rather, “‘Reason’ means to
[Aquinas] nothing other than ‘regard for the openness to reality,’ and ‘acceptance of
reality.’ And ‘truth’ is to him nothing other than the unveiling and revelation of
reality, of both natural and supernatural reality.”88
As can be seen then, though we might begin building an understanding of Thomistic
morality with a broad understanding of natural law, its outworking need not be in the
form akin to

Kantian moral law simply speaking nor limited to voluntarist

precept/command theory that can and has been its outworking. The place of virtues
and prudence in particular becomes apparent and vital in engaging a fuller vision of
realising the good in this sense. In this vein the image of natural law need not
necessarily be bound to precept and command alone but, also, the context within
which the formation of character is found. As noted above, character-based morality
is based on the formation of the person as a whole. Drawing from the above
discussion, and understanding moral formation in a Thomistic sense, such formation
becomes one where character is formed in the acquiring of prudence which itself
rests on experiencing and engaging with created reality in its fullest form.
Holding this approach provides an entryway in how wisdom in Proverbs and the
Thomistic virtue of prudence can find correlative discourse on a fundamental level.
As will be discussed in the following section, this understanding of providential
creation that underpins a notion of natural law can also be found, in a certain sense at
least, in the wisdom literature including Proverbs. Also found therein is a
virtue, so the principles of natural law are the ends of our natural inclinations.” Keenan, "The Virtue
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commitment to the formation of the virtuous character in concert with this sense of
providence and created order. William Brown makes the point in the introductory
sections of his examination of the wisdom literature:
The role of perception in the definition of character cannot be
overemphasized, for the subject matter of character is in essence the self
in relation, in relation to the perceived world, including God, and to the
history and pattern of one’s choices. The particular orientation espoused
by the ancient sages involved nothing less than perceiving the world from
the perspective of all things subject to and ordered by God’s will, be it
discernible or inscrutable. … It is in appropriating and embodying truth
rather than simply apprehending it, that creation functioned for the
ancient sages. Specific creation texts of wisdom literature (e.g. Prov
8:22-31; Eccl 1:2-11; Job 38-41) are constructed in such a way so as to
(re)construct the reader’s perception of the world and God in accord with
certain values, perspectives, and principles, the stuff of ethical
character.89
This correlation will be more fully fleshed out in the following. However, at this
stage what can be held is that natural law, as a conceptual expression of God’s
creation and providence, provides a framework in which the formation of the human
person towards the good can be couched and, importantly, it is something achievable
within the experience of being human. 90 This is important because, as will be
discussed below, the experience of being human and our relationship to creation is
the dimension in which the book of Proverbs sits. As such, moral compulsion in
Proverbs (and the rest of the wisdom literature) is not necessarily found in ‘divine
command’ typical of much of the rest of the Old Testament. Often moral authority in
the Hebrew Scriptures is found in special revelation in a Yahwistic sense and is
typically precept-based or at least interpreted that way. Certainly, if we are to lean on
a mode of understanding natural law that is voluntarist and deontological in nature,
then Scripture is limited to supplying the details of ‘the commands’ of moral
obligation. In contrast, the wisdom literature tends to have very little reference to
moral obligation being found in that sense. It is with this in mind that we turn to
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Proverbs and the wisdom literature tradition and examine a correlative understanding
of how notions as discussed above might be found.

1.2.3 Theological Backdrop to Biblical Wisdom and its Relationship to
Creation
This understanding of natural law built on the natural order of creation that is
theologically informed has important correlative significance in our examination of
the biblical wisdom and the book of Proverbs in particular. This will be unpacked
more as this work unfolds, but is useful to touch on it here to help set the scene of
what is to come. Just as moral thinkers using certain aspects of Thomistic teachings
of virtues and natural law have led to an overemphasis of the capacity of the human
person to use reason to navigate the good apart from any theological concern (such
as grace and creation mentioned above), the interpretation of the wisdom literature
(including Proverbs) in modern scholarship has borne out a similar, though not
identical, dichotomy.
In short, there has been a reading of wisdom literature that sees it as inherently
secular rather than revelatory and thus something of an invalid expression of
Yahwistic faith that is proper to the Old Testament overall. Such an understanding is
premised on a number of grounds, but significant among them is the understanding
that the concerns of much of Proverbs and wisdom literature is in the day-to-day
matters of the human person and, further, that the wisdom drawn therein can be
detached from the rest of the Old Testament corpus and still remain intact, as it were,
as a form of teaching. Moreover, within Proverbs there is very little reference to the
revealed God found in the history of the people of Israel and the prophetic texts
which attest to them. This has led to some considering the wisdom literature as a less
than valid expression of Old Testament faith. Roland Murphy is one of many who
have discussed this issue. As an example he refers to Horst Preuss as a “vigorous
exponent of the theological illegitimacy of the Old Testament wisdom.” 91 Preuss’
view is built on the understanding that the older parts of the wisdom literature in
particular (e.g. Prov 10-29) are essentially a foreign import with their focus being on
91
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the successful human life in itself apart from theistic concerns featured in the rest of
the Scriptures. Preuss acknowledges that there is a divine image of sorts in the
foreign influence within Proverbs, but it is not in keeping with the revealed Lord
found in the rest of the Old Testament. As Murphy describes it, “Preuss considers
the religion in Prov 10ff. a form of “Polyyahwism,” a contaminated faith in a God
different from the Lord that is revealed in the rest of the Old Testament.”92
There is no doubting the foreign influence in the development of Proverbs and
biblical wisdom literature overall. However, the conclusion typified by Preuss and
others, that biblical wisdom literature is “strongly secular in flavour” and is only
“loosely connected with religious faith”93 is only based on an interpretive approach
which assumes that the only legitimate religious faith expressed in the Scripture (and
the Old Testament in particular) is one that is revelatory in the Yahwist mode with
the historical, prophetic and cultic narratives that go along with it. More recent
responses to such issues in biblical theology has been to recognise a theological
integrity of wisdom literature in its own right even if it does not hold to the
revelatory mode in the same way as the rest of the Hebrew tradition. As such, there
has been a revisiting of understanding wisdom as a theology within biblical
scholarship in recent times.94
Firstly, there is a recognition that it is only modern scholarly readings of wisdom
literature that tend to see it as a distinct aspect of the Israelite experience from that
found in the Old Testament overall. As Dell notes in regard to how Proverbs is
perceived in particular:
The function of the Proverbs is largely seen as education and moral
formation; and wisdom is seen as an area clearly distinct from other
concerns of Israelite life such as law, worship, prophecy and story-telling
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… while this separation provides a helpful way of categorizing material,
one wonders how far it was reality in the people’s lives.95
Further, there has been a heightened focus on the more central place of creation
theology “whereby historical and ahistorical elements of Israelite faith are being
recognized,”96 the upshot being that wisdom found and experienced in created reality
is neither an inherently secular notion nor an appendix to other more ‘legitimate’
faith expressions. As Murphy suggests, the wisdom experience is a faith experience
in its own right, “the shaping of Israel’s views of the world, and of the activity of
God behind and in it, was done in an ambience of faith, and was characterized by
trust and reliance on God.”97 So it may well be the case that the teachings of wisdom
are steeped in the experience of humanity in creation and are also found in the
experience of those outside of the tradition inherited by Christians and Jews.
However, there is a recognition that such teachings are not an adjunct to revelation
but, rather, that they represent a form of revelation in itself – and as with all forms of
revelation, they rightly call a response from the human person, a calling back to right
relationship as it were, to the Revealed. Murphy goes on to state:
Wisdom literature provides a biblical model for understanding divine
revelation apart from the historical mode (salvation history) in which it is
usually cast. We have portrayed the dialogue with divinity that takes
placed essentially via human experience and creation. It is also clear that
the issues of life and salvation emerge in this dialogue, and especially in
the invitation of personified Wisdom (Prov 8:35). On this level the
Israelite encountered the Lord in a vital faith relationship that is as valid
as the liturgical experience in the Temple, or the Exodus event itself.98
The question can be asked then, in the context of wisdom writing, in what vein does
one respond to God revealed in created reality? What mode does it take particularly
as it relates to moral theology? The most common approach one can make here is to
95
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recognise the place of order within creation that underpins much of the wisdom
literature but is particularly expressed in Proverbs. As with the notion of wisdom and
theology discussed to this point, the place of order in relation to wisdom writings has
not been a settled matter in scholarly circles. However, the general principle is built
on a recognition that the wisdom enterprise, both in the Hebrew tradition and the
non-biblical traditions that most likely influenced it, 99 seemed to be steeped in
finding an ordering within creation (as laid out by God when a monotheistic mode is
focused on) that, when properly recognised, provided the conduit onto which right
(wise) living could be based.
Many scholars have explored such understandings and some, such as the often cited
Koch for example, interpret Proverbs in a very tight deed/consequence mode where
God

has

established

creation

in

such

a

way

that

retribution

for

wickedness/foolishness is mechanically accounted for without any further
engagement on God’s behalf.100 However, most contemporary scholars point out that
such a mechanistic reading of Proverbs is neither accurate nor in keeping with the
wider biblical tradition. 101 As Dell states it, “The concept of order is a close
companion to that of creation and can be held together with that doctrine as long as
the concept does not become too deterministic.”102 In any case, the concept of order
as an outworking of creation and the ability for human beings to recognise such order
and act in keeping with it presents a fundamental plank in understanding the moral
framework of wisdom and Proverbial wisdom in particular. More the point for our
purposes, it is not hard to see, then, how such an understanding becomes close to the
99
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concept of natural law as discussed above. Indeed, certain scholars have gone as far
as to recognise this within the wisdom writings and beyond.
In a sense, this is nothing new. Though not always acknowledged, a close look at the
natural law tradition does reveal that such thinking has long been informed by
Scripture. Most notably, places such as Romans 1-2103 as well Genesis 1 have been
used to affirm natural law from the Patristic through to its more formal development
in the Scholastic periods and beyond.104 As Boyd in his discussion on the subject
notes:
For Christians, the Genesis narrative of creation provides an account of
the goodness of creation, the importance of human beings in the cosmos,
and most importantly the idea that the entire created order is the
contingent creation of a loving and wise God. The creation narrative also
demonstrates that God has established an order to the creation. While
Genesis affirms the goodness and orderliness of creation, we find in the
Epistle to the Romans not only a reiteration of the Genesis account of
created natures, but also an epistemological affirmation concerning the
universal accessibility of the natural law.105
In our contemporary setting, Barr is one in particular who, in a very polemical style,
makes the point that contrary to Barthian approach (as mentioned in the previous
section), Scripture itself attests to a natural theology.106 Barr draws on Scripture as a
whole in building his argument, however he does make a point on wisdom literature
in particular that is worth noting. He states, for example, that:
With the Wisdom literature we widen our scope, for we are no longer
discussing the individual classic passages, long used as evidences for
natural theology, but are turning to large bands of literature, and few will
question that, within the Old Testament, the Wisdom literature is the area
with the largest similarity to the procedures of natural theology.107
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Of course, interpretations that expose a natural theology are not the same as natural
law as understood in the Thomistic tradition, but they are closely related. 108 Barr
himself notes that “natural law is in some respects the gateway to into natural
theology.” 109 However, there have been others who have been more willing to
identify ethics based on natural law in the Scriptures and name them as such. John
Barton is one in particular who, on a number of fronts, suggest that:
Though obedience to God’s expressed will is no doubt present, it is not
an exclusive view. Natural law, both in the weaker sense of moral
principles supposed to be common to all men, and in the stronger sense
of principles built into the structure of things, is also present.110
More recently Levering is another who, drawing on Barton among others, holds that
natural theology is a viable concept within biblical theology broadly speaking.
However, he critiques Barton on one particular ground; that being the over emphasis
on the anthropocentric outworking of natural law morality that Barton seems to hold.
Levering is wary of reducing biblically informed natural law to an approach in which
human-reasoned ethical deliberation is seen in opposition to revealed positive law.111
In so doing, Levering’s critique helps to highlight the thesis being explored in this
project. He identifies that achieving an authentically Christian understanding of
natural law can be informed by scripture by holding in firm view the teleological
notion found in wisdom literature – one that is built on an image of the Creator’s
relationship to divine wisdom. Levering relies primarily on the Wisdom of Solomon
to illustrate the point, and in referring to Wisdom 7:22-8:1 he notes:
Personified wisdom thus fashions all things and ‘can do all things’
because she is ‘a reflection of eternal light, a spotless mirror of the
working of God, and an image of his goodness’. Thanks to her, the
created world that she ‘orders …well’ possesses an intelligible order
toward its proper flourishing. … As Wisdom of Solomon states, God and
God's personified wisdom make rationally accessible to human beings
‘the structure of the world and the activity of the elements; the beginning
and end and middle of times, the alternations of the solstices and the
changes of the seasons, the cycles of the year and the constellations of
108
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the stars, the natures of animals and the tempers of wild beasts’ (Wisd.
7:17–20). Human beings thus discern an intelligible ordering of each
thing toward its proper flourishing.112
Such reflections also apply to similar imagery found in Proverbs, particularly Prov 8.
It points to the notion that there is an anthropological dimension to be had in the
understanding of natural law, but it is one conceived in participating in created order
by sharing in God’s wisdom, which itself is discernible because wisdom bears
witness to the very creation we are in (Prov 8:27-31).113 This is also evidenced in
Aquinas’s own writing where he cites Prov 8:23 as pointing to the existence of the
‘eternal law’ 114 before unpacking the notion of natural law which, as discussed
previously, is a participation in the eternal law.
As will become apparent in the discussion that follows, the wisdom that persons are
called to share in is prudential in nature. However, the point that is important to hold
here is that there is a fundamental framework of the virtues as understood in the
Thomistic tradition that is also apparent within the wisdom literature including
within Proverbs. It is a correlation that rests on a view of created order which both
points to the teleological good (that is the Creator God) and, in certain ways at least,
is also able to reveal the means to that good as humans experience that same
creation.
A point should be made here on terminology and certain boundaries of understanding
pertaining to natural law and the related notions of natural theology. Though authors
such as Barton and Levering suggest that natural law is expressed throughout the
Bible, it is unwise to categorise natural law as witnessed in the biblical literature as
identical to that used by Aquinas and the moral tradition since. Rodd in his
examination of Barton’s understanding of natural law poses the question, “is it
rightly termed ‘natural law’, a concept with a distinguished pedigree in moral
philosophy, drawing its inspiration form the work of Augustine and Aquinas, and
reaching back into classical philosophy?”115 Rodd’s own response is that a classical
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understanding of natural law, in particular its philosophical approach would be “far
removed from anything which can be found in the Old Testament. The wisdom
writers were not philosophers in the Greek and modern sense,”116 and though certain
interpretations of the bible, particularly of the wisdom literature, can reveal elements
akin to natural law, to describe it as such is “not fully in accord with the normal
philosophical understanding of the term.”117 In this vein, the caution Rodd offers is
warranted. Clearly the biblical authors and the Hebraic tradition in which it sits do
not engage an exact understanding of natural law as classically defined. However, as
already discussed above and noted by many scholars in the field, there is a
correlation of a kind and understanding this allows one to find greater avenue in
which the wisdom writings (and Proverbs in particular for our purposes) is able to
inform a moral understanding in our contemporary context.
Murphy offers a similar reluctance in suggesting that the wisdom literature is
underpinned by a natural theology as put forward by the aforementioned Barr.118
Murphy’s reluctance rests on a definition which would stress the distinction between
supernatural and natural such that they are seen in opposition as it can (and has) been
classically defined.119 Murphy suggests that a better definition to hold is one built on
the theology of Karl Rahner which sees all of created order as a supernatural order
within which any concept of the natural would be subsumed. As Murphy states:
The explicit history of salvation found in the Bible is, for Rahner, a
special “official” history of revelation. There is no reason why so-called
“natural theology,” which is only theoretically distinct from theology as
it is usually understood, does not also have its roots in revelation. What is
described as “natural” theology in the Bible is the product of supernatural
revelation that calls for a faith response. It may also be something that
could be known and apprehended by human reason, but that is irrelevant
when we exist in a supernatural order.120
Once again, this reflection has merit and is noted here as a caution. As already
discussed above, the principle of natural order/theology/law that underpins Proverbs
116

Rodd, Glimpses of a Strange Land, 63.
Rodd, Glimpses of a Strange Land, 64.
118
Murphy, 2002, 224-225, 276-277
119
Murphy describes this succinctly in 2002, 276
120
Murphy, The Tree of Life, 276-277. Contra to Murphy, it can be argued that such a position as held
by Murphy is only necessary if one feels that the natural is unnecessarily downplayed in relation to the
theological (graced) reality of all existence. As will be discussed below (section 2.2.4 and 4.2), such a
downplaying need not be necessary when examining Proverbs or the virtue of prudence informed by
Thomistic thought. Cf. Porter, Nature as Reason, 383-398.
117

36

and the rest of the wisdom literature is necessarily theological and, in some form at
least, supernatural. As such, it is stretching the concept of natural theology too far to
suggest the underpinning of order to which one is called in the wisdom tradition can
be conceived fully and faithfully apart from the Creator and, thus, be conceived as an
entirely natural (i.e. human) concept. In any case, technicalities of definitions aside,
the concept of an underpinning created order being party to moral concepts that can
be gleaned from the wisdom literature is nevertheless valid and Murphy, on this
level, agrees.121 Moreover, Murphy reminds us that the teachings of the sages are
built on the experience of engaging in the world and not simply on pondering the
origins of existence in some abstract sense. As he points out, “the world is the
showcase for divine activity … It is not a cosmos that works mechanically, but a
happening that occurs over and over for all its inhabitants (Ps 104). Hence the human
experience of the world is so important.”122
Drawing from our starting point of this section, and to summarise, though both the
sources and teaching of wisdom literature do point to a mode of understanding that is
found outside of the revealed faith of Israel, this does not preclude a theological
dimension that then calls a particular response. As with Thomistic notions on natural
law broadly speaking, there is an understanding prevalent in the wisdom writings,
particularly in certain parts of Proverbs, that the power of reason allows one to find
the good apart from theological frameworks explicitly stated, but that does not
preclude a theological dimension proper to it. In Thomistic language we might say
that the good found by human reason is only good in the first place because it is
proper to our nature as God created it. In the language of biblical wisdom, the good
that is found in the sage exploration of wisdom is only the good/wise in the first
place because it is proper to God’s creative order. Of course such an expression is
only illustrative rather than technical and the two frameworks cannot be entirely
interchanged (except perhaps on a meta-ethical level) but the principle is still
apparent; that the experience of being human in creation is potentially morally
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trustworthy because one is able to find, within the experience itself, the goodness of
God.
Thus the correlation between virtues in the Thomistic tradition and the moral vision
of wisdom in Proverbs becomes more apparent. As just stated, the experience of
being human in creation is potentially morally trustworthy, but, according to
Proverbs, to realise that potential one needs to acquire wisdom. In a similar vein, the
inclination, apparent in Thomistic anthropological dimension of nature realises its
potential in the virtues in general which are governed by the virtue of prudence in
particular. 123 What can be held here is, though we might talk of created order or
natural law setting the framework of moral deliberation in the wisdom writings or
Thomistic traditions respectively, ultimately the concern in both contexts is most
fully realised in the anthropological dimension of the formation of person in light of
and in relation to that order.
It is this sense that is the concern of Proverbs; it is not interested in understanding the
world for its own sake but, rather, it is to understand the place of the human person
within and in relation to creation and it is this notion that sets the moral framework
of Proverbs.124 The aforementioned William Brown is one who takes this point and
engages with it by utilising a character-based ethical language. Brown sees Proverbs
and the other wisdom writings being interested in the formation of character in
conformity with a fuller worldview. As he states:
The particular orientation espoused by the ancient sages involved nothing
less than perceiving the world from the perspective of all things subject
to and ordered by God’s will, be it discernible or inscrutable. … It is
within the purposeful context of living, in appropriating and embodying
truth rather than simply apprehending it, that creation functioned for the
ancient sages. Specific creation texts of wisdom literature (e.g. Prov.
8:33-31, Eccl. 1:2-11; Job 38-41) are contextualized in such a way as to
(re)construct the reader’s perception of the world and God in accord with
certain values, perspectives, and principles, the stuff of ethical character.
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Simply put, to alter one’s perception of God and the word is to shape and
reshape character, the goal of sapiential rhetoric.125
There are two points that are worth highlighting in Brown’s quote and provides an
apt way to conclude this section. Firstly, he points to the understanding, as already
stated, that the wisdom of Proverbs is necessarily prudential. It is so because
prudence is concerned with forming the agent in such a way that they are able to
perceive existence accurately. This then allows one to employ the other virtues
appropriately to the reality of one’s situation as they experience the world. Seeing the
world rightly, which includes what Aquinas calls ‘sound judgment’,126 is the heart of
the virtue of prudence. As will be discussed below, and particularly in section 3.1, it
is in developing this capacity where Proverbs perhaps has the most to teach us in the
virtue ethics tradition. Secondly, prudence needs to be understood fundamentally as
resting in the formation of character. Brown uses the terms “appropriating and
embodying truth rather than simply apprehending it,” and this captures the
understanding of both the virtues in the Thomistic tradition and the teachings of
Proverbs well, for they are both concerned with a ‘knowing’ that is not simply
cognitive in the simplest sense. ‘Smartness’, though undoubtedly valuable, does not
lead to the full life, to the eudemonic fulfilment of the moral agent. To draw on
language used above, the virtuous life is essentially tied to the formation of character
and it is out of a formed character that one moves from an inclination to the good to
the actuality of the good.
In this vein, what follows is a close look at Proverbs in particular and the nature of
prudential wisdom found therein as it pertains to formation of character. The moral
life in both the Thomistic tradition and in Proverbs does not rest primarily on
particular laws as legal codes as an expression of natural law or created order
(though they don’t deny them either), but on the formation of the person in
harmonious prudential engagement with this order.
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2. The Nature of Prudential Wisdom in Proverbs
The above sets a ‘meta-ethical’ framework of how both Thomistic thought and the
wisdom of Proverbs can interact in a shared discussion on prudential wisdom. In this
section the focus shifts to Proverbs in particular before moving more overtly back to
Thomistic thought in sections 3 and 4 that follow. Though an examination of
Proverbs using methodology typical of modern biblical scholarship will be had, the
starting point will be to look at key terms that help identify both significant
principles of wisdom as it pertains to the virtue of prudence as well as unpacking an
understanding of the virtue itself.

2.1 Words for Wisdom
The understanding of prudence as part of a family of intellectual virtues in the
Thomistic tradition is one couched in relatively precise technical language, which
itself sits in a precise understanding of the human person. In contrast, the teachings
of Proverbs (and the Hebrew Scriptures in general) are not written in the same
systematic style found in Aquinas or Aristotle and its word usage, particularly with
key terms such as ‘wisdom’, is loaded in its expressions and uses. Further, as will be
discussed below, the composition of Proverbs is such that many sources spanning a
number of times and places have left their mark, further colouring certain
understandings that might be gleaned. As such, the following examination of the
words for wisdom is an important focus.
Here we wish to engage with what Whybray termed the “slippery word” of wisdom
as found in the Hebrew Scriptures and in Proverbs in particular.127 The ‘slipperiness’
of the usage of wisdom in Proverbs is based on two points which in part will be dealt
with here. Firstly, there is no single Hebrew word that encapsulates its every use.
Certainly the most common Hebrew term is ḥokmāh,128 but other terms are used and
examining their lexical meaning helps illuminate the fuller understanding of wisdom
that Proverbs edifies. Secondly, as is common with many Hebrew concepts, there is
rarely an English word that can be used to exactly translate a Hebrew equivalent. As
such, more than one meaning may be construed with any particular term. With this in
127
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mind, I will follow the framework of Fox’s study and touch on a number of key
terms for wisdom.129 However, unlike Fox I will not examine every term where the
concept of wisdom might be implied. Rather, for the sake of space, included here are
only those terms most pertinent to the present study which attempts to elucidate the
notion of prudence as found in Proverbs.
2.1.1 Ḥokmāh/Ḥăkam
Derived from the verb root ḥākām, it is the word translated most commonly to the
adjective or noun ‘wise’ and, as the verb, to be wise. The meaning of ḥākām, as used
throughout the Hebrew Scriptures, can be broadly placed into two categories. The
first is the more general sense referring to a person possessing certain ability, often a
cognitive one, though not exclusively. In this sense it is often translated to the term
‘skill’ (e.g. Ez 27:8). In that sense it is ethically neutral. As Frydrych notes, “It
denotes a proficiency, which can be put to both good and bad use, although the
former is more common.”130 The second use is better understood in the adjectival
sense to describe the ‘wise one’. In its plural form (ḥăkāmîm) it is associated with the
professional position of royal advisors in Israelite and foreign courts (e.g. Jer
18:18).131 Such uses do tend to have more moral weight implied. For example, it
includes an ability to understand the implications of situations and interpret signs and
texts – what could be termed “perceptiveness”, “astuteness” and “reasoning ability”
(eg. Jer 9:11-12, Ecc 8:1),132 or good judgment in practical and interpersonal matters;
i.e. “good sense” or “prudence”. As Fox notes, these may not necessarily entail moral
virtue, but they do overlap into the concept of wisdom as “knowledge of right living
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– ‘right’ in both the ethical and pragmatic senses.”133 This understanding finds even
more purchase when examined in the particular context of Proverbs.
Some occurrences of ḥokmāh do refer to ‘skill’ but closer examination of its actual
use in Proverbs renders it significantly tighter to its moral sense. Most occurrences of
the word in this technical sense are in a context of describing what ḥākām does, i.e.,
the thrust of the book is to define what it means to be wise. The adjective then does
not designate a person with just any skill, but someone who lives according to the
principles expressed in Proverbs, and has an understanding of the consequences of
human actions that agree with its perspective (e.g. Prov 10:14; 13:20; 14:3,16; 15:3132). Further, even though ḥokmāh is associated with knowledge (e.g. Prov 10:14), it
is not so much about intellectual knowledge or abilities but, rather, it is a
commitment to a way of life, one which is often depicted by the metaphor of walking
along a path (eg. Prov 4:10-19; 15:10; 23:19). This metaphor captures an important
characteristic of Proverbial wisdom; for being wise is not merely a present static
state, but it is a continual dynamic process.134 Fox’s study on the use of the word in
Proverbs states it as such, “Ḥokmah is not inert knowledge. You could memorize the
book of Proverbs and not have ḥokmah. Ḥokmah always implies ability to carry out
what one knows. But it is never an innate talent devoid of knowledge.” 135 More
specifically still:
Proverbs consistently applies the word ḥokmah to wisdom as manifest in
the skill and knowledge of right living in the enriched sense. This is
because the sages are making strong claims for the powers of human
expertise. Wisdom of this sort may be manifest in numerous aspects of
behaviour … But these distinctions are matters of emphasis, and usually,
ḥokmah refers to these qualities all together.136
This brief analysis shows that there are a number of features of ḥokmāh that are
prevalent to this study. Firstly, it implies a way of life rather than an articulated set of
instructions or a particular skill set (though it might include those). One is wise
(ḥokmāh) in character rather than in arbitrary or even practical knowledge. Related to
this, one does not drift in and out of ‘being wise’ in this sense. Rather, if one is truly
ḥākām (a wise one), then it is formed through and out of a fuller sense of the self, i.e.
133

Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 33.
Frydrych, Living Under the Sun, 26-27.
135
Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 33.
136
Fox, Proverbs 1-9. My emphasis
134

42

their character. Secondly, there is an essential link to wisdom and living life well in a
moral sense. Taking the use of ḥokmāh in Prov 4:10–19 as an example, we see here a
coupling of the term ḥokmāh with yōšer (righteousness) and how ḥokmāh will thus
serve the ongoing moral life of listener (if heeded, of course). Thirdly, the one who is
of wise character is able to hold many aspects of the term in a balance. One is not
simply wise in particular matters, e.g. in interpersonal matters (Prov 11:30), or
cleverly aware of their situation (Prov 14:8), or in theological/ethical matters (Prov
9:10) but, rather, ḥokmāh refers to these and other qualities as a whole, and the
ability to hold and apply them in right measure. As Fox states in discussing the term,
“Proverbs teaches that there is a global intellectual power – wisdom – that can be
called upon in all endeavours that is inherently righteous and almost always
effective.”137
As can be seen then, ḥokmāh includes a sense of what we understand as prudence
held in the Thomistic tradition. It refers to a wisdom that is not purely speculative
(knowledge for its own sake) but about actively living the moral life. Further, it is
found in the character of a person and allows one to negotiate the varieties of
circumstances that life entails. This ability to hold in balance other virtuous notions
is a key feature of prudence and one that ḥokmāh captures.
2.1.2 Śēkel/Śākal
Śēkel is the term that would most resemble prudence in the narrow sense of the term
and, in Proverbs, is rendered as such numerous times in major translations such as
the NRSV (e.g. 1:5). On other occasions it is translated as, ‘sense’ (13:15) or ‘good
sense’ (3:4). When the root Śākal is used, its core meaning is insight; an ability to
grasp the fuller meaning or implications of situations. TWOT states that:
In many instances śākal is synonymous with bîn, … but there is a fine
distinction. While bîn indicates “distinguishing between,” śākal relates to
an intelligent knowledge of the reason. There is the process of thinking
through a complex arrangement of thoughts resulting in a wise dealing
and use of good practical common sense. Another end result is the
emphasis upon being successful.138
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Thus, it can be understood not only in terms of good judgment, but more accurately
what could be understood as discernment; the ability to understand practical matters
and interpersonal relations and come to good decisions.139
The term is not always used in a way that implies inherent ethical virtue, however
most times it is. 140 A man’s śēkel gives him patience and allows him to avoid
unnecessary conflict (Prov 19:11). The prudent person (maśkîl) is one who stores up
provisions during Summer (Prov 10:5), one who is reserved in speech (Prov 10:19),
or a good wife (Prov 19:14).141 In the latter reference we also see that encountering
the maśkîl is akin to a gift from God, something greater than the material wellbeing
that can be provided by benevolent parents. Interestingly, in later Hebraic writing
śēkel becomes associated more overtly with intellectual understanding. In Daniel, for
example, the maśkîl is one able to teach many (Dan 11:33), yet it maintains its moral
association (e.g. Dan 12:10). In addition, the TDOT’s analysis stresses that śekel is
strongly associated with successful living.142 As such, it holds the notion of ‘good
sense’ leading to good outcomes.
This notion of ‘good sense’ helps flesh out an understanding of practical wisdom that
Proverbs invites the reader to consolidate into one’s life. Though the term captures
an intellectual ability of sorts, as with ḥokmāh, it is not a ‘book smarts’ concept but a
good sense that anybody of good character will exhibit for their own good and the
good of those around them. The term ‘good sense’ is one that at least one recent
moral theologian (Herbet McCabe) uses to describe prudence and captures a similar
notion being described here. A concept of sound intellectual ability is included but,
moreover, it is an ability to capture the fullness of a situation and find pragmatic
methods of responding well for the sake of the good.143 As such, śēkel is probably the
term that most directly resembles prudence in our wider study. However, one should
still be wary in seeing it as a direct equivalent. As already noted, the tapestry of
Proverbial wisdom is rich as is the Thomistic concept of prudence. As such,
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prudence as a virtue might be one that includes śēkel, but it would not be limited to
it.
2.1.3 Bînāh/Mēbîn
Bînāh, from the root bîn, refers to the faculty of intellectual understanding as well as
the outworking of such intelligence in action and in oral discourse. Its etymology is
particularly associated with ‘distinguishing between’ and so is also associated with
discernment in that sense. Though it is not necessarily concerned with practical
matters in itself, in Proverbs in particular it is often placed with tĕbûnâ (also derived
from the root bîn) which has a notion of pragmatic outworking of good sense.
Nevertheless, more broadly speaking, as Fox puts it, “the raw faculty of bînāh,
insofar as it is possessed by an individual apart from application, is similar to the
modern concept of intelligence.”144 As such, in itself, it does not necessarily hold
moral significance. However, it is a necessary aspect if one is going to have a sound
grasp of reality, to perceive it well, which allows one to employ other faculties
towards prudential living (see section 3 below for further discussion).145
As such, the mēbîn (understanding, perceptive or intelligent person) is one who is
able to more readily discern the fullness of a situation. For example, the mēbîn is able
to see through men’s facades (Prov 28:11) and quickly understands why they might
face rebuke (Prov 17:10). This latter example also points to the moral standing of a
mēbîn. They may not necessarily be perfectly sinless and would thus be deserving of
correction, however, they are virtuous enough to be aware of their limitation and see
value in holding a teachable spirit.146
Fox highlights a particular form of bîn in the form of nābôn which typically refers to
one who has bînāh or tĕbûnâ. However, a key example of its use is in Prov 16:21
where it is the wise heart (ḥākām lēb) that is called nābôn.147 In other words, what is
implied is that one is nābôn not because they have a certain knowledge as such
(though they might), but because they have an astuteness to finding right knowledge
in the first place (e.g. Prov 14:6). As such, and taking the concept as a whole,
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bînāh/mēbîn can be understood as both an innate capacity on the one hand, but also a
character trait that can be developed on the other.
2.1.4 Tĕbûnâ
Though related etymologically to bînāh, tĕbûnâ according to Fox has a distinct sense
of being more practically oriented. He states:
Tebunah is the pragmatic, applied aspect of thought, operating in the
realm of action; it aims at efficacy and accomplishment, whereas binah is
the conceptual, interpretive activity of thought. … Tebunah is the
competence to deal with the exigencies of life, and it generally implies a
follow-up action, or at least the expectation of one.148
Fox cites uses such as in Prov 14:29 and 17:27 where one with tĕbûnâ is patient and
measured in human relations. He does not engage in folly (Prov 15:21) and conducts
himself wisely (Prov 10:23). Fox suggests that “these virtues are in the realm of
attitudes and social skills rather than intellectual penetration and comprehension.”149
The term is used heavily in Proverbs, more so than anywhere else in the Hebrew
canon (nineteen times in Proverbs, seventeen more than any other book), and is
clearly an important feature of what the ‘wise one’ would characterise. It is
particularly heavily used in ch. 2 where the listener is implored to accept the words
that follow, to “attend their heart” and “incline their ear to tĕbûnâ” (2:2). If they
recognise its value (v. 3) they will “find knowledge of God” (v. 5) no less and,
indeed, it is from God that tĕbûnâ comes (v. 6). The outworking of this is that one is
able to recognise and actualise moral virtues including righteousness, justice and
equity and of “every good path” (v. 9).
This passage will be revisited at a later point,150 but what can be gleaned here is a
sense that tĕbûnâ is an expression of wisdom that has right vision and right action
imbued therein. In this sense, tĕbûnâ has some parallel to the Thomistic virtue of
prudence which is able to bridge the intellectual virtues which deal with speculative
knowledge and the moral virtues which seek the perfection of the agent in character
and action.
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2.1.5 Mĕzimmâ
The term mĕzimmâ is a curious one in the context of this study. In the wider Hebrew
canon nominally the notion is used mostly in reference to God who carries out his
purposes and plans (noun form mĕzimmôt) “against wicked nations or of wicked men
who devise schemes against God and the righteous.”151 As such, it has the notion of
discreet execution of judgement. When referring to humans, the term tends to have
an air of secret scheming often with a view to immoral or harmful ends. This is
particularly evident in the Psalms (eg. Ps 10:2, 37:7), but the negative sense is also
seen in Proverbs (eg. 30:32, where the NRSV translates the term to being “devilishly
evil”, though perhaps “prideful scheming” would be closer to its meaning given the
context).
However, mĕzimmâ need not be negative and is certainly not intrinsically evil,
especially as it is used in Proverbs. As mentioned above, God’s own plans are
considered mĕzimmôt. This is true particularly according to Proverbs where in the
singular form (mĕzimmâ) it expresses a consistently positive and morally sound
meaning. It is found only five times in the Hebrew Canon in this form and all five
occurrences are in Proverbs (1:4; 2:11; 3:21; 5:2; 8:12). In all cases the NRSV
translates the term to prudence and, on a more detailed level, is associated with
discretion of being able to recognise the good and truly valuable and thus walk
confidently through the course of life (3:21-26ff).
The morphological closeness of the negative and positive sense of the term provides
a point of interest. As a verb, one can scheme (zammôtā) to evil ends (Prov 30:32) or,
on the other hand, consider (zommâ) and execute toward the good (31:16). However,
the one who truly has the noun mĕzimmâ in the singular sense used in Proverbs
knows and takes the path of righteousness. For the purposes of this project, it is
useful to highlight this distinction. There is shrewd scheming and devising, but this is
not necessarily a good. One can work towards good ends only if one has the wisdom
of mĕzimmâ that Proverbs entreats. As with other notions of wisdom discussed
above, it certainly has a moral outlook. Further, it has particular relevance to the
Thomistic notion of prudence because it is associated with internal recognition of the
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truly good as opposed to the apparently good and, further, uses such recognition
towards deliberating well in the activity of life.152
2.1.6 Tûšiyyâ
Tûšiyyâ is a relatively technical term for wisdom that is found almost exclusively in
Proverbs and the Book of Job. Like tĕbûnâ, it has a pragmatic outworking and
encapsulates the ability to deal with difficulties and navigate courses of action
therein. TWOT describes it as a “sound efficient wisdom, i.e. sound judgment,
wisdom that leads to practical success.” 153 More simply, the NRSV translates the
term in Proverbs to ‘sound wisdom’. Its general use in context, again like tĕbûnâ, is
associated with an ability to recognize and live life well in the broadly moral sense.
Of note, given the focus of this study, is that one of its only two uses outside of the
wisdom literature is in Is 28:29 where it expresses the type of wisdom that denotes
God’s providential control of history. This finds its way into Proverbs as well,
though with a distinct nuance. The Lord’s providence is acknowledged in Proverbs;
however, it is mediated to humans through wisdom. As such, tûšiyyâ is a particular
form of wisdom available to humans that allows them to successfully negotiate
creation as ordered by God. For example, in concert with other forms of wisdom, it is
tûšiyyâ that affords protection from harm (3:13-35). It does so not by removing
points of difficulty or confusion outright but, rather, by allowing those who acquire it
to navigate times of confusion or vulnerability successfully (3:21-26). The link to
God’s providential dimension is expressed in this pericope in the verses that follow
(3:27-28). As Van Leeuwen states it, these verses point to God acting as the ultimate
“guarantor” behind such notions of practical wisdom. 154 As noted above, the
Thomistic notion of prudence is linked to providence155 and, though it would be a
stretch to consider it a directly equivocal term, the conceptual expression of tûšiyyâ
clearly expresses moral weight tied to living within God’s providential creative order
which, when grasped, leads to just and life-affirming outcomes.
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2.1.7 ʿormâ
As used in Proverbs,ʿormâ is another term that more easily translates directly to the
English prudence and is translated as such by the NRSV on two of the three
occasions it appears in Proverbs (8:5, 12). On the other occasion it is translated to
“shrewdness” (1:4), though here, as suggested by Brown who ties it with the term
mĕzimmâ, prudence would be the more appropriate.156 Outside of Proverbs, ʿormâ
signifies a talent to attain one’s goals by cunning and wily means. The goal in that
sense might be arbitrary. However, in Proverbs it is exclusively seen as an ability to
use such skills towards ends that are morally sound.
Nevertheless, this notion of ʿormâ as ‘cunning’ or ‘cleverness’157 points to an ability
that can potentially be used towards illicit ends and bears interesting reflection when
compared to a sin of ‘cunning’ (astutia) as held by Aquinas. For Aquinas, cunning
as a vice (like many vices) 158 has much in common with its equivalent virtue in
prudence but is distinct in two ways. Firstly, those who exercise cunning as opposed
to prudence use sound reasoning (a necessary aspect of prudence), but towards an
end that is not good or good only in appearance. Secondly, cunning is also evidenced
when pursuing an end that may be good, but is done so by means that is “not
genuine, but feigned and specious.”159 The latter in particular is what Aquinas calls
“the sin of cunning.” Such notion of cunning, which is often tied to guile (dolus)
which can be understood as the activity of trickery and deceit,160 may use certain
skills found in prudence but is, in fact, false prudence. Though not articulated in
Proverbs as such, it certainly seems that such a notion sits behind ormâ, however, it
is used carefully by the sages to refer to a morally licit understanding of this human
capacity.
Further, in Proverbs ormâ is particularly associated with moral sophistication. In
Prov 8, ʿormâ is one of the qualities that Lady Wisdom has to offer and it is the
simple and naive (petî) that lack it (8:5). Further, it is the simple that do not pay due
consideration to their ways (Prov 14:15) and are unable to recognise a disastrous way
of life when walking it (Prov 22:3). In this sense, ʿormâ is a prudential wisdom
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associated with maturity; that is, an ability to move one from naivety to right or
truthful vision found in the morally mature.161
2.1.8 Mûsār
Along with daʿat, which will be discussed below, mûsār represents a term for
wisdom that has least resemblance to prudence, but is worthy of focus nonetheless.
Seen in context with its root meaning, mûsār is commonly associated with discipline
or punishment and is at times translated as such. However, particular when taking in
its equivalency in the LXX (paideuo), it is understood to entail the notion of
education or instruction in a broader sense. In Proverbs at least, this would be its
more common understanding. However, it should be pointed out that it is used in
both senses throughout and commonly, even when used in the sense of instruction, it
is nonetheless linked to reprimand through terms such as ‘rebuke’ and ‘reproof’ (e.g.
10:17, 13:18). In any case, as Fox notes, the goal of mûsār is always towards
providing moral insight or a quality of moral character. Further, “it is always given
by a superior to an inferior, who is morally obliged, but not forcibly compelled to
listen and learn.”162
It is not surprising then that the term is so frequently used in Proverbs which has, at
its heart, the task of instructing the young and immature, in a formal and informal
sense, in the ways of wisdom and righteousness. This notion of instruction will be
returned to more fully in section 3.3 below, but it is of use to pick up key points here
in how Proverbs uses mûsār.
Firstly, the moral instruction (mûsār) of Proverbs is often tied to an accentuation of
the stance of humble reception that the listener must have (e.g. Prov 15:33). It is a
notion akin to the docilitas so important to the Thomistic understanding of the virtue
of prudence. Secondly, when Proverbs warns of the consequences of rejection of
mûsār, in virtually all cases the source of negative consequence that would follow is
arbitrary (e.g. Prov 5:23, 10:17); it is not, for example, sourced from the instructor or
even from God. This is not to say that Proverbs suggests that rightful reproach cannot
come from a superior, a teacher or from God. Indeed the wise person is able to both
heed and utilise such reproach when it is necessary (e.g. 13:1). However, when
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righteous admonition is present, and particularly when one takes the path of rejecting
such wisdom and good teaching, then no additional reproof is necessary; the
rejection itself creates the situation in which negative (including evil) consequences
will follow. The implication here is that there is a natural course of consequence to
one who rejects the ‘teaching’ (mûsār) on offer. One actualises the good in their
seeking and heeding of wisdom found in mûsār, or actualises the bad on its rejection.
As such, Proverbs does not present a simple punitive moral framework even where
reproach associated with mûsār is evoked.
2.1.9 Daʿat
Simply translated as the noun ‘knowledge’, daʿat expresses “a multitude of shades of
knowledge gained by the senses.”163 As such, it is the broadest of the wisdom words
used extensively throughout the OT and strictly speaking is not, literally at least, a
word for wisdom at all. Because of its scope, daʿat can refer to cognition too
elementary to be called wisdom in the mode associated with the terms discussed
above. However, particularly in Proverbs (and throughout the Wisdom literature), it
is associated with wisdom properly understood and so bears some relevance here. In
this sense, Proverbs seems to present daʿat in what Fox terms “the high end of the
spectrum” where it begins to “overlap ḥokmāh, both as erudition and as sagacity in
living.”164
Its use in Proverbs then has a particular sense. It certainly suggests that the one of
mature and wise character will value knowledge but, more specifically, Proverbs
clearly expresses that true knowledge is prudential in nature. One who seeks daʿat is
of virtuous character, able to avoid folly (e.g. Prov 15:12), to temper blind desire
(Prov 19:2) and understand “the rights of the poor” (Prov 29:7). As such, knowledge
(daʿat) in Proverbs of any kind is always valuable but it is not an end in and of itself.
Rather, it is a means to finding and maintaining a wise character, to act prudently and
journey on the path to righteousness.
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Taken as a whole, the terms examined above provide weight to the prudential nature
of wisdom as expressed in Proverbs. Fox provides a useful summary of the lexical
leaning of the words that are commonly translated or associated with ‘wisdom’:
Wisdom is always prudential, conducive to the individual’s well-being,
but it weighs the effect of an action on others as well. It is an ethical
quality, never merely instrumental. It is also a quality of character, for it
entails not only the knowledge of the right ends but also the will to
pursue them.165

2.2 Overall Composition of Proverbs
The above lexical analysis focuses on some key words associated with wisdom in
Proverbs and highlights the prudential nature of many concepts raised therein. The
aim of this section is to broaden the scope and to begin to take in Proverbs as a whole
whilst also allowing the individual parts and sayings to speak for themselves. As
such, general themes and concepts found in the book of Proverbs will be examined.
However, the backdrop of the wider discussion of virtue-based morality in the
Thomistic tradition and the virtue of prudence in particular is still held. With that in
mind, exegetical analysis is included in this section and a broad appreciation of
Proverbs is held; however, the aim is not to provide a detailed analysis of Proverbs in
its own right but, rather, to focus on that which helps inform the wider discussion
most directly.
2.2.1 Overarching Moral Framework of Proverbs
Michael Fox makes the point in his opening to Ethics and Wisdom in the Book of
Proverbs that the unity of Proverbs “allows us to discuss various topics in the book
as a whole.”166 It is this unity which allows Fox and others to find key moral themes
in Proverbs. By briefly examining how this unity is established and what it says
about the nature of Proverbs, we can witness how some aspects of these themes
relate to the virtuous life and the virtue of prudence in particular.
The distinct parts that form Proverbs, particularly its short self-contained pithy
sayings which constitutes the bulk of the work and their diverse form and places of
165
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contextual origin has, at times, led many scholars to suggest that there is no overall
organisational intent within the work.167 As Van Leeuwen suggests, there is a long
held position “which takes the actual arrangements of proverbs in the collections as
being quite haphazard and thus virtually irrelevant for their interpretation.” 168
However, there are problems to this approach. Though one may well find utility in an
atomised reading, it risks missing an overall narrative that can be gleaned and,
moreover, individual sayings and expressions may lose their intended impact when
pulled out of context in this manner; a typical atomised reading alone may diminish
the moral weight and direction that can be found within Proverbs.
It is in response to such issues that the aforementioned Fox recognises a more unified
reading.169 Underpinning Fox’s approach is the notion that wisdom “is not only a
genre of literature, it is a process, a dialectic in which thinkers of different times
mediated on ideas they had learned from their predecessors and shaped them in new
ways.” 170 In Proverbs, this dynamism is reflected in three stages which are
identifiable in their literary form and topical concern. In a very general sense, Fox
articulates a development of wisdom and the type of morality that this wisdom
presents from one more overtly pragmatic in the first stage, to one more interested in
moral character in the second, to the more abstract and universal in the third. Fox
stresses that one stage does not displace the previous but, rather, that each stage
builds on the previous, extending and enriching them. This highly developmental
approach is one that is not overly popular among some scholars.171 Nevertheless, it
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provides a valuable examination of the overall unity that can be found in Proverbs
and something of the overarching teaching that the book seeks to impart.
Another example of an approach that traces a unifying arc over the work of Proverbs,
and one that will be looked at more closely, is found in William Brown’s piece The
Pedagogy of Proverbs. 172 Brown also regrets the lack of attention given to Proverbs’
overarching literary organisation. He notes that even where attention to literary form
is made, there is often little attention given to the overall arrangement and direction
exhibited by the work as a whole and the interpretive value found therein. Brown
responds by examining the discernible movement in both textual form and theme
from beginning to end which expresses certain messages. 173 Obviously Brown’s
study focuses on 10:1-31:9 of Proverbs, the sections most commonly noted as being
disparate and disorganised. However, Brown does place the central bulk of the book
in relation to Proverbs 1-9 and 31:10-31.
As is commonly held, chs.1-9 introduces the book and provides a “guide to how it is
to be read and used.” Brown further notes that:
Indeed, Proverbs 1-9 and 31:10-31 have been deliberately placed to
exemplify the formation of moral character. The development of
Wisdom’s character, for example, form irritated teacher in 1:20-33 to
child of God and hostess in chapters 8 and 9, and ultimately her
association with the ʾēšet-ḥayil (“woman of strength”) in the concluding
acrostic poem of 31:10-31, suggests an overarching movement from
beginning to end. … In short, the bookends of Proverbs trace the
formation of moral character that culminates in the union between
Wisdom and her student, a movement that spans the process of
maturation from receptive child to responsible adult, from dependent to
patriarch.174
Further, within Prov 1-9, the very opening section of 1:1-7 acts as an introduction to
the work overall. Whybray, for example, states that, “1:1-7 reads like a preface, not
merely to chapters 1-9, but to the whole book.”175 Contained therein are a number of
terms addressed in the previous section that have significant intellectual and moral
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weight; the inference being that what follows will confer on the attentive
reader/listener a tremendous array of virtuous qualities. Among them, the notion of
prudential wisdom is brought to the fore suggesting that a key concern of the work to
follow is:
To teach shrewdness (ʿormâ) to the simple,
knowledge (daʿat) and prudence (mĕzimmâ) to the young. (1:4)
This verse sits in a prologue highlighting the value of wisdom (ḥākmâ) (v. 2) and
does so with a leaning towards ethical virtues of righteousness, justice and equity (v.
3). As such, present in this very foundational introduction is a linking of wisdom
properly understood and ethical living. Further, this linking is not built on
speculative thinking but on the concrete reality of prudential living highlighted with
terms such as mĕzimmâ above and others such as discerning (nābôn) 176 and skill
(taḥbulôt) (v. 5).177
As such, this opening stanza anticipates the movement that is to be encouraged in
Proverbs proper, from the gullible and immature (captured in the notion of ‘simple
one’ (petî) in v. 4) to the well-formed character imbued with the virtues as described.
This overarching movement, Brown suggests, is not only intentional and evident in
the ‘instructional’ bookends of Proverbs, it is also evident in the bulk of the work
found in the intervening sections (10:1-31:9) that would “sustain this overall
movement.”178
Brown’s essay traces through a number of identifiable topics that are developed
throughout the work based on literary structures and thematic focus. Of particular
interest is the development he notes through the two Solomonic collections (10:122:16. Part 1 being 10:1-15:32, part 2 being 15:33-22:16). Within the collection of
sayings, Brown notes a movement on a number of levels. He outlines this movement
as one from terse antithetical sayings to more poetic verse forms suggesting that this
“may indicate greater complexity of learning, particularly a move from a strictly
176
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binary mode of moral understanding to more synthetic modes.”179 To explain, the
sentences tend to be dominated by proverbial sayings that paint the world in a moral
dichotomy of the right and wrong; one is either wise or foolish, righteous or wicked
with little room for ambiguity or mitigation beyond that paradigm. However, the
movement that Brown highlights points out that the teaching of Proverbs does not
remain there. Proverbs, particularly in the later part of the Solomonic collection and
even more so in the later sections overall (22:17-31:9), nuances this position in both
form and theme. Naturally, righteousness and wisdom are still held in high regard
and wickedness and foolishness as evils to be avoided, but there is a greater
complexity introduced, so much so that even when a way may seem right it may, in
fact, lead to ultimate destruction (16:25).180 Without going into great detail at this
point, what is being taught here is that being wise and living rightly is more complex
than what is immediately apparent and certainly not as basic as blindly following a
prescribed rule or principle in the simple sense. Further, when we consider the nature
of the instructional material found in 1-9 (as noted above), we see that the very
structural flow of Proverbs implies that prudence is not only a virtuous character trait
being encouraged in its own right but, also, necessary if one is going to find full
meaning and right application of the collection of sayings themselves.
Brown also highlights other thematic progressions. For example, there appears a
movement in the settings of the instructions which progress from the familial home
to the more abstract communal and political sphere – particularly the setting of the
royal court which underpins the Hezekian collection (25:1-29:27) and the Words of
Agur (30:1-33). As Brown notes, in the first part of the Solomonic collection there
are only two references to the royal context (14:28, 35), whereas there are twelve in
the second half. Further, within the identity of the ruler himself (where he is present)
there is a movement of sorts. In the Solomonic collection, the position of kingship is
179
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made akin to that of God himself and a king can hold such office when embodying
virtues such as loyalty and faithfulness (20:28) and deep righteousness (16:12). In
this section, there is an implication that a king can be of poor character, wicked and
unjust, but it is not explicitly noted. However, this shifts in the Hezekian and Agur
sections where the vulnerability of the position of kingship is more overtly exposed.
To illustrate, in 25:2 Proverbs notes that the role of the king is to pursue wisdom
which is hidden by the very glory of God no less. Later, in 28:16, an abject warning
is given where the leader who lacks prudence will inherently be a cruel (i.e. morally
corrupt) oppressor.181 The ultimate conclusion to this is that, as Brown identifies it,
there is a pedagogical direction within Proverbs to move one from the naïve son to
the wise (prudent) king, something that requires one to constantly hold a character
trait of being teachable and humble. As Brown summates, “the main body of
Proverbs illustrates a certain advancement of sapiential instruction. As the king
becomes an object of critique, so the reader must cultivate self-criticism.”182
Moreover, speaking more generally on Brown’s approach, he notes that:
The pedagogy of wisdom, in sum, begins with the basic staple and
proceeds to more advanced, variegated fare. Although many of the
proverbial sayings and instructions seem simplistic in isolation, together
they build up a substantive and sophisticated level of moral instruction.183
In other words, the pedagogical outlook of Proverbs is to move the implied reader
and would-be student towards maturity. This process involves holding certain
disposition and virtues in the first place (captured in Prov 1-9), then being able to
negotiate and interpret the familial and sometimes simple proverbial notions,
building on them to develop the sophistication implied in the later sections of
Proverbs. As will be discussed in section 3.3 below, this concept of movement from
immaturity to maturity is a key dimension of prudence in general. As such, this
unifying theme of growth in maturity in Proverbs also points to a theme of how one
acquires prudence.
The approach that Brown makes is useful in many respects. However, a point should
be made here on the position this study makes in relation to the overall arrangement
181
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and themes of Proverbs; are they a collection of disparate sayings (in regard to
chapters 10-22) and slightly larger but still independent lectures (1-8, 31) or a
homogenous work of tightly organised material? The simple response is something
of a middle ground. Frydrych, though ultimately underlining the disparity of the
work, notes that:
The whole is more than the sum of its parts. At the same time, this new
perception of the book should not obscure the fact that the nature of the
petty sayings is such that they have to be understandable in relative
autonomy, i.e. the primary source of meaning in the collections is the
individual saying.184
In other words, taking in the overall whole has useful implications for using Proverbs
in a study such as this one, but the individual units and even particular short sentence
sayings inherently must have discernible worth in and of themselves. As has been
discussed above, it is this approach which allows one to identify the moral
framework of Proverbs resting on the formation of character overall even when
individual isolated sayings may seem particularly casuistic or situational in their
expression.185 The interpretive analysis which follows holds this in mind. Even when
individual sayings are examined, it is acknowledged that a larger framework of moral
formation of the reader is implied. This moral formation is found in a number of
dimensions, some of which will be unpacked in the following.
2.2.2 Social-Political Influence in Proverbs and the Political Dimension of
Prudential Wisdom
A common approach when dealing with a particular work of Scripture is to focus on
something of its exegetical framework by examining such things as its social context,
authorship and historical influences. A fuller appreciation of Proverbs, particularly as
it pertains to the virtues and prudence, can be had in this process. It is one already
started in the previous sections, but an interpretive analysis using such exegetical
tools is taken up more overtly here.
As a starting point, we can consider the notion of authorship. Though authorship of
Proverbs has traditionally been attributed to Solomon, usually based on the opening
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line in 1:1,186 it is generally held by most scholars that the final form of Proverbs is
unlikely to have been composed by the historical figure. Though some would argue
that certain parts that have found their way into the final form of Proverbs trace their
origin to the historical figure, the connection between the historical Solomon, or even
his court, to the literal authorship of Proverbs as we have them today is an
improbable one.187 There are a number of reasons why this is so. Firstly, there are
numerous discernible sections within Proverbs that are quite distinct in style and
content that suggest disparate authorship. Further, certain collections within Proverbs
bear distinct relationship to non-Israelite ANE wisdom literature in general. This
relationship came to the fore and has been explored to various degrees since the
publication of the Teachings of Amenemope by W.E. Budge in 1923. These ancient
Egyptian sources evidently bear particular resemblance to Proverbs 22:17-24:22. 188
However, later scholarship has also shown links in the ten lectures or instructions
that form the bulk of the first nine chapters of Proverbs.189 Though there is no fixed
understanding as to how much non-Israelite influence there is in Proverbs, or even
the direction of that influence,190 there is little argument that certain parts at least
were not unique to the Israelite tradition much less a unique product of the
Solomonic context. Adding to the complexity of this issue has been the additional
and more recent analysis of non-Egyptian ANE wisdom literature, particularly that of
Semitic regions of Mesopotamia. 191 Taken as a whole, what this broadening
contextual perspective undoubtedly indicates is the international character of the
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wisdom tradition, one that seemed to influence Israel’s surrounding cultures as much
as it influenced Israel’s.192
Moreover, this ‘foreign interaction’ is only part of the story in the formation of
Proverbs. It is but one part of many influences that seem to have shaped the final
form. A very important one nonetheless, particularly for our concern, because it
indicates that the redactor sages certainly saw an appreciation in wisdom that went
beyond the exclusive domain of the Israelite community. It indicates that the wisdom
teachings of Proverbs, including its prudential aspects, were witnessed and stretched
out into the wider reality in which the Hebrew people found themselves and points to
a universal conception of wisdom. As noted above, the Pontifical Biblical
Commissions recent document on the bible and morality does not refer to the
wisdom literature at length, but it does make reference to this universal notion:
The sages contemplate the world God created in all its beauty, order and
harmony. These reveal something about their Creator. Through wisdom
Israel meets her Lord in a living relationship open also to other peoples.
The openness of Israelite wisdom to the nations and the clearly
international character of the sages’ movement provides a biblical basis
for dialogue with other religions and the search for a global ethic. The
Saviour God of Jews and Christians is also the Creator who reveals
himself in his creation.193
Foreign influence aside, the material in Proverbs also bears evidence of multi-faceted
influence in terms of social setting. For example, there are significant parts of the
collection that have a familial ‘folksy’ nature to them in both syntax (references to
‘father/mother and son’) and, on occasions, their topical focus.194 This is particularly
so with the sayings of 10:1-22:16 which appear to have the ‘pre-history’ at least of
being common oral sayings – short self-contained adages that bear the hallmarks of
popular proverbial aphorisms common across most cultures and times. 195 On the
other hand, there is clear inference that other parts of Proverbs were compiled within
an aristocratic or courtly environment and certainly the non-Israelite sourced material
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noted above seems set for the instruction of the courtly elite.196 Christopher Ansberry
taking in the work overall suggests that, though Proverbs was compiled from a
variety of social settings and periods, ultimately the work is set for the audience of
those in or aspiring to leadership in the courtly environment.197 Most scholars would
agree with this position to at least some degree, and certainly that the final redactors
were scribal sages of a courtly status is quite likely. However, the role of the ‘family
environment’ and the place of the ‘father and son instruction’ should not be
underestimated. As Dell succinctly states it, particularly in reference to Prov 1-9,
“why, if they were intended for the education of officials or even as school
instruction, was the primary address from father (and sometimes mother – Prov 1:8;
6:20) to son?”198 This point will be returned to shortly, but if the various contextual
influences that can be discerned within Proverbs are acknowledged, they highlight
the diasporic origin of the collections and hints to the broadness of intent of the final
work as we have it. As Crenshaw states it, “The book therefore takes the shape of an
anthology, its various components coming from various periods of Israel’s
history.”199 The upshot is that the intended audience, as far as what can be gleaned
from the text itself, could be of any place and time and, more the point, the moral
teachings it contains could be rightly imbued into people’s lives of varying
backgrounds and of varying standings – from the common peasantry, to the courtly
elite of potentially many cultural contexts. Whybray notes as much in one of his
many introductory discussions on Proverbs, stating that, “the reader, who is
addressed almost exclusively as an individual, might, it seems, be of any
nationality.”200
Given the eclectic and nebulous contextual setting evident in Proverbs, dating and
discussing authorship of the work with any certainty becomes problematic. As Fox
states it, “the notion of “dating” a text, a traditional concern in Bible studies, is not
quite germane to the book of Proverbs.”201 The best that can be achieved is broad
196

Particularly regarding the second Solomonic collection (25:1-29:27). Fox, for example, describes
Chapters 25-28 as forming a “sort of manual for a monarch.” Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 10.
197
Christopher B. Ansberry, Be Wise, My Son, and Make My Heart Glad: An Exploration of the
Courtly Nature of the Book of Proverbs (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 126-161.
198
Dell, The Book of Proverbs in Social and Theological Context, 24.
199
Crenshaw, "Proverbs," 355. See also Roland E. Murphy’s discussion on the ‘pre-history’ sources
of Proverbs in "Form Criticism and Wisdom Literature," Catholic Biblical Quarterly 31, no. 4 (1969):
especially pp.481-483.
200
Whybray, Proverbs, 5.
201
Fox, Proverbs 1-9, 6.

61

allusion to the boundaries of when certain sections may have been composed, which
itself would be full of conjecture where any specifics were to be applied. Having said
that, though certain parts may be difficult to pin down, there is a general consensus
that the final redaction took place in the post-exilic environment, and this point does
have some bearing on interpretation as will be noted presently.202
With the above in mind, the focus of many biblical scholars has shifted to the final
form of the work and what can be gleaned from any discernible processes the
redactors may have employed. Fox makes the point as such:
While the sayings in Proverbs are drawn from different social groups,
including the “folk” and the literati, it was a series of editors who
ultimately determined what was included and what was excluded … in
the end it is their work and their idea of wisdom that we are reading, and
it is, not surprisingly, ideologically quite coherent.203
Returning to the notion of Solomon’s authorship touched on at the start of this
section, and if we are to take on board Fox’s suggestion that the final redactors
compiled their work with clear intent and purpose, then clearly Solomon’s attribution
was not an arbitrary inclusion. Its inclusion draws into focus an aspect of wisdom
and the virtue of prudence that makes for noteworthy correlative comparison to the
Thomistic teaching that informs this project.
As discussed above, the multi-faceted (including multi-authored) influences of
Proverbs gives it a certain flavour of universality and, at the same time, the
significance of Solomon’s authorship as a matter of historical fact becomes less
important to interpreting the work. Having said that, the attribution of Proverbs to
Solomon can bear importance in understanding the work overall and the nature of
wisdom taught therein. Alan Moss is one recent scholar who has attempted to
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examine the place of Solomon in this sense. 204 He notes that the attributing of
Solomon as author of at least significant sections of Proverbs has traditionally (i.e. in
the scholarly environment pre-dating the historical-critical approach) given it a
certain sense of authority 205 and most contemporary scholars agree that the
superscription of Proverbs 1:1 at least is placed in memory of some sense of special
authority assumed of Solomon.206 In the historical-critical environment, the place of
this authority has been questioned, not only historically as already stated, but also in
terms of the lack of congruency between the Solomon as depicted in Kings
(particularly 1 Kings 1-11) and the Solomon given attribution of the various books
and parts of books of the wisdom canon. Most strikingly is the ultimate
unfaithfulness of Solomon and the subsequent decline of the monarchy (1 Kings 11)
in contrast to the unity and safety that his reign promised and, to a certain extent at
least, delivered (1 Kings 4:24-25) – a successful reign attributed at least in part to
Solomon being particular gifted in understanding (bînāh) and wisdom (ḥokmāh) (1
Kings 3:9), key character traits also esteemed in Proverbs. 207 The incongruence
between Solomon’s ultimate demise and the wisdom writing that is attributed to him
in later works is captured particularly so in the contrast between the teaching of
Proverbs, which warns the young son to avoid the ‘strange woman’ (e.g. Prov 2:1622),208 and the recording of 1 Kings 11:1, which states categorically that Solomon in
fact “loved many foreign women.”
It is beyond the scope of this work to expound such issues at length, but it is worth
positing, as Moss does, that the contrast points to a particular need of the post-exilic
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Israelite community in which the final work of Proverbs was compiled and, at the
same time, to a particular kind of moral outlook. In short, there is a shift in focus on
wisdom and, to the degree it can be discerned, a corresponding shift in the
characterisation of Solomon. 1 Kings clearly presents wisdom in the context of a
political and administrative setting, where its outworking is prudential, but
governmental in nature. In Proverbs, the social setting and the image of ‘Solomon’s
teaching’ tends to focus on sustaining the community in the familial context
compared to the more particularly political-governmental one that typifies 1 Kings.
This shift is necessary because the latter proved to be ultimately inadequate in
maintaining social and communal good. Moss explains it as such:
In Proverbs 1–9 Solomon enacts no political and administrative reforms.
Indeed the society implied in Proverbs 1–9 is a family-centred world.
Wisdom consists more in avoiding too much contact with the wider
world than in engaging explicitly in that society. True, kings reign by
Solomon’s wisdom (8:15–16) and temple offerings are due (3:9).
However, the rituals lead to the household’s prosperity (3:10). As I have
argued elsewhere, the Wisdom who instructs kings personifies
Solomon’s domestic instruction.209 In 1 Kings Solomon’s political and
administrative programme caused division of his kingdom (1 Kgs 12:1–
20). On the other hand, Solomon’s family-based and nonpolitical wisdom
programme in Proverbs consolidated Jewish society after the exile.210
Brown similarly notes, in reference to the opening nine chapters in particular, that:
Proverbs addresses a situation of social distress, a dissolute age in the
eyes of some. To be sure, much of the attention is focused upon the
family with the silent son listening at the feet of his parents. Why the
family? Because it is seen as the invincible bastion of ideological
innocence by virtue of the fact that everyone has or has had a family …
Hence, of all social domains, the family provides the strongest appeal and
basis for shaping and reorientating the praxis of the community.211
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The point being made here is twofold. Firstly, it reiterates the already noted
understanding that any moral outworking that Proverbs might make leans to a
universal appeal. Though those in positions of power are called to exercise it
particularly, including in matters of state and for the sake of justice (Prov 8:15) and
prudential wisdom is inherently important for good leadership because by it rulers
“govern rightly” (8:16), it is also the same prudential wisdom that is meant for those
on every street, the town squares, the busy corners and the city gates (1:20-21).
Further, and by extension, as discussed previously, the call to prudential wisdom
serves to realise a created order and that order has a social-ethical dimension,
however, it is erroneous to assume that it is purely the place of the political elites to
seek and maintain such a dimension. The assumption that the created order setting
the backdrop to wisdom equates to a socio-political order that requires mandating by
political leadership (prudential or otherwise) does not seem to necessarily hold in
Proverbs. It is clear, and often documented, that parts of Proverbs are directed to
forming the young aspirant to leadership by the ways of wisdom such that the
societies they rule find life-giving cohesion and stability in keeping with the order
woven into creation itself.212 However, if we are to draw on Moss’ reflections noted
above, the idea that prudential wisdom exercised at the governing level is enough to
ensure a staving off of chaos and destruction (which is the antithesis of order) seems
to be evidently not true. A social order is required, but it is to be sought and found at
a more fundamental level – in the individual in relationship to their familial
community and thus to their community at large. Von Rad’s seminal work on
Israelite wisdom speaks to this. He notes that:
Both good and evil create social conditions; in a completely ‘outward’
sense they can build up or destroy the community, property, happiness,
reputation, welfare of children and much more besides. Here, then it is a
question not only of movements and tendencies inside a man’s heart, but
of life-forming forces whose power was obvious to all.213
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Von Rad later asks whether this concept of attaining wisdom for good ends and for
the avoidance of evil socially expressed pertain only to a ruling class. He answers:
Seen as a whole, this question is certainly to be answered in the negative.
It is impossible to establish a particular interest in the sphere of life of the
upper civil servants, nor any, of course, in the sphere of life of the
enslaved or even those who were socially or culturally of the lower
classes. In the foreground there appear the relationships of a relatively
well-placed middle class. The decisive factor is, however, that here
orders are described which not only have their validity in a specific social
group but which are, in principle, valid for all men.214
Thus, it can be said that, in part at least, Proverbs does seem to hold in mind an
audience that is courtly and thus concerned with prudential leadership that is typical
of the wisdom enterprise understood in other ANE contexts, and the Solomonic
attribution attests to this in some sense. However, Proverbs also presents a notion of
wisdom that is clearly wider in its scope. Succinctly put, the virtues that Proverbs
encourage can and should be taken up by anybody seeking the good life. How this
can be witnessed in Proverbs will be unpacked in the following. However, it also
points to a certain political-communal dimension of prudential wisdom that has
strong correlation to the notion of political prudence found in the Thomistic moral
tradition. This latter point will be examined in the final section of this thesis,215 but
suffice to point out here that Proverbs does not leave the exercising of prudential
wisdom for the sake of the communal good in the place of a distinct ruling class.
Rather, it sees all members’ adoption of such wisdom as being necessary for the
good of the society overall.
2.2.3 The Particular and Universal Scope of Proverbs
It has been noted that Proverbs seems to address a reader who could be of any
nationality and from any strata of society. The same could be said of the
chronological placement of the intended audience. Though the final redaction of
proverbs occurs in the context of Israel’s post-exilic experience and this naturally
influences its composition, Proverb’s sourced material and articulation is such that
the teachings it enshrines are meant for an audience of any time and place. Crenshaw
indicates as much when discussing the dating of Proverbs. He notes that the “sages
214
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endeavoured to communicate insights that transcend space and time. Their teachings
aimed at universal assent by any intelligent individual, Israelite or non-Israelite.”216
Rather than dwelling on the “specifics of national history” which is obviously
important to the majority of the Old Testament as it is in the course of historical
events that God’s salvation and ongoing relationship with His people is established,
the authors of Proverbs “remained silent about the specifics of national history,
choosing rather to dwell on things accessible to every human being.”217
Waldemar Janzen makes a similar point in his Old Testament Ethics.218 Citing the
work of Hans Schmid, Janzen nuances the notion that Proverbs is intentionally ‘nonhistorical’, suggesting that it does bear a relationship to history, but one that is an
interplay between the concrete experience within history properly speaking and the
timeless and universal principles that we see associated with wisdom within
Proverbs. The interplay is expressed as a three step process articulated by Janzen as
such:
(1) Very concrete (historical) experiences are observed and sifted. (2)
These are handed down from father to son, teacher to student, in poetic
generalized formulations (proverbs) that in themselves seem timeless and
universal. (3) They are, however, meant to be received in a particular
historical situation and applied judiciously to it, to see whether they can
become new historical reality at this new time an in this new place.219
Expounding this a little, there appears embedded in Proverbs an appreciation of the
importance of lived experience in the process of discerning what actually constitutes
good teaching on wisdom.220 The lived experiences of both the parent/teacher, who is
often the narrator, but also the generations that precede him/her are the fundamental
building blocks of Proverbs. Whether that be the sagacity gleaned in a more formal
context of a courtly school or ‘informally’ in the intergenerational interaction in the

216

Crenshaw, "Proverbs," 358.
Crenshaw, "Proverbs," 358. See also Ansberry who makes a similar observation while discussing
the original historical context of Proverbs surmising that “in essence, proverbs are situationally
oriented, open-ended sayings that cut across social barriers and remain relevant to a wide variety of
people.” Ansberry, Be Wise, My Son, and Make My Heart Glad, 2.
218
Waldemar Janzen, Old Testament Ethics: A Paradigmatic Approach (Louisville: Westminster John
Knox Press, 1994).
219
Janzen, Old Testament Ethics, 123, citing Hans Heinrich Schmid, Wesen und Geschichte der
Weisheit: eine Untersuchung zur altorientalischen und israelitischen Weisheitsliteratur, BZAW
(Berlin: Töpelmann, 1966), 79-84.
220
This point is made even more poignantly when looking at some of the proverbs which speak to life
experience in particular. See section 3.3 below.
217

67

village circle, the ‘words of the wise’ (Prov 22:17a) were collected and laid out not
only for a particular generation, class or vocation, but with an eye for an arbitrary
future. This process is impossible but for an understanding that wisdom has a
necessarily universal appeal. This is evidently true not only by taking in Proverbs as
a work itself but, also, how it sits in the broad wisdom tradition. Fox, for example,
notes that:
Proverbs is a slice of tradition that precedes ancient Israel and continued
beyond it. This tradition comprised the creation, reshaping, and
transmission of wise sayings and teachings about how to live a righteous,
productive, and happy life. The Israelite tradition had predecessors in the
ancient Near East and successors in Jewish Wisdom texts.221
Ronald Clements in his Wisdom in Theology is another author who addresses the
relationship between the particular and the universal as presented in Proverbs.222 In a
mode typical of modern biblical scholarship, Clement draws his theological
reflections through the lens of the historical context in which the wisdom tradition
came to prominence in the Israelite history. In particular, in the post-exilic
environment, the concept of ‘world order’ comes to supplement the Israelite faith
that was previously built on the centrality of the nation state and the temple cult.223
Some significance of this has already been discussed above, but Clement’s focus
points out that such a notion of ‘world order’ that underpins Israelite world-view
necessarily is imbued with a universal ethic. Clement, in a similar vein as Fox, notes
that a key development in this ‘universal principle’ is found in the process that the
early sages undertook in collecting and redacting the writings of Proverbs. In short,
as the proverbial tradition moved from more folk and essentially oral to a written
one, a more universal appreciation of them emerges. He states, “Once sayings were
written down they could be compared and contrasted with each other and more
universal truths deduced from them” and, as such, isolated truths and perceptions
became “coordinated into a more universal body of truth.”224 However, the ultimate
purpose of such a collation does not remain there. Ultimately they are recorded with
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the intent that the future reader would be able to apply universal notions of wisdom
captured therein to the particulars of his or her individual life.
It is this latter point that is particularly pertinent to our discussion. Returning to
Janzen who again cites Schmid, he makes the observation that the temptation to
“freeze” wisdom at the second level (seeing Proverbial wisdom as timeless and
universal) as a problematic interpretive inclination – suggesting that allowing
“individual formulation [from Proverbs] to become contextless absolutes” misses
their intended use.225
What is being implied here is that Proverbs does not present timeless and universal
deeds which must be ‘re-enacted’. Nor is the heart of what Proverbs might impart
found in simply finding ways to ‘reinterpret’ certain aphorisms to a corresponding
present day situation in a narrow sense. It is, rather, deeper than that and is found in
the character formation that lies at the heart of the moral framework of Proverbs.
Clifford makes this point stating in his commentary, “Proverbs is concerned with
wisdom as a fundamental option in life rather than specific wise actions.”226 It is
important to note here that this does not mean that the sages were not interested in
actions at all. Rather, he is stressing that Proverbs does not present a formulaic list of
maxims that must be followed if one is to be wise. As such, the teachings of Proverbs
proposes a disposition that must be captured and directed such that one is able to
recognise what wise living looks like in the activity of a particular life.
We see this elaborated elsewhere by Clifford when discussing the relationship of the
lectures of Prov 1-9 with the sentences of 10-22. He notes:
The narrative in Prov 1-9 locates the pursuit and practice of wisdom with
the formation of the human person in all of his or her responsibilities …
Karl Rahner has helpfully coined the term “fundamental option.” It is the
outgrowth of God’s encounter with people: the attractiveness of divine
love draws humans into orienting themselves and their choices [and thus
their actions] toward God. In Proverbs, the instructions of Woman
Wisdom and the parents are not very specific. They inculcate receptivity
to trustworthy authorities and fidelity to basic relationships. Counter-
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voices mimic the genuine call and must be rejected for the primary
invitation to be properly received.”227
This notion of “receptivity”, which will be discussed at greater length below,228 is not
only necessary to gaining wisdom in general, but also to navigating the bulk of the
work of Proverbs, being the sayings themselves (Prov 10-29) and the concluding
appendices (Prov 30-31). The Solomonic section in particular (10:1–22:16) is drawn
from and seeks to espouse concrete actions, but actions, nonetheless, that are the
outworking of a virtuous character, and especially a prudential one. As Clifford goes
on to note, “since the book conceives life largely as action, it comes close to equating
knowing the good with doing the good. The ignorance of the fool is not a simple lack
of knowledge but an active aversion to it.”229 An illustrative example among many is
Prov 12:11;
Those who till their land will have plenty of food,
but those who follow worthless pursuits have no sense.
This verse forms part of a triplet of proverbs rooted in agricultural activity (12:9-11),
but as Fox discusses in his commentary, it is not praise of physical labouring of the
land which is the heart of the message (though it would be dismissive to ignore it
either). Rather, “the couplet juxtaposes images of fullness and emptiness: The worker
is rewarded with satiety, while they who pursue trifles – lit., “empty things” – are
mindless.”230 The word rêqîm which is translated as “worthless pursuit” in the NRSV
is the key here. NIV uses perhaps a more accurate word of “fantasies” which rightly
evokes the image of ‘mindlessness’ that Fox alludes to. Taken as a whole, what is
captured here is that he who has good sense will work their land – importantly it is
their land i.e. what they are able to work in the particular, not an arbitrary notion of
working the land as an abstract concept.231 Conversely, he who lacks good sense is
lost in ‘fantasy’ and ‘frivolous thought’ and will go without because of it. The
concept is not literal, but it is not purely allegorical either. Rather, it is attitudinal and
virtue-based. It points to the quite typical imagery in Proverbs where the tangible
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activity that is observable in the real world of the ‘ordinary person’ points to the sort
of character one is to hold such that they will find sustenance in the total sense. This
is captured here and many times throughout Proverbs in the Hebrew lēb (or in this
case the lacking of it; ḥăsar-lēb – lit. lack heart) which in the NRSV quoted above is
translated as ‘sense’. It is imbued with holding the concept of the totality of one’s
inner life – including their intellect, dispositions and emotions i.e. what we
understand as pertaining to character. Van Leeuwen in the NIB captures this well in
his commentary on Prov 12:11:
Not to work with what is ours is to flee the real to chase the unreal. To
lack judgment is literally to lack heart, without which one cannot acquire
wisdom (17:16; see Pss 51:6; 90:12). The heart, in OT psychology, is the
burning centre of our humanity from which flow our thoughts, words,
and deeds.232
There are a number of points which can be gleaned from this which are important for
our purposes here. Firstly, as with wisdom in Proverbs, the virtue of prudence is
concerned with the relationship between the universal principles of goodness and the
lived reality of how it looks in the activity of our lives at any given point in time. In
other words it is properly ethical in its concern. However, it is so in a particular
manner; Proverbs builds the moral framework around the character of person rather
than the specifics of particular acts themselves. Further, this interplay between the
‘concrete experience’ and the timeless universal principles that can be gleaned
therein implies a certain trust of creation that underpins the sapiential tradition in
general, but particularly so in Proverbs.
This is an important theme that has already been discussed above, and is a reminder
of the basic premise that Proverbs inherently sees created reality as essentially
capable of revealing the right way to be and act. As discussed in section 1.2, though
technically this does not directly equate to a form of ‘natural law’ that underpins
Thomistic virtue ethics, there is a correlation on the fundamental level which sees
human participation in creation (as well as creation itself more broadly speaking) as
inherently good. It is therefore capable of illuminating the proper ends of human
nature and, thus, of human conduct – particularly so when right observation and
reflection on such participation is made.
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Moreover, this focus on the nature of human affairs and creation leads to
understanding the universal appeal of this ‘right living’. As was noted previously,
there is modern day conjecture on how an appeal to nature can truly be understood as
‘universal’ given the myriad of understandings of ‘nature’ that have been borne out
of the scholastic tradition into the modern era.233 Certainly there are philosophical
issues to this approach in the modern context. Nevertheless, there is something useful
to be had in drawing on the basic premise held in both Proverbs and in a traditional
understanding of natural law. 234 The wisdom teaching of Proverbs builds from
particulars to universal and then asks the reader to apply the universal back to the
particular. Though steeped in the human capacity for right reasoning and a trust in
the goodness of creation, the process also recognises limits; that being, that we are
not creators of our own world of moral meaning. Prudential wisdom taught in
Proverbs asks the student of wisdom to discover moral truths and ends and then find
means to attaining those ends, not to determine what those ends are. Such a notion is
also found in the traditional scholastic understanding of natural law that Porter
identifies as a useful import even in our contemporary context. She states that such
an understanding reminds us of a “pride of assuming that we can create our own
world of meaning, within which we can take refuge from the ambiguities of human
society and the stark inhumanity of the physical universe.” Rather, the scholastics,
and I would add the sage author of Proverbs, remind us that:
We live in a world that we did not make, under the sovereignty of a
Creator whose goodness we can trust but whose designs will always be to
some extent opaque to us … what the scholastic concept of natural law
provides is not an absolutely reliable guide to determining what is
natural, but a framework within which to reflect on the moral
significance of the pre-conventional roots of human practices, in
accordance with our best efforts at any given point to discern what these
are.235
To summarise, the interpretive approach to Proverbs discussed above suggests that
the ultimate call of Proverbs is not simply to establish a sense of ‘universal order’ in
itself but, rather, to draw the reader to navigate their experience of creation such that
they can discern how right living looks in the particulars of their lived experience in
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keeping with that sense of the universal which is implicit in a notion of created order.
In this sense, the call of Proverbs is prudential in that the virtue of prudence,
similarly, draws the person to find the means in the particulars of their circumstance
towards realising a universal notion of the good. The noteworthy feature of Proverbs
is its movement from the particular (of a given admonition, for example) to the
universal and then the implication for the reader to find application to their particular
lives from there. This is only possible, however, if one takes on the call of wisdom
itself; and this is the key to what Proverbs attests to. Simply careful examination of
created reality is not enough, one can easily be deceived. To successfully recognise
what right living looks like, one needs to do so by cultivating and maintaining a
certain character. As Proverbs points out, it is the one who has a discerning and
perceptive character (mēbîn) that finds wisdom in their very midst, but the fool can
search all of creation and not find it (17:24).
In the teaching of Proverbs, however, being of wise character is more than a form of
human moral deliberation in the natural order of things. There is a limitation, as has
been alluded to above, in the human capacity to employ prudential wisdom;
however, Proverbs does not leave the formation of prudential wisdom at that. There
is a theological dimension that engages with this limitation that is explicitly
addressed which is vital to understanding prudential wisdom in its fullest form. This
is taken up in the following section.
2.2.4 Fullness of Life and Theological Imagery in Proverbs
In both Proverbs and the virtue ethics tradition, there is the potential to understand
prudence and the virtuous life in general as an intrinsically secular activity. That is to
say that one can simply apply human intellectual faculties (of prudence or otherwise)
to carefully observe the goings on of the world and employ such observations in
deducing how to live the morally good life. One level of addressing this has already
been made in highlighting the importance of the theological dimension of creation
that underpins both the natural law tradition and the concept of wisdom in Proverbs.
It has been well noted that God, as the author of creation and one that has proclaimed
it ‘good’ (Gen 1), has inherently created a world that is able to witness to the good in
itself. However, there is a further theological thought to be held which is captured in
Proverbs in particular ways. In both the book of Proverbs and in the Thomistic
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tradition there is an understanding that, though there is a human capacity to navigate
to the teleological good, we struggle to actually recognise what that entirely is and
so, for humans to achieve the truly good, something outside of itself is needed. It is
Proverbs that will be the particular focus here, but it will be a notion returned to in
the final stage of this thesis.
A starting point to this topic can be found in returning to Prov 12:11 mentioned in
the previous section. It points to the idea that the reward for ‘good sense’ and right
living is sustenance. However, a closer look at this and the rewards of wise living in
general, as is done by Murphy, reveals that the good to be had is not limited to
physical sustenance in the simple sense but a fullness of life in all its facets – and it is
this which represents the telos of wisdom. Murphy states it most emphatically, “the
kerygma of wisdom can be summed up in one word: life.”236 He comes to this point
within an examination of the introductory opening of Prov 1:1-6237 and of Proverbs
8; in particular vv. 32-36 where Wisdom speaking in the first person cries out:
“And now, my children, listen to me:
happy are those who keep my ways.
Hear instruction and be wise,
and do not neglect it.
Happy is the one who listens to me,
watching daily at my gates,
waiting beside my doors.
For whoever finds me finds life
and obtains favor from the LORD;
but those who miss me injure themselves;
all who hate me love death.”
As is found in numerous places in Proverbs and throughout the Hebrew Scriptures, a
pathway is set out for life and death.238 Read at face value the options are very simple
and stark, seek and find wisdom and you find the end of searching that is life, hate
wisdom (and all it entails) and you will necessarily gravitate to death. It is this stark
expression of gaining life and avoiding death which is the ultimate aim of wisdom,
but life here needs to be understood with a certain depth. It does refer to ‘the good
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things of life’ as would typically be understood and this is iterated in Proverbs in
various ways; longevity (3:16; 28:16), reputation (10:7; 22:1), nourishment (28:19)
and material wealth (8:18; 24:4) are all identified as good things of life in Proverbs.
However, as Murphy warns, “life is a very elastic concept”239 and these materiallybased goods have a greater depth of meaning than we might immediately give them.
As he points out, “life is more than material goods; these are seen as sacramental,
signs of the Lord’s blessings (Prov 10:22).”240
This is particularly notable when the antithesis of life is looked at, that being
death. 241 Death in the context of Proverbs is undermining to the person and
community and it entails not so much a ceasing of earthly existence that we might
typically associate with the term (though it might include that), but an existence
where we animate as if alive but are less than living at the same time. It is captured in
the image of Sheol which is synonymous with the place of death (Prov 7:27; Ps
49:14)242 and certainly the pathway towards which one will head if they are not able
be wise (Prov 15:24). It is a state where one exists, but is never complete or whole; a
state of forever seeking, a place of constant want (Prov 30:16). Guillet (who Murphy
also cites)243 captures the notion when reflecting on various Proverbs (Prov 10:16;
27; 11:19 among others) and notes that there is something more than the “naïve
belief” that simple enumeration of length of life is at stake. Rather,
there is a profoundly moral conviction: that sin is, in man, a principle of
corruption, an evil which undermines his being. The sinner may appear
prosperous, but this is an illusion. At [the] bottom, he is a sick man
whose equilibrium has been affected.244
Thus, in contrast, we can say that life, as the telos of wisdom, is encompassing of the
full being of the person. Brueggemann describes it as all the assets associated with
being human; “emotional, physical, psychical, social, spiritual – which permit joy
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and security and wholeness. It includes ‘all these things’ which let a person reach his
full capacity.”245
With such a lofty image of the sort of life that is offered in the enterprise of wisdom,
it is not surprising that attaining it becomes a difficult prospect. On the one hand, the
way to ‘life’ is ever present, woven into the very stuff of existence; of human activity
and natural occurrence alike. It is witnessed in as common an endeavour as how one
goes about building an abode (Prov 24:27) and in the natural activity of ants,
badgers, locusts and lizards (30:25-28). Yet the ways of wisdom are inherently
difficult and the personification of Wisdom in Proverbs 8 captures this. The image of
wisdom being tied to the act of creation has already been touched on, and her call to
the listener to find life through her is repeated throughout the work, but what is also
highlighted in this section is the chasm between the human experience and wisdom
in her totality. Frydrych is one who focuses on this. Starting with an attentive reading
of 8:22-31, he notes that “this passage shows that the divine sphere has an existence
which is entirely independent of the human world, for God [and Wisdom] is active
before the human world is brought into being by this creative work.” 246 The
countering forces of the chaotic enter the cosmology of Proverbs without any clear
indication of its origin, but its presence reflects what Frydrych describes as a
‘dualistic battle’ between the forces of creative wisdom and destructive chaos, one
played out within creation but which has its origins and end beyond it as well.247
However, this is not to deny the monotheistic imagery of God, and the primacy of
God over any image of wisdom (personified or otherwise), plus both God and
wisdom’s superiority over chaos and folly maintains that monotheistic stance of God
as creator absolute.248 It is thus that the locale of wisdom is very much in creation
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and in the ongoing activity of creation, but it is beyond it as well and, further, its
fullest expressions and rewards are found in God alone.249
This conception is important as it lays the groundwork for a thoroughly theological
aspect of wisdom. Central to this thesis is the notion that wisdom in Proverbs is
inherently prudential, however, this does not make it entirely a human activity apart
from any theological conception. It necessarily (according to Proverbs) cannot be – if
one is to grasp the truth of things, then one is going to have to apply a certain
attentiveness to created reality, the world we live in, that is intrinsically theistic. In a
sense this is a re-iteration of what has been stated earlier (particularly section 1.2).
However, the stress here is the more overt attention to the theistic dimension that can
be gleaned in the scope of prudential wisdom. Proverbs explicitly states on a number
of occasions and at key points, predominantly through the ‘fear of the Lord’ idiom,250
that the search for wisdom originates and ends in God. Most notably the allimportant introductory stanzas of 1:1-7 have at their crown such a statement:
The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge;
fools despise wisdom and instruction.251
Given the discussion had to this point, and the cosmology put forward by Proverbs,
such a notion is entirely logical. The introductory stanza mentions a number of
prudential aspects of wisdom such as discretion, vision and knowledge (Prov 1:2),
and Proverbs encourages that ‘learning and skill’ in such things can be gained (1:3),
but the complete depth of such learnings can only be found if such tasks are found in
God. As Van Leeuwen states it, Prov 1:3 “is the book’s motto and states its
theological theme.” 252 Brown points out this verse is a “leitmotif of proverbial
wisdom” and “is presented as a comprehensive intellectual virtue. It marks the
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starting point as well as the end point of the journey of wisdom.”253 As is Brown’s
outlook overall, he highlights that such an assertion points to the disposition one
must hold if they are going to appropriate the “repertoire of virtues”254 that are made
on offer. This disposition, Brown highlights, sits in a relational dimension and speaks
to the totality of the person. He states:
“The fear of the Lord” introduces a relational dimension to the list of
virtues that grounds this catalogue squarely within the parameters of
normative character. Whereas the list of virtues delineates the external
contours of ethical character, the “fear” of God deals fundamentally with
the heart and center of character, namely the position of the person in
relation to God. A position of humble, receptive reverence, an
acknowledgement that all wisdom is divinely generated.255
Another key expression of the same sentiment is found in the very next chapter,
particularly 2:1-6. The chapter starts with the familiar call from the parent/teacher for
the attentive youth to take heed of his words which provide both the pathway to
wisdom and includes wisdom itself (2:1-2). Verses 3-4 point to a disposition of
character that one is to attain and the language and tense is conditional;
if you indeed cry out for insight,
and raise your voice for understanding [good sense];
if you seek it like silver,
and search for it as for hidden treasures256
These verses clearly express the attitude the pupil should have, one that not only
seeks out the things of wisdom, but does so with a depth of awareness of the sort of
value it entails. Further, being like ‘hidden treasure’, it will require activity built on
that disposition to find. What is the outcome of such conditional statements? In the
words of Prov 2:5, it is a grasp of “fear of the Lord” and “knowledge of God.” Fox in
his examination of this chapter makes the point that, “whereas we would expect the
quest for wisdom to culminate in the finding of wisdom, this verse makes an even
greater claim. The promised outcome is religious enlightenment: the understanding
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of the fear of the Lord and the knowledge of God.”257 Fox’s comments on the verse
that follows is particularly illuminating. Proverbs states in 2:6:
For the Lord gives wisdom;
from his mouth come knowledge and understanding [good sense].
As Fox notes “Wisdom engenders mature piety because God is the source of
wisdom, and in seeking it you are in effect seeking him.”258 He goes on to state that,
as is typical of Proverbs and the wisdom literature in general, this does not equate to
a form of verbal revelation as one would witness, for example, among the
Prophets.259 Nevertheless, there is a meeting between human and divine and it is one
that advances to a mature form of “reasoned, cognitive conscience.” 260 Fox
continues, “hence fear of God … is the object of understanding (2:5a) and is defined
by the parallel as a form of knowledge (2:5b). With wisdom, fear of God becomes
conscience, and inner sense of right and wrong and a desire to do what is right.”261
Fox goes on to cite the Franciscan Dermot Cox who provides a point of view that is
particularly pertinent to our discussion. He states that ‘fear of God’ is:
A form of conscience that calls for an intellectual adhesion to a principle,
the divine order, the concept of goodness of life, and this is a guarantee
of 'success’. … It is a state of mind, not an action; it is almost
synonymous with knowledge (especially in Prov 1-9).262
That said, it should be pointed out that this notion of ‘fear of the Lord’ is not simply
an inner state of mind or character trait with no outward expression. Clifford is one
who seems to stress a more ritualistic image of the ‘fear of the Lord’ motif.
According to Clifford, and based on the conception found in the ANE broadly,263 he
states that “‘fear of a god’ does not refer primarily to an emotion or a general
257
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reverent attitude. Rather it means revering a particular deity by performing the god’s
rituals and obeying the god’s commands.” He then warns that the “modern readers
need to recall that ancient religion was regarded as something one did rather than
something one felt. Doing one’s duties were part of fearing God.”264 This perspective
is duly noted, and it is fair to say that Proverbs, though it does not say much
regarding cultic activity, does nonetheless acknowledge it. However, and contra to
Clifford’s observation, it does so only in a certain way. Prov 21:3 is a particularly
pertinent example which simply states that “to do what is righteous and just” is
preferable to Yahweh than cultic sacrifice.265 Not that religious activity in and of
itself is unimportant to Proverbs,266 but the moral disposition of the person is vital. In
this case we are also reminded that ‘righteousness’ itself, which tends to be used in
such references, is not simply a state of simple external piety either. Lyu’s study on
the concept of righteousness within the context of Proverbs specifically provides an
excellent definition:
Righteousness is the all-encompassing quality of human or divine
character in toto above and beyond specific behaviours, which is
actualized as rectitude in moral choices and fairness and benevolence in
social transactions. A righteousness person embodies righteousness as an
internalized and pervasive character trait, cultivates the desire to be
righteous, and finds pleasure when that desire is met.267
To bring the above together and into the wider discussion, it can be seen that the end
that is life in its total goodness will be found by those who acquire prudential
wisdom. Further, such wisdom belongs to the human but is beyond it as well.
Moreover, the person’s ability to follow such a path is not entirely within the human
capacity and, more the issue, it is not a given that what might seem like the ‘right
path’ to humans is in fact so. As Prov 14:12 warns; “There is a way that seems right
to a person, but its end is the way to death.” Drawing on this, Frydrych well warns,
“the sage who acquires wisdom using his God-given senses should not think that
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such wisdom can make God dispensable.”268 Frydrych, citing Prov 16:2; 16:9; 20:24
as well as the aforementioned 14:12, suggests that such expressions point to “general
limits” to human capacities, “consequently the wise person is never entirely selfreliant … it is from this basic anthropological perspective that the fear of Yahweh
emerges as a cornerstone of proverbial wisdom.” 269 It is a cornerstone that is
necessary because, though there is tremendous capacity for the good in the human
being, it will not automatically reach that potential without formation in wise living
that, according to Proverbs at least, can only be conceived as truly wise when the
theological conception is imbued in it.
This allows the makeup of the moral outlook of Proverbs to be further identified.
Firstly, it is teleological in that the ultimate aim of acquiring wisdom, both its
prudential facets as well as the other virtues that work in concert with it, is life in its
fullest. Secondly, this notion of fullness of life can include that which pertains to
‘natural’ goods, but an appreciation of the theological imagery of Proverbs
recognises that the fullness of this telos is necessarily theistic as well. How this can
be more fruitfully interpreted will be discussed in section 4.2 below where the notion
of infused virtues is taken up. In anticipation of that discussion, what can be noted
here is that Proverbs presents an elevation of what would appear as prudential pursuit
of ‘natural goods’ (such as good familial and political relationships, adequate
sustenance, just dealings in business) to a good which serves and is served by the
human relationship to God.
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3. Truthful Vision and the Parts of Prudence that Aid It
3.1 Truthful Vision: Seeing Reality Rightly
One common thread running through the discussion to this point rests on the
importance of seeing reality right. It was noted at the beginning of this project that
the heart of the moral life rests on a truthful grasp of reality, which can be termed
‘truthful vision’. We recall again what was quoted there from Pieper:
The intrinsic goodness of man – and that is the same as saying his true
humanness – consists in this, that “reason perfected in the cognition of
truth” shall inwardly shape and imprint his volition and action. In this
fundamental principle of Thomas Aquinas is summed up the whole
doctrine of prudence.270
The contemporary theologian Paul Wadell, from whom the term ‘truthful vision’ has
been borrowed, likewise states that “there is an intrinsic connection between truthful
vision and virtuous action because we cannot act rightly unless we first see
rightly.”271 Doing so, however, is not as easy as it may seem. Wadell continues by
pointing out that seeing truthfully is not as straightforward as “opening one’s eyes,
because we can open our eyes and still fail to see;”272 what is needed is a depth of
attentiveness that takes in the whole human fabric and thus pertains to the formation
of character in the fullest sense. Similarly, Proverbs invites the reader to form right
vision of the world, but also points to the notion that to fully apprehend reality is not
necessarily straightforward and we can be easily deceived. It is thus that Clifford
observes that, “Proverbs assumes the existence of a world created by God with a
certain order or inherent dynamism. People perforce live in God’s world, but they do
not by that fact know how to live in that world. There is much they do not know,
much that is hidden.”273 That fuller knowledge necessary for the fullness of life is not
simply a technical or empirical apprehension of things, but an appropriation of the
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truth of how the world, as created by God, is. Thus, as Clifford adds, “knowledge in
Proverbs is not information but a way of seeing reality.”274
Aquinas himself likewise notes that right apprehension of reality is an important
aspect of prudence. This is captured particularly in his description of the various
parts of prudence and allied virtues that are bound to it (what can also be called ‘subvirtues’). 275 He also, in a similar vein to Proverbs, points out that our natural
existence gives us a certain propensity towards seeing reality rightly and thus
developing prudence, but doing so does not occur by effortless course. In describing
one of these parts of prudence, that being memory (memoria), Aquinas, citing
Cicero, states: “The aptitude for prudence is from nature, yet its perfection is from
practice or from grace. And so Cicero observes that memory is not developed by
nature alone, but owes much to art and diligence.”276 This observation pertaining to
the sub-virtue of memoria is the first of three parts of prudence that will be
examined. Here I will follow Pieper in taking three of the more significant parts of
prudence as outlined by Aquinas, that being memory (memoria), teachablity
(docilitas) and nimble decisiveness (solertia). 277 In each of the three areas I will
address an understanding of the ‘sub-virtue’ as understood in the Thomistic mode,
highlight some key features of it and address its relationship to the virtue of prudence
in general. Secondly, I will look at how this concept is expressed in Proverbs. In
doing so, the benefit of the aspect of prudence in question will be unpacked while
also allowing the teachings of Proverbs to enrich such an understanding.
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3.2 Memoria
3.2.1 ‘True-to-Being’ and ‘True-to-Self’ Understanding
On the face of it, the importance of memory as a part of the virtue of prudence is not
especially complicated. Recollection of past experience helps one formulate an
impression of the present and thus allows one to navigate a path to a future goal.
Further, it seems that memory is an entirely natural and involuntary activity, thus it
might seem of little use to discuss it as a part of the formation of a virtue as there is,
correspondingly, little we as moral agents can do about it. Indeed, one of the
objections in the relevant article on memoria in the Summa Theologiae points out
that, unlike prudence more broadly, it would seem that memory should not be
considered a special part of prudence because it happens as a matter of course and is
not something that can be “perfected by practice” as applies to the virtues in
general.278
Aquinas’s response helps us understand the importance of what we can term ‘right
memory’. It has already been indicated above that memory, as a cognitive function,
is not perfect by nature – the sheer fact that one can improve recollection of things by
certain ‘aids’ points to this (and Aquinas, citing Cicero and Aristotle, lists four
methods to achieving just that). 279 The implication is that our memories can be
distorted or obscured. There are two aspects which can be held in this regard. Firstly,
we can think of memory as simply the ability to recall the experience of our past,
including how we may have dealt with moral dilemma and the like. How did we
navigate such events? When confronted with a situation where we were required to
favour one particular moral norm at the expense of another, how did we employ them
in the right order towards the right ends? Such elements of memoria, which are
important to developing a prudent character, seem to be the focus of Aquinas in the
reply of II-II, 49.1. It is, in this vein, that memoria is an important aspect of coming
to moral maturity. This topic is more closely examined in the next section but, put
simply here, failing to utilise and foster right memory is akin to failing to ‘learn from
our experiences’ and, as such, there is a sense of culpability associated with such a
neglect.
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Secondly, and not totally distinct, there is a more complete sense of memory that
applies to the self that is more than simple cognitive recollection. It is related to what
Pieper terms ‘true-to-being memory’. Pieper describes this principle as such:
True-to-being character of memory means simply that it “contains” in
itself real things and events as they really are and were. The falsification
of recollection by the assent of negation of the will is memory’s worst
foe; for it most directly frustrates its primary function: to be a “container”
of the truth of real things.280
Pieper is pointing out that the human person not only can struggle to ‘remember’ in a
technical sense, but that the human condition is such that, whether by wilful
movement or a negation of it, we falsify or distort our recollection of things. For
example, I might have been asked to give money to a viable and sound cause but
chose not to for selfish reasons and by negating my will that would otherwise be
moved to do so. I might ‘recall’ later that my reasoning was based on lack of means
or a perception that the charity involved was questionable in its practices and the
like. I might falsely regard myself as being just and generous in character though my
actions in a certain point in time did not demonstrate those virtues at all. Such an
example is simplistic but, as Pieper notes, the problem is that such falsification of our
memories of is often unnoticeable. As such, right memory, or ‘true-to-being
memory’, requires diligent and active work at developing a character committed to
the good and to the truth of things. As he states:
There is no more insidious way for error to establish itself than by this
falsification of the memory through slight retouches, displacements,
discolorations, omissions, shifts of accent. Nor can such falsification be
quickly detected by the probing conscience, even when it applies itself to
this task. The honesty of the memory can be ensured only by a rectitude
of the whole human being which purifies the most hidden roots of
volition.281
As such, we can understand this concept of memory as holding to a clear-sightedness
of the self, a ‘true-to-self memory’ as much as true recollection of events and entities
outside one’s self. As McCabe states it, “good sense282 is a kind of clear-sightedness
about our problems which enables us to put them in proper perspective, to see what
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is more important and what is less so. It also, and most importantly, involves a
certain clear-sightedness about myself.”283
Given that, it is quite understandable that such a practice does not come easily.
Pieper goes on to state that the ‘knowing’ required by prudence is metaphysical in its
scope rather than purely psychological and, as such, is not acquired easily. Thus, it is
rightly described as a bonum arduum, a steep good.284
There is another layer to note in regard to right memory. Though the above is deeply
personal, there is a notion of shared or collective memory that can be (and evidently
clearly is at times) falsified or suppressed from a people’s viewpoint. For example,
Australia’s inadequate attention to Aboriginal occupancy and heritage for much of its
colonised history allowed for political imprudence and injustice to develop in the
nation’s formal dealings. Turkish failure to recognise the genocide of Armenians
during World War I has done similar.285 In the play Paradise Lost by Clifford Odets,
the character Leo Gordon is listening to a radio announcer’s upbeat nationalistic
commentary celebrating the 15th anniversary of Armistice Day. Leo, holding to the
memory of a loss endured from the war, recalls in a lamented tone “We cancel our
experience. That is an American habit.”286 These words speak to how a failure to
attend to ‘right memory’ frustrates the role experience can have in serving the
virtues, both in a collective and individual sense. In either case (collective or
individual), morally sound activity guided through the virtue of prudence is
impossible when our memory is supressed or obscured.287
3.2.2 Proverbs and the Concept of Memoria
This deeper notion of memoria is also esteemed in Proverbs though the terminology
is not used. It does not describe memory as a particular psychological conception in
the technical sense, but the importance of ‘true-to-being’ and ‘true-to-self’ memory
is nonetheless present. This is captured in a number of ways. One has already been
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mentioned regarding the Hebraic concept of heart (lēb).288 The concept of lēb is an
encompassing one that captures the entire inner motivations, sensibilities, and
dispositions of the person. Though generally representative of emotions in modern
Western settings, in the Hebrew Scriptures the heart is associated more so with the
intellectual capacities of reason. Having said that, it should not be confused with
mere psychological functionality either; the Hebrew image of heart holds an
integrated conception of the faculties of the human mind.289 Included in it would be
the concept of memory as discussed above. Though the sages of Israel may not
necessarily see memory as being distinct from other capacities associated with the
‘inner workings’ of the human being, nevertheless, the way the concept of heart is
used in Proverbs provides for a useful point of reflection in relation to the
understanding of the sub-virtue of memoria being considered here.
For example, Prov 27:19 states:
As face mirrors face in water,
so the heart reflects the person.
This somewhat cryptic verse in the Hebrew is translated in various ways and the
NABRE translation is used here as it is closest to the literal.290 The notion is that
one’s face is essentially invisible to the self unless one sees it reflected back to them.
Likewise, the person is known by seeing into the inner reflections of the heart, the
inner mind.291 As Murphy states it, “the heart serves as a mirror, and when you look
honestly and directly into it, you attain greater knowledge.”292 Murphy also indicates
that there is ambiguity into whose heart is being looked into. It could be one’s own or
the other. Neither is definitive nor should they be mutually exclusive.293 As such, the
former is possible and, thus, inference can be found in two senses. Firstly, outward
appearance is not the measure of a person, both as we see ourselves and as others
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perceive us. Secondly, and subsequently, if one is to have a true appreciation of the
self, a ‘true-to-being’ apprehension, the heart is where the examination must lie.
The importance of the notion of ‘heart’ can also be found in observing how Proverbs
describes those who lack it. Among characteristics that are found in the fool, we see
that deception and misapprehension is high amongst them. For example, Prov 14:8
states:
The wisdom of the shrewd enlightens their way,
but the folly of fools is deceit.294
This verse illustrates a typical pattern found in Proverbs where wisdom and folly are
juxtaposed. In this case, it indicates that prudential wisdom295 illuminates the way of
one’s life, while the vice of the fool is found in their dishonesty. As Fox points out,
the deceit in question in such a verse is primarily of the self. He states, “Since the Aline alludes to wisdom’s benefit to its possessor, the B-line presumably speaks of
folly’s harm to its possessor. Hence the deceit in question is self-delusion.”296
Elsewhere Proverbs points out that the one who has understanding (tĕbûnâ) has clear
path to follow, but those that lack ‘heart’ fail to recognise folly for what it is. Prov
15:21 for example states:
Folly is a joy to one who has no sense [ḥăsar-lēb, lit. lacks heart],
but a person of understanding walks straight ahead.
Davis’ analysis of such concepts points out, “the exercise of prudence is so basic that
to be without it is to lack the identifying element of humanity, namely, a ‘heart’ or
‘mind’.”297 Davis continues, while referring to Prov 14:8 as cited previously, that the
prudent life explicated in Proverbs asks one to be self-critical, “The realism that
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underlies good judgment begins with a rigorous attitude towards the self.” 298 As
such, the teachings of Proverbs are very clear that a failure to seek ‘true-to-self’
apprehension of reality will necessarily inhibit prudential living.
It is not surprising, then, that Proverbs instructs the young student to, above all other
things, guard one’s heart, for fullness of life is found therein (Prov 4:23). Van
Leeuwen’s reflections on this are worth noting:
Even though the heart can stand in metonymy for the whole person in its
“mental,” inner aspect (what my heart thinks is what I think), there is in
the admonition to guard one’s heart an awareness of the mysterious
reflexivity that humans possess: I can look at myself and make even my
inmost self the object of care, reflection, improvement, and betterment.299
As can be seen, Proverbs does not describe ‘truthful vision’ as including memory in
the same terms as those found in Aquinas, but the deeper sense of memoria discussed
previous, namely that indicated by ‘true-to-being’ and, even more so, ‘true-to-self’
memory is certainly present. Acquiring prudential wisdom is wrapped up in a sense
of the self that is deeply truthful. Conversely, deception, and in particular selfdeception, is found inherently in imprudent and foolish lives.
As noted previous, memoria as a part of prudence also has a collective dimension. A
collective underpinning is certainly found in Proverbs that correlates with this. For
example, much of the teaching of Proverbs rests on a notion that what is being
passed on is a collective wisdom, a collective memory of prudential living as it were,
gathered such that those who follow can ‘recall rightly’ the truth of things and thus
form virtuous character.300 Correspondingly, the teaching being imparted in Proverbs
is not only for the betterment of the individual, but it benefits the community at large.
The communal dimension of prudence has been discussed previously (2.2.2 above)
where it was noted that the prudence of individuals and the collective/communal
good are intrinsically entwined. Indeed, according to texts such as Prov 14:34, it is
the moral and spiritual character of a people in the collective sense that is the
measure of a nation’s greatness rather than its power, wealth and influence which
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would be the more obvious criteria. As such, though Proverbs is largely addressed to
the individual and a sense of ‘truthful vision’ is encouraged on that level, a
communal dimension is always implied and surrounds such notions.301
On both the individual and communal level, prudential living requires a ‘true-to-self
memory’, one that sees the reality of the self as it has and continues to engage with
existence in its fullest sense. Proverbs in its own mode of expression supports the
importance of self-awareness and a ‘true-to-self memory’ and, with some frequency,
also reminds the reader of the self-deception that shadows the fool. According to
Proverbs, as Von Rad states, “the fool miscalculates his potentiality; he lives in
deception (14:9). For this reason, folly is always something which endangers life
(10:21; 18:7).” Thus, the acquiring of prudential wisdom requires a rigorous attitude
toward the self and, further, spills over into the virtue of being humble and teachable,
notions captured in the part of prudence termed docilitas which is taken up presently.

3.3 Docilitas
After memoria, the next necessary part of prudence to be examined is understood as
docilitas. It rests on the idea that one way to aid the acquisition of the virtues is by
being taught them via the wisdom and example of others. It is not the only way and
certainly not the complete way for it is well noted that exercising the virtues in the
activity of one’s life is necessary to habituate them into the character of one’s being.
Nevertheless, for Aquinas, because prudence is concerned with the particulars of
activity in the vast contexts of our lives, the ways of prudence above any other virtue
seeks to gain the most in learning from others for it exposes us to a far greater sphere
of experience than we could acquire with self-reflection alone.302 Likewise, the Book
of Proverbs esteems the reader to be a student of wisdom, attentive to instruction in
prudential living. Of all the aspects of the virtue of prudence this thesis examines,
this is perhaps the one that is most prevalent in the Book of Proverbs. As Aquinas
quoting Proverbs 3:5 indicates, one needs to be cautious when “leaning on their own
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prudence.” 303 A good part of Proverbs’ instructions are on where one can ‘lean’
rightly and thus learn the ways of wise living.
3.3.1 Docilitas: Acquiring the Virtues by Being Open and Teachable
When discussing notions of acquiring virtues, invariably most scholars in the field
will address the issue of habitus. Included within the concept of habitus is the idea
that one acquires the virtues and, more specifically, has their character shaped in
accordance with the virtues in the ongoing and repeated activity that concurs with the
virtue in question in the particulars of life. In this sense, the virtues are expressions of
enacted choices an individual makes over a period of time. There is a certain
relationship between speculative reason and practical reason here. A person may
indeed have a grasp of the good in a speculative sense, but, through the exercising of
prudence, the truly virtuous is able to enact speculative knowledge of the good in the
particulars of one’s life such that the virtue habituates itself into the character of the
agent. It is this which provides a depth to the notion of habitus as it relates to the
virtuous life.
Though habitus is often translated as ‘habit’, it is not simply through disengaged or
mindless repetitive activity that one acquires the virtues nor is it a form of what
Pinckaers terms an empty “psychological automatism.”304 Pinckaers cautions seeing
the virtuous life as being something acquired through repetitive action alone or the
‘automatic’ activity built on simple notions of habit because such a rendering
diminishes the moral weight that formed virtue should have.305 Rather, virtues are
acquired by deliberate, formed inner conviction which moves one to morally sound
activity born out of sound character – i.e. it is prudential activity which itself forms
the virtuous person. Keenan commenting on the same article by Pinckaers states; “by
prudence, an agent becomes what she or he intentionally does. … Humans are not
simply products of their actions, rather, virtues are acquired by intended, desired,
prudential activity.”306
Such reflections by Keenan and Pinckaers are built on the thoughts of Aquinas who,
in simple terms, taught that the agent’s prudential engagement of particular activities
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occasions the further development of dispositions present within the agent. As
Keenan notes, “Thomas’s appropriation of Avicenna’s formula for the acquisition of
virtue through ‘reflection and exercise’ (stadium et exercitium) is evident here: to be
virtuous requires right exercise of immanent activity.”307 As such, prudence, like any
other virtue, is obtained and perfected through practice in deliberation and action.
When we consider a more nuanced approach to this notion of practice, deliberation
and action, as suggested by Keenan and Pinckaers, we can begin to conceive that
formed virtue is not simply acting automatically, but developing what can be termed
moral maturity.
The cardinal virtue of prudence in particular is dependent on one’s experience in
moral deliberation; experience which is found over a lifetime, which is why,
according to Aquinas, it is seldom found in the young. 308 As such the quality of
prudence is necessarily tied to maturity of age and the necessity of long years of
experience.309 Though the young may have a degree of prudence, Thomistic thought
would suggest there is a correlation between age in years and the capacity for having
a character more fully imbued with prudence.
However, simply living long enough to be considered ‘mature in age’ is not enough.
To again draw on Pinckaers, even simply repeating certain acts for a length of time
does not necessarily lead to the fully formed character. It is thus that Pinckaers notes
that one does not acquire the virtues by simple habit, but by a fuller notion of ‘moral
education’.310 To be ‘educated’ into the moral life one has to be teachable and it is
this which represents the crux of docilitas. Aquinas teaches that the sub-virtue of
docilitas allows one to be humble enough to learn the lessons that life has to offer; to
be open and teachable to the ways that prudential living looks such that one can
indeed mature into being prudent. As such, it also affords an avenue for acquiring
prudence (and indeed an understanding of the virtues overall) for the young such that
they can truly find moral maturity as they grow into physical maturity.
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Of course the notion of docilitas has a multi-layered aspect. It is most directly
translated as ‘docility’ which potentially has the undesirable connotation of what
Pieper terms “simple minded zealousness of the ‘good pupil’.”311 Rather, as Pieper
continues,
what is meant [by docilitas] is the kind of open-mindedness which
recognizes the true variety of things and situations to be experienced and
does not cage itself in any presumption of deceptive knowledge. What is
meant is the ability to take advice, sprung not from any vague “modesty,”
but simply from the desire for real understanding (which, however,
necessarily includes genuine humility).312
The aim of moral maturity is ultimately to be able to recognise and exercise the
virtues in one’s own particular life. Speaking from an educators perspective,
Pinckaers suggests that the aim of moral education is to “acquire enough maturity to
take formation into his own hands and to trace out his path to moral perfection by
himself,”313 i.e. to able to recognise vice and virtue in the reality of their own lives
and the context they occupy. However, such a place of maturity requires a prior
formation that strikes a balance between the need of ‘personalism’ on the one hand
and moral rigour that will not “abandon the other person … to his own
inexperience”314 on the other.
Returning to docilitas in particular, what is imaged here is the realisation that a good
moral pupil will be able to ‘think for themselves’, that is, to be malleable enough to
realise the variety of life situations and have the character to adapt moral
understanding to it. It also, however, requires at a more fundamental level that one be
open enough to being taught in the first place. In the Thomistic tradition, this is
intrinsically part of acquiring prudence. If one finds oneself holding the position of
being a ‘know-it-all’, then it is quite likely that the virtue of prudence is in fact at
some distance away from being acquired. The truly prudent is able to hold the
somewhat counterintuitive notion of needing to be aware of their lack of wisdom and
knowledge such that they are able to seek it from outside of themselves. Thus, it
necessarily requires seeking and recognising what Aquinas would term good counsel.
Indeed, it is part of what would be the first step in the ‘activity of reason’ as
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indicated in ST II-II, 47.8. Prudence includes the ability to seek good counsel and
deliberate well with it, to form judgements about such counsel and inquiry, and to
then command to action in accordance with that judgement.315
To put this into the language of ‘truthful vision’ noted above, seeing reality rightly
will only be possible if one is open enough to being taught how to do so in the first
place. One’s own vision will only go so far. To acquire prudence, one needs to be
open to being educated in moral formation. This is not found simply in abstract
notions of the good nor is such an education found in imparting a codified set of
rules to perform at certain points. Moral formation is an education into moral
maturity, one that allows one to become good such that they recognise it and can
respond rightly in the particulars of daily activity in its infinite possibilities; and such
moral maturity is one that necessarily requires docilitas.
3.3.2 Proverbs and the Concept of Docilitas
This understanding of educating one into moral maturity similarly underscores
Proverbs. It has already been noted that imparting a codified set of moral rules is not
the mode in which Proverbs is shaped. However, the moral life is nonetheless its
underscore and education in this vein certainly seems its intent. As discussed in
2.2.2, the social setting of Proverbs is a disputed understanding. However, what is
generally agreed is that the intention of Proverbs is for instruction, particularly for
the young. Education in ancient Israel and throughout the Ancient Near East was
devoted primarily to the task of “moral formation” or the “building of character”316
and Proverbs, shares this aim. In agreement with Aquinas as discussed above,
Proverbs suggests that prudence is seldom found in the young and they have to be
formed into moral maturity in that sense. It was noted previously (in 2.2.1) that the
overall progression found in Proverbs is to move ‘the student’ from a place of naïve
childhood to one of moral maturity able to deal prudently with the caprices of life.
The aim here is to bring this into sharper focus through the sub-virtue of docilitas.
More specifically, we can examine how Proverbs seeks to imbue the reader with a
sense of docilitas as part of its pedagogical framework and thus help us shape an
understanding of this important part of prudence.
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As with the Thomistic notion of docilitas mentioned above, the start of wisdom is
found in the ability for the pupil to have a quality of humility, to realise that they can
only grasp the height of wisdom by being aware that they are, in fact, not near it in
the first place. Crenshaw concludes his opening section in The Acquisition of
Knowledge in Israelite Wisdom Literature by highlighting such a notion:
[The teachers of wisdom] never forgot that wisdom was a stage beyond
knowledge and that it meant far more than the accumulation of
information. Wisdom, the capacity to use information for human good,
includes virtue. By virtue these scholars meant generosity and humility.
Perhaps a biblical proverb best sums up what these ancient scholars seem
to have meant.
Three things are too wonderful for me;
four I do not understand:
the way of an eagle in the sky,
the way of a snake on a rock,
the way of a ship on the high seas,
and the way of a man with a girl. (Prov 30:18–19)317
Life’s abundant mysteries evoke gratitude and reverence before the
author of wisdom and truth.318
Elsewhere in Proverbs we are reminded that deception is the vice of the fool and the
wisdom of the prudent (ʿārûm) is to understand one’s way (Prov 14:8). However, this
cannot be a self-created activity. Understanding one’s way is not the same as selfforming one’s way despite the contemporary tendency to equate the two. On the
contrary, according to Proverbs, one in essence despises the self if they do not seek
to be formed by those around them:
Those who ignore instruction despise themselves,
but those who heed admonition gain understanding. (Prov 15:32)
Quite simply the fool thinks they know it all, while the wise seek and, more
importantly, listen to advice (12:15) even when it is not that easy to receive.
As discussed above, to be without prudence is to lack heart/understanding. If one is
to overcome this lack, one needs to be willing to do so through the discipline of
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submitting to the critical judgment of others, particularly those who not only hold
authority but have intimate knowledge of you:
A fool despises a parent’s instruction,
but the one who heeds admonition is prudent. (Prov 15:5)
It is worth dwelling on this verse for a moment. In section 2.2.2, the role of the
‘parent’s instruction’ was touched on. Drawing on that again, we see that parental
image implies not only a mark of authority in an abstract sense but, moreover, one
who seeks to form their child in the context of a particular familial community; to
maintain and enhance an existent relationship. The one who is acquiring prudential
wisdom recognises that right instruction and ‘admonition’ will come from such a
relationship.319
Further, as Fox notes, the structure of this verse is typical of the A-B line structure.
In this case we are to deduce from the B line the consequence unstated in the A line,
namely that a fool will remain imprudent if they despise a ‘parent’s instruction’.
Thus, “The fool … very likely fancies himself ʿarum ‘shrewd,’ ‘cunning,’ so the
proverb targets the very quality he prides himself on.”320 Fox goes on to note that the
focus is not on the “chiding” a parent might instinctively express in response to poor
behaviour. Rather, the reprimand implied is more considered; “instruction
(discipline) and admonition (reproof) are ethical correction.”321 Taken as a whole, the
imprudent fails to recognise the value in authoritative familial moral instruction not
because they do not value ‘prudence’ itself (or aspects akin to it), but because they
think they already have it. In contrast, one who is actually enhancing prudence
knows how to accept admonition from appropriate sources.
The one truly seeking prudential wisdom not only heeds it as found in familiar
environments, but will actively seek it out in the world they live. Fox’s translation of
Prov 15:12 provides an example of this:
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The impudent man does not like being rebuked.
He will not go to the wise.322
The verse rests on the principle that the one truly seeking prudential wisdom will
find company that helps in this cause, a notion that is echoed throughout Proverbs
(e.g. 12:1; 13:20; 14:7). The impudent one (Heb: lēṣ lit. prideful and scorning) does
not recognise the value of wise correction and thus is dissuaded from finding
company that would offer such advice. They will keep away from the wise who will
have an eye to rightly point out imprudence and foolishness where they see it. In
contrast, one who seeks to live wisely will understand that rebuke and correction will
be part of the process, they will not only hear it as such, they will, further, ‘bed
down’ and find a home in it. As 15:31 states:
The ear that heeds wholesome admonition
will lodge among the wise.
All this points to the good quality of being humble and teachable that Proverbs
esteems and many other examples could be drawn.323 However it is the attitude that
one must hold that is to be highlighted.
Prov 12:1, for example, bluntly states:
Whoever loves discipline loves knowledge,
but those who hate to be rebuked are stupid.
Here one who loves discipline (mûsār) is, effectively, showing right corresponding
love for knowledge (daʿat). This knowledge is no doubt prudential and valuable to
the one who would seek it and would allow them to live the good life. However, this
knowledge is not the real focus of this proverb as such. The focus, rather, is on the
seeker of daʿat. Someone who has to seek this ‘knowledge’ is not, by implication,
fully wise or knowledgeable and, as such, some of his or her actions may call for
correction. However, lacking wisdom or knowledge is not necessarily in and of itself
a foolish or an immoral position. The virtue really being highlighted here is not
knowledge (prudential or otherwise) but, rather, the attitude of being open and
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indeed appreciating reproof.324 On the other hand, he who hates reproof is ‘stupid’
regardless of what they may demonstratively know or not know. Their culpability
lies in their attitude to learning (mûsār), an attitude which leads to irredeemable
ignorance.325
Thus, the attitude that is in keeping with docilitas has an air of paradox about it. As
Davis states in her reflections on Proverbs 3:5-8:
The sages address us [the readers] as newborns, challenging us to give up
our adult pretensions to know just what to do. Shockingly, prudence
begins with acceptance of our own ignorance; yet ignorance itself is no
virtue. The sages have no praise for the intellectually lazy; only fools
hate knowledge (1:22). Nonetheless, genuine prudence means
recognizing how much in fact we do not know, and can never know.326
This last statement is poignant. Davis here is drawing from Prov 3:5; “Trust in the
Lord with all your heart, and do not rely on your own insight.” As mentioned above,
it is the same verse that Aquinas himself uses to highlight the importance of docilitas
to prudence. But Davis is also drawing in the greater theological notion of ‘fear of
Yahweh’ which is persistent throughout Proverbs and is ‘the beginning of all
wisdom’ (1:7; 9:10).327 Full and complete wisdom is only found in God, thus there
will always be a knowing that is beyond us. Proverbs illustrates that a notion of
docilitas extends to this inestimable level and informs the attitude that the student of
wise living should have. As Davis puts it, “the discipline of elders is a necessary help
towards prudence, but a properly rigorous attitude toward myself always proceeds
from a realistic attitude toward God.”328
With the above in mind, it is not surprising that Proverbs is keen to teach the student
to recognise good authority from that which is malevolent. Clifford makes the point
that in Proverbs, particularly Prov 1-9, key authority figures in the parent and ‘Lady
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Wisdom’ are found. Further, the instructions the authority figures provide are not
very specific. Rather, “they inculcate receptivity to trustworthy authorities and
fidelity to basic relationships. Counter-voices mimic the genuine call and must be
rejected for the primary invitation to be properly received.”329 In other words, an
overarching theme in Proverbs is to recognise and heed the advice from appropriate
authority, but to recognise that there are many characters (both literal and figurative)
who will make claim to our sensibilities and searching who in fact have no capacity
to impart true wisdom. For example, the calls of both Lady Wisdom and the
juxtaposed Woman Folly will be found in the streets, squares and many other
vantage points (Prov 1:9 and 9:14-15 respectively). The task for the attentive student
is to recognise them for what they are. To find counsel in the right place as it were.
When found, such sources of advice and counsel need to be approached with
humility and a state of being teachable, an approach that is forever useful for even
the wise can be come wiser still (Prov 9:9; 1:5).

3.4 Solertia
As has been pointed out previously, in both the Thomistic tradition and the wisdom
literature there is an understanding that creation is imbued with a certain order.
However, our experience of creation is not always predictable and the dynamism of
our existence means that it is impossible to account for every circumstance we may
face. The most complete moral system, codified or otherwise, or the most
knowledgeable in moral matters cannot anticipate every situation one will face in
every context. Further, such vagaries of life can rise in such a manner that timely
response is required. Solertia is the ability to respond to such matters; to assess a
situation quickly yet accurately and move one towards the goal of the good.
One advantage of the character-based morality taught in Proverbs is that it too
recognises that all contingencies cannot be catered for and, though there is a
discernible order in creation, the fullness of this understanding is beyond us. We can,
however, navigate this uncertainty by forming a certain character of preparedness
that allows us to respond to such contingencies in a composed yet decisive manner.
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3.4.1 Solertia: Timely Decisiveness
Solertia is not a word that translates simply into English. As Aquinas uses it, it can
be understood as adroit, astuteness and quickness of mind. Deferrari states that it
means “skill in discovering something, especially the principle of a thing.”330 Pieper
uses the term “nimbleness” and describes it as “objectiveness in unexpected
situations” 331 and Thomas Gilby translates the term in the Summa Theologiae to
acumen.332 All these terms capture the notion of Solertia which is an ability to assess
a situation and decide on a right course of action and to do so in good time. Its focus
is an ability to come to a right decision when presented with the unexpected and
when “something has to be done without warning.”333
This particular habitus which serves prudence sits in contrast to other aspects that we
might consider useful for the virtue. For example, the two other parts of prudence
examined above (memoria and docilitas) are lingering and more deliberate in their
nature. They are based on the idea that one can grasp reality and come to right
decisions with sound reflection, both introspectively and by good external advice and
counsel, over a lengthy period of time. However, life and the moral encounters that it
requires will present us with the necessity to make decisions in quick time, ones for
which we may not be able to fully prepare. In such circumstances, the ability to
accurately size up the situation and act well to achieve the good is a required aspect
for the perfection of prudence.
However, the focus on rapidity can be overstated. Good decisions, even when needed
quickly, should still employ the aptitudes of prudence. Aquinas holds that certain
steps are needed to cause an action to be prudent. Included among them are true-tobeing memory, insight into the present and heeding good advice, all of which inform
an action. For Aquinas unnecessarily rushing any of these steps can lead to
imprudence rather than prudence.334 Further, thoughtless action even when haste is
required is still thoughtlessness and will necessarily lead to a poor judgment of
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reality and thus is culpable to sin.335 On the other hand, being thoughtful and wellreasoned, but lacking decisiveness to execute a conviction in good time will likewise
inhibit prudence.336 Thoughtless haste is a vice not to be confused with solertia. On
the other hand, indecisive irresolution is not to be considered a viable approach to
moral quandary either. Solertia, in a sense, is an ability to make the right decision at
the right time.
This aspect of the virtue of prudence is applicable to any age, but perhaps is
particularly pertinent today where the types of activity we engage in and the
technological advances of modern life accelerate the frequency in which we are
faced with new experiences in decision making. Celia Deane-Drummond provides an
interesting insight into the value of prudence in this regard and includes the value of
the three ‘sub-virtues’ that are examined here.337 Regarding solertia she states that,
“Solertia includes the ability to take decisions when faced with the unexpected, even
when there is little time for deliberation, as it draws on the experience gained in the
past.”338
As Deane-Drummond is indicating, solertia (as with the other aspects of prudence
and the virtues overall for that matter) does not operate in isolation from other
abilities and virtues. The successful implementation of solertia assumes that other
parts are functioning well. In this case memoria is alluded to, but another that is
indicated by Aquinas himself is solicitude (sollicitudo). 339 Aquinas warns against
excessive solicitousness as unnecessary fear and anxiety towards the future which
not only clouds judgement but disturbs the spirit. 340 However, urgent concern of
future contingencies regarding things that matter is an aid to the prudential life. It
encourages one to be moved to rightly prepare in both a practical and psychical sense
but recognises, at the same time, that one can never operate out of a state of complete
certitude. As Aquinas states, “because the subject matter of prudence is composed of
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contingent individual incidents, which form the setting for human acts, the certitude
of prudence is not such as to remove entirely all uneasiness of mind.”341
To expand on this, Aquinas notes that there is an appropriate solicitude to any
moment; “different times call for their own sort of solicitude.” 342 Taking this on
board, we can say that reading the times that one is situated in allows one to prepare
rightly for the circumstances of one’s life. However, we must also recognise that we
cannot account for all contingencies. Solertia, then, is the ability to face such
contingencies when they arise in keeping with the wider notion of prudence. To
change the terminology slightly while still holding to the principle; concern which
leads to preparedness does not eliminate the need for nimble astuteness, rather, it
serves it. To illustrate this notion Aquinas uses the example of the ‘diligent ant’
found in Prov 6:6. A reflection on this provides a useful entry way into this subject as
found in Proverbs.
3.4.2 Proverbs and the Concept of Solertia
It is not uncommon in the Hebrew Scriptures for animal behaviour to be held up as a
model in the ways of wisdom and right living. 343 In the case focused on here,
Proverbs uses the ant to target the problematic behaviour of laziness but it also
speaks to the notion of sollicitudo as just indicated. It reads:
Go to the ant, you lazybones;
consider its ways, and be wise.
Without having any chief
or officer or ruler,
it prepares its food in summer,
and gathers its sustenance in harvest. (6:6-8)
The word translated by the NRSV to ‘lazybones’ is the character being targeted and
is less colloquially translated to ‘sluggard’ by many other versions and
commentaries. The sluggard is one who not only embodies laziness, in itself a vice
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like quality but, as highlighted in these verses in particular, does not have an
appreciation for the season at hand. Hence Aquinas points out the ant, in contrast to
the ‘sluggard’, shows solicitude at the seasonable time.344
Davis provides a useful analysis of this verse in relation to the Thomistic expression
of solicitude and notes that the parable of the ant can be engaged on three particular
layers. 345 First is the more obvious reading where what is being encouraged is
practical and industrious preparation. Another is the encouragement to pay particular
attention to the non-human world, a kind of ‘nature wisdom’, to use Davis’ term; to
read accurately the goings on of our created reality and seek wisdom therein.
However, the notion that is most pertinent to our concern is based on a long
traditional reading of this passage which sees it as an admonition against the sin of
sloth. This interpretation of Prov 6:6 is more overtly spiritual and moral in that sense.
As Davis puts it:
Sloth is more than laziness, an aversion to work. One may have
considerable achievements and still be slothful. The spiritually deadly sin
is the refusal to be alert to the new opportunities that continually come to
us from God, opportunities that require us to keep our hearts open, minds
fresh and restless in God’s service.346
What the ant teaches then, in this traditional reading, is an urgent concern for the
future that motivates one to action – but not action for the sake of activity. The ant is
not motivated to do anything and certainly not everything, but to prepare food based
on what the season holds. There is, as the often quoted stanza from another wisdom
book states, a time for all things (Ecc. 3:1-8).
As such, we can well note that ‘solicitous preparedness’ is part of the moral life
esteemed in Proverbs347 but, ironically it might seem, one way that solicitousness is
exercised rightly and aids prudence is recognising that we cannot attend to all
circumstances.348 We cannot account for all cases in advance, only what is presented
to us in a given time and place, but a prepared attitude and openness to ‘new
344
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happenings’ allows us to deal in a prudent manner with such events. Here we a
returning to solertia in particular. The ability to discern rightly and with good timing
what is presented to us in a given moment, particularly in regard to the unexpected.
In terms of particular texts in Proverbs, there is not anything obvious which discusses
the ‘unexpected’ or novel as a dilemma in its own right. However, it does point out
that calamity catches the fool by surprise as they are so blind to the reality of the
world and fail to heed the teaching of wisdom (e.g. Prov 1:26-27; 6:15). Moreover,
Proverbs does call the one of sound character to be ready to enact and apply the
teaching of prudential wisdom at any moment. As Prov 22:17-18 states:
Incline your ear and hear my words,
and apply your mind to my teaching;
for it will be pleasant if you keep them within you,
if all of them are ready on your lips.
The latter stanza in this verse suggests no specific reward except for goodness itself
(nāʿîm translated as ‘pleasant’ here); there is no concrete issue at hand toward which
the wisdom being taught will address. However there is the imperative that such
teaching will nonetheless be useful at any moment. The notion of ‘on your lips’
captures this; what is internalised in our minds (Heb: lēb) will find expression in our
lips, a symbol of both action and speech.349
Indeed, as has been discussed in the examination of Proverbs overall, the
pedagogical structure of Proverbs is such that the aim is not to prescribe set action in
and of itself but, rather, form one into a certain quality of character such that they are
able to cater for the particularities of any given situation and to navigate the
sometimes conflicting requirements of living the moral life. This is evidenced in the
myriad of life settings and aphorisms, sometimes contradictory, which form the
collection of chs.10-29. An often quoted example is 26:4-5:
4

Do not answer fools according to their folly,
or you will be a fool yourself.
5
Answer fools according to their folly,
or they will be wise in their own eyes.
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Not only do we see a contradiction, but they are deliberately, it would seem, placed
up against each other. There have been many interpretations attempting to reconcile
the contradiction 350 but most scholars concede that the presence of contrasting
maxims is a point in itself. As Crenshaw states:
The wise man is one who knows the right time and place, the person who
exercises propriety. Thus one finds outright contradictions in proverbial
sayings, once even juxtaposed (Prov 26:4-5) … Both statements are true,
and one must choose which of the two is called for by the situation itself.
The willingness to face up to contradictions arises out of the fact that
wisdom is an open system, … the sage knew that there were limitations
to the comprehension of reality, both in terms of intellectual capacity and
divine inscrutability … The ever present incalculable ingredient to every
experience promoted an openness to various possibilities and a
recognition of one’s limits.351
Thus those with prudential wisdom know how to read the times and anticipate the
choices one will have to make (what we understand as solicitousness), but has the
acumen of solertia to deal with the ‘incalculable’ and unexpected that even the
wisest sage cannot fully anticipate.
Solertia as an aid to prudence requires a certain disposition in other modes as well.
For example Proverbs often attests that a prudentially wise person is calm (17:27),
good-tempered (15:18), patient (19:11), unperturbed and measured (14:29-30) in
character. Thoughtless haste is particularly problematic and will have one missing
the way of wisdom all together (19:2). Composure is the key to dealing wisely with
the situations of life, particularly when emotional rashness is the easier option
(15:11). All these points allow one to hold solertia which thus allows one to be
prudent in any circumstance.

At the start of this section it was noted that a key aspect of prudence is truthful
vision. There are many ways this can be unpacked, three noted here help elucidate an
understanding of truthful vision and, further, how the Thomistic notion and the
teaching of Proverbs correlates and aids such an understanding. Memoria is an
important starting point of truthful vision as it draws the agent to recall rightly the
350
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lessons of the past. Proverbs in particular attests that a sense of memoria is more than
cognisant recollection but is, rather, an honest dealing with the self in a total sense –
a ‘true-to-being’ memory. Such an approach will necessarily recognise that no one
person can possibly have all that is required to live the moral life, as such, the one
who is truly prudent will also employ the ability of docilitas. In this regard, the
assumed and expressed underpinning of Proverbs rests on a notion that the full moral
life is not automatically attained but, rather, requires an attentive openness to
teaching; a humility and attitude of seeking such that one can be educated and
formed. As such, docilitas is not simply a passive docility that an English translation
might suggest, but an engaged obedience to right authority and right teaching built
on respect. However, even the most well-formed and ‘true-to-self’ individual will
encounter circumstances that cannot be entirely anticipated. In such a case, solertia is
an ability to still remain prudent even in those circumstances; to stay ‘true to
character’, as it were, when circumstances are most likely to force one to do
otherwise. As such, truthful vision is neither purely retrospective nor entirely
anticipatory (though it includes those elements), but seeks to hold to a truthful grasp
of reality in the particularities of a given moment.
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4. Thomas Aquinas in Dialogue with Proverbs: Socio-Political
and Theological Dimensions of Prudence
The overall work to this point has examined a number of different aspects of
prudence and sought to analyse Proverbs in relation to it. The aim of this final
section is to bring some of that discussion into a closer dialogue with Thomistic
thought. Two dimensions of prudence are examined here. The first is the socialpolitical dimension of prudence, more commonly understood as political prudence. It
recalls particularly section 2.2.2, though draws on the overall discussion had to this
point. The second dimension attempts to address the theological dimension of
prudence in a particular mode. The theological dimension has been addressed
throughout this work, but by way of conclusion it provides a crowning perspective of
what prudence in its fullest sense is in the Thomistic tradition and how it can
correlatively inform and be informed by the teaching of Proverbs.

4.1 Thomistic Political Prudence
The virtue of prudence in the Thomistic tradition has a significant political
dimension.352 This dimension also brings to the fore the difficulty that can present
itself when drawing two somewhat disparate traditions into dialogue when
expounding one concept. In this regard especially, Aquinas is far more technical and
delineating in his understanding of morality compared to the more organic and
eclectic approach that we see in writings such as Proverbs. For Aquinas, the moral
science was divided into three distinct spheres that allowed for conceptions of
corresponding types of virtues. The first domain concerned personal conduct, that
which pertains to all people, the second was the management of the household and
the third was concerned with right governance of a city or realm. Correspondingly,
there were three types of prudence: personal prudence (prudentia simpliciter dicta),
domestic prudence (prudentia oeconmica) and governmental prudence (prudentia
regnativa).353 Not surprisingly given Aquinas draws on Aristotle in this field, the
352

As J. Patrick Dobel states, the virtue of prudence has long been considered “a linchpin of political
judgment and that any theory of leadership needs to develop an account of prudence.” J. Patrick
Dobel, "Political Prudence and the Ethics of Leadership," Public Administration Review 58, no. 1
(1998): 74.
353
All three terms (personal prudence, domestic prudence and governmental prudence) are defined by
the ends they seek (good of the individual, good of the family/household, good of the nation/polis

107

question of the distinctly political nature of prudence is given some attention
throughout his work including the Summa Theologiae. For example, he states:
It belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and command
concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence
regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the common
good of the multitude.354
Aquinas later goes on to articulate the special place of prudence in the life of the
individual ruler in attaining the ‘common good’:
Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of governance in
one who has to govern not only himself but also the perfect community
of a city or kingdom; because a government is the more perfect according
as it is more universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher end.
Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king
who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom.355
Domestic prudence follows this in a sense, though is still seen as distinct and sits as a
‘midway point’ between political and personal prudence. Thomas notes that just as
individuals are part of a family, so a family is part of a political community. As such,
domestic prudence is distinct in that the head of a household exercises an authority
“like a king … but without the full power of a king.”356 Beyond this, Thomistic
thought does not display a particularly strong emphasis on prudence in the familial
context as it pertains to maintaining the ‘common good’ compared to the imagery of
prudential wisdom in Proverbs. However, as in Proverbs, Thomistic thought does
draw attention to the importance of maintaining ‘good family order’ as an important
aspect of maintaining the good of the community more broadly speaking even when
the notion of ‘domestic prudence’ is not directly evoked. In Thomistic thought, it is
evident that the understanding that the various ‘institutions’ of society (e.g. family,
state, legislative authorities, church) are linked to the wellbeing of both society and
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individual. 357 Regarding the formation of the virtuous person, it is certainly well
noted that the place of familial relationships becomes vital. As Wadell sates:
Morality is not something [apart from] friendship, but is what happens to
us through the best and most enduring relationships of our lives, with
God to be sure, but also with family, spouses, communities, or lifelong
companions. It is in these friendships that our character takes shape and
we are transformed in the good.358
Thus, the familial context matters to the formation of good societies and good
individuals.
Returning to the more technical aspects of virtue of prudence in the social-political
sphere, Aquinas’s scheme offers important points of reflection. Certainly on the face
of it, Aquinas seems to follow many other classical thinkers in understanding an
ordered society as being the outworking and the responsibility of the prudent ruler
who, in that capacity, allows society to experience a ‘common good’. In this vein
Aquinas seems to hold a hierarchical sense of political ordering drawn from a
cosmological (and theological) understanding of the created order. Aquinas utilises
Dionysius in particular whose neo-platonic, theologically informed, hierarchical
imagery was very influential throughout the middle ages and seemingly on Aquinas
himself.359 Moreover, Aquinas holds that the crown of any hierarchal sense of reality
is a God who governs, by way of the eternal law, “the whole community of the
universe by Divine Reason” and by “dictates of practical reason.”360 The rulers in a
society are called to participate in the same eternal law by fulfilling the natural law in
357
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their capacity as ruler by way of prudence (governmental prudence to be more
specific) so the community itself can be ‘perfected’.
This is not unlike, at least in broad principle, the expression that seems to sit behind
wisdom in Proverbs (where it pertains to governance) and articulated in 1 Kings as
noted above in section 2.2.2. Recall, however, that the role prudential wisdom might
have in maintaining a morally ordered society does not rest in the ruling class alone.
Similarly Aquinas, and many influenced by him, does not leave the ‘perfection of
society’, and the role of political prudence therein, within the moral character and
actions of the ruler(s). Clearly, there are expressions in the Aristotelian tradition that
find their way into Aquinas’s thought that suggest the role of subjects, being the
individual members of society, is to simply enact ordinances prudently within their
limited sphere of influence.361 However, the place of the individual and the virtue of
prudence, even in a societal context, is more sophisticated than that line of thought
would suggest.
A closer examination of Thomistic thought identifies that there is a greater role for
those being ruled (the subjects) in building a society that is ordered to the common
good. This can be gleaned when we recognise how Aquinas draws from Aristotle in
the formation of his political conceptions. Aquinas uses Aristotle heavily, but he
does so in certain ways and, ultimately, in ways of some difference to that of classic
Aristotelian thought. Gilby is one who examines this and he demonstrates how
Aquinas moves Aristotelian notions in a direction that suggests political
responsibility (and hence a notion of political prudence), in some sense at least, rests
on all people not simply those charged with enacting societal ordinances. Gilby
articulates that in Aquinas’s earlier writings, particularly in the Commentary on the
Sentences, Aquinas followed Aristotle in stressing the role of ‘governmental
prudence’ (prudentia regnativa) and there was only “a vague reference to another
kind of prudence which should be expected of his subjects, namely the statesmanship
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of the citizens themselves.”362 In the Summa Theologiae, however, Gilby points out
that Aquinas modified Aristotle’s approach. Gilby states “Statesmanlike prudence,
prudentia politica, was not reserved to the ruler, … it was the virtue of practical
intelligence whereby citizens freely made their own ordinances of political
authority.”363
Here Gilby is focusing on the difference between prudentia politica, what might be
termed political or civic prudence; a prudence of the populace, 364 and prudentia
regnativa which is the term Aquinas generally uses when discussing the virtue in
relation to the person or persons in positions of legislative leadership. Prudentia
regnativa would rightly be attributed to the position of regent and political law
maker, while the former (political or civic prudence) is something that can be
acquired and exercised by everybody within a given polis. It is this broader notion of
civic prudence where Aquinas (unlike Aristotle) seems to place significant focus.
Gilby explains this shift from a traditional reading of Aristotle as such; he notes that
Aquinas’s examination of Politics indicated that political prudence was restricted to
the governor.365 However,
St. Thomas was uneasy about the limitation of political responsibility. In
the Summa Theologiae, however, he felt freer to expound his own
sentiments even if that meant stretching what Aristotle had said. The
legis positiva and the government was in some sense everybody’s
responsibility.”366
The point of interest for the concern of this project is that the role of prudence as a
virtue is one that not only finds expression in the life of the individual but, while
remaining operative in the individual, has a role in shaping the good of the
community at large and does so regardless of where a person sits within the various
strata of a given community. In this vein, Aquinas sees a connexion between the
362
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good to be found in the individual and a communal sense of the good. Moreover,
prudence that is exercised in whatever capacity will rightly regard the “common
good of all people, not merely the private good of one individual.”367 Along these
lines, the primacy of the common good is well evidenced in Thomistic writing.368
This is premised, however, by an understanding held by Aquinas that the human
person is necessarily social and so, even in a perfect state, what Aquinas would
describe as a ‘state of innocence’, she would maintain that social context,369 thus the
goodness of the individual will also serve the good of the whole. It is this socialcommunal dimension in Thomistic thought that adds depth to the virtue of prudence
that could otherwise be construed in rather individualistic terms. Naturally, the
responsibility of maintaining a ‘common good’ is going to rest more overtly in the
ruler. However, as noted above and indicated by Aquinas himself, the individual
subject (not just the ruler) should also employ ‘political prudence’ for the sake of the
common good.370
Broadly speaking then, prudence as taught in the Thomistic tradition, though it will
have particular ends proper to the position one holds, is fundamentally a virtue that
should play a role in both the individual subject and in the communal-political
sphere. In this sense there is a correlation of sorts between prudence in Thomistic
virtue theory and Proverbial wisdom. The wisdom teaching of Proverbs is couched in
more familial context, but it nonetheless stresses a communal dimension and
responsibility to the ‘common good’ that crosses all strata of society. It is worth
unpacking this further. Starting with the communal dimension generally, it is often
observed that, though many of the teachings of Proverbs seem to be addressed to a
single person and relate to his individual success and prosperity, the person is
nonetheless necessarily seen in a communal context. For example, Frydrych states:
While the book addresses itself to an individual and the depiction of
success is largely in individual terms, in general, prosperity is understood
in the book as happening in the context of the progress and affluence of a
367
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community to which the individual belongs. Wisdom is not simply a tool
of bringing order and success to an individual’s life, but also a means for
creating order on the social level. The righteous and wise uphold such an
order, principally to do with justice, while the fools reject and pervert
it.371
The interrelationship between the individual good and the surrounding community is
not only implied, but often stated as such, particularly in the sentence material (10:129:27). For example, Prov 10:21 states that the righteousness of the individual is not
only self-nourishing, but it “feeds many, while fools die for lack of sense.” The
implication seems to be that those who surround the righteous one will be nourished
as a natural consequence; a spilling over, as it were, of goodness. In contrast, the fool
as a victim of his own lack of ‘right reasoning’372 not only fails to see the value of
goodness in itself, but he fails to recognise the nourishment provided by the wise
around him and becomes lost within his individual folly.
Naturally the wellbeing of the community is tied to the ruler in many ways and, as
already noted above, it seems self-evident that people would rejoice when the
righteous rise in influence and groan with despair when “the wicked rule” (Prov
29:2). Nevertheless, for large parts of Proverbs, the familial/communal setting is the
most important dimension in which prudential wisdom as a concept is expressed and
in which it is to also be found. Familial points of reference are located throughout
and, in particular, the parent appealing to the child to follow the former’s teaching is
most common. This is perhaps more evidenced in the lecture material where we see
the importance of family cohesion expressed. As an example, on a number of
occasions the notion of marital faithfulness is evoked (e.g. 5:15-20) and considered
of the utmost importance given the discord that can follow from the jealousy that
unfaithfulness unleashes (6:34).
Expanding on this example of marital faithfulness, the point to focus on is that,
within Proverbs at least, it is not adultery or lack of faithfulness in itself which is of
concern – an intrinsic evil of the act in itself is not the issue. Rather, it is the
disharmony that it creates within the family as well as in wider society that is of
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concern. As Rodd states, “what the writers of proverbs and the givers of instruction
are worried about are those who threaten the stability and easy functioning of the
community. This can be seen from various angles.”373 Those angles include what we
could term the general public sphere; the marketplace, streets, the gate and town
squares374 where thieves and murderers undermine the community (Prov. 1:11-19).
Prov 11:9 indicates that one’s imprudent words could destroy one’s friends and
neighbours but prudent knowledge (daʿat) can build the society up, a notion that
extends to the wellbeing of the city at large (11:10-11).375 It is within this larger
framework that the most significant angle of the familial dimension sits – the “home
and the wider society cannot be separated. Stability within the community is of
central importance to the sages, and they are swift to condemn those who disturb
it.”376
There is a role for the political leadership in this, and on at least one occasion (Prov
29:4) the character of the king is explicitly tied to the stability society might enjoy,
and thousands of years after such words were recorded, the virtue of prudence as
understood in our contemporary times would likewise still hold; as Dobel states,
“prudent leaders hold special responsibilities to maintain and strengthen community
foundations. Excellent political achievements do not stand in isolation but sustain the
legitimacy of institutions and build community.”377 It is this communal dimension
that Proverbs helps to draw into focus, but it does so with a view that it is not only
the prudent political leader who creates life giving communities, but all people
valuing, seeking and acquiring prudential wisdom that will necessarily be needed if
we want stable and successful societies.
By way of conclusion we can draw two points of focus. Firstly, both the wisdom of
Proverbs and the virtue of prudence in the Thomistic tradition point to a
political/communal dimension. In Aquinas there is more emphasis on the political
role that prudence employs particularly as it relates to those in governmental
authority and is inherently more technical. Proverbs places far less emphasis on the
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importance of the political leadership in this regard (in the form of the court/king in
its own context), but it is nonetheless present. In both cases, however, there is
recognition that prudence will necessarily have a communal dimension whether
exercised by the ruler in their capacity as leader, in the familial context or at the
individual level in one’s ‘common’ life. It is this communal dimension which offers
a particular twist on our contemporary understanding of the virtue of prudence (or
the virtues in general for that matter). There is a tendency to see them in an
individual sense; that it is the betterment of my individual character that is ultimately
and perhaps even entirely at stake. The virtue tradition and, even more so, the
prudential wisdom teaching of Proverbs, reminds us that our character formation and
the actions that ensue will necessarily shape our community and, likewise, our
character will be shaped by the community in return. Indeed, as the discussion on
docilitas in particular attests, the need of the other in the formation of the self is in
fact necessary.378 Brown discussing the relational dimension of prudential wisdom in
Proverbs agrees. Taking 3:27-31 as an example, he states that the listed five negative
directives are designed to illustrate the outworking of “the sensibly prudent
lifestyle.” He continues:
How they hang together is readily clear. All deal with the maintenance of
harmonious relationship within the community. The importance of this
list cannot be underestimated, since it clearly indicates that the
instrumental virtues of discretion and good sense (3:21) are intimately
bound up with the welfare of the community. The prudent lifestyle is
profiled relationally, beyond the perspective of the efficient and
successful attainment of individual goals.379
Secondly, the familial/communal dimension, certainly as far as Proverbs is
concerned, is another layer of universality that seems to underpin its teachings. As
discussed previously, the eclectic socio-political setting and multi-authored influence
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of Proverbs points to a universality in its teaching. Though it may not seem so
obvious on the face of it, the importance of prudential wisdom in maintaining
fundamental familial relationships also lends itself to a universal appeal. It might
seem counter intuitive to state that the family speaks to a universal principle because
how we understand the notion of family seems to be heavily influenced by the social
setting in which it sits. A family of modern day Europe, for example, could well be
considered very different to a family in ancient Israel. Even within the biblical world,
the character of a ‘typical family’ in Israel in the monarchical era would differ in
quite significant ways from pre-monarchical Israel – and both find expression
throughout the vast scope that the Hebrew bible covers and, as noted above, within
Proverbs itself. It is for this reason that Perdue in his examination of the family in the
Hebrew tradition warns against drawing “absolutist, propositional, moralistic truths”
on the “dos and don’ts” for the modern family in the contemporary Western
context.380 Nevertheless, as Carol Meyers in the same publication suggests, “virtually
all considerations of human behaviour operate under the assumption that there is
such a thing as a family in every society. Indeed, the family is empirically
ubiquitous”381 and it is this sense of ubiquity which seems to pervade Proverbial
teaching. Regardless of the socio-historical setting, those who embody prudential
wisdom will do so within our fundamental social units and it will necessarily lead to
a communal good.
Moreover, the formation of prudence should not be considered a moral trait for the
‘professional’ statesman or those in socio-political power.382 As Aquinas indicates,
theirs is a special place that requires the perfection of prudence for the sake of the
common good, but there are limits to leadership regardless of age or system.
Proverbs expresses a similar sentiment in the limitation of kingship (of the human
kind at least) in the imagery of Solomon as the patron of Wisdom. We recall from
section 2.2.2 above that Solomon represents a highpoint of Israelite culture and,
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moreover, he represents a point in history where unity and order are apparent and
thus can speak with authority in dictating how ‘the good life’ for Israel can be found
and what it constitutes – most notably that it is found in wisdom itself. But the
prudently wise king is not enough, and so Proverbs emphasises, even more so than
Thomistic thinking (even though there is a correlation of sorts) that prudential
wisdom is to be sought by those at any level of society and in any sphere of life. It is
in this broad application to the formation of character that will ultimately lead to both
the good of the individual and of life-giving societies.

4.2 Theological Imagery and the Infused Virtues
We recall the concluding examination of Proverbs conducted above (section 2.2.4)
highlighted the teleological image of life that informs the direction to which
prudential wisdom aspires. This teleological imagery provides a useful comparative
basis on how Proverbs and Thomistic conception of the virtue of prudence can be
examined. It is well established that Aquinas employed the eudaimonic principles
from Aristotle and related philosophies to help formulate his broader moral outlook
and, as touched on in earlier sections, this approach is integral in understanding the
virtues. To briefly elaborate, virtue theory in this classically informed mode has at its
heart the idea that everything has a particular and appropriate telos or a ‘final end’
which, when realised, expresses the fullness of that thing. Further, when that proper
end is realised, the thing is fulfilled or ‘happy’ (Greek: eudaimonia). Eudaimonia, in
Aristotelian thought and that which follows it, is the highest human good and, in
itself, has significant resonance (though is not to be confused as being the same
thing) as the notion of ‘goodness of life’ as found in the Proverbs discussed above.
As with Proverbs, classically defined eudaimonia has a certain depth. It is identified
with having a good life in a whole and consistent basis – it consists in both living
well (eu zēn) and doing well (eu prattein).383
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Aquinas takes such a position and, though he ultimately moves away from Aristotle,
fundamentally agrees with it. In Summa Theologiae I-II 1-5 Aquinas discusses such
notions more closely. There he points out that all humans desire complete fulfilment
and this complete fulfilment is what is meant by the ‘ultimate end’ (ultimi finis) of
human existence.384 The good, then, is that which rightfully realises this ‘desire for
fulfilment’. However, as he goes on to articulate, how one realises such an end is not
held unanimously, “since some desire riches, as their consummate good; some,
pleasure; others, something else.” 385 For Aquinas, this uncertainty about what the
good actually is opens up the idea of limits of human nature and, further, sin (both
actual and original) which has as one of its effects the confusing of the desire for the
ultimate end with the seeking of it in ‘lesser goods’.386 Though Proverbs does not
articulate this with the same technical and philosophical language, and it obviously
does not have a developed concept of sin as it would appear in the later Christian
tradition, there is, as discussed above, the echo here of such ideas – where the human
person can seem to be on the path to the good, but whose end is anything but good
(e.g. Prov 14:12).
Returning to Aquinas, he goes on to examine a catalogue of spheres where true
fulfilment might be found.387 Raised are many human goods, but as to holding the
ultimate good, none of those suffice. Rather, it is found in God alone. Even the good
quality of one’s soul is not the ultimate good. As Aquinas states:
The thing itself desired as the final end is that which gives substance to
happiness and makes a man happy, though happiness itself is defined by
the holding of it. The conclusion to be drawn is that happiness is a real
condition of soul, yet is founded on a thing outside the soul.388
Then in the following article he states it clearly, as translated by McInerny:
For happiness is the perfect good which totally quiets appetite; otherwise,
if there still remained something to be sought, it would not be the
ultimate end. The object of will, the human appetite, is the universal
good, just as the object of intellect is universal truth. From this it follows
384
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that nothing can quiet the will of man except the universal good, which is
found in no creature but in God alone, since every creature has a
participated goodness. Hence God alone can fulfil the will of man.389
As McInerny discusses, this leads to an understanding that a perfectly fulfilled life is
impossible in this one and can only be found in loving union with God in the beatific
vision; a state of being that can be tasted in this life but not fully experienced.390 A
point should be made that, given we are bringing the wisdom of Proverbs into
dialogue with Thomistic thought, this notion of the afterlife that is heavily informed
by New Testament and early Christian imagery, is not one found in Proverbs. The
concerns, articulations and teachings of Proverbs are weighted to how the current life
is shaped and, as such, are not concerned with ‘ultimate rewards’ in the same
manner.391 However, as has been argued previously, there is in Proverbs a vision of
God who is beyond human experience but, nonetheless, is imbued within created
reality and that such a vision matters in properly conceiving life in its goodness as
well as the means to achieving such goodness. Moreover, when we begin to reflect
on how such ‘high’ imagery of God both within and beyond created reality impacts
the virtuous life including the virtue of prudence, we can find points of similarity
between Thomistic thought and Proverbs and, consequently, a place where one can
begin to more directly inform the other.
With that in mind, and returning to Thomistic thought more centrally, what this
theocentric image of the ultimate good does is open a layer of understanding of the
virtuous character that might otherwise remain silent. For Aquinas this is considered
in a number of ways including in his integration of the theological virtues as well as
the importance of the infused virtues. It is difficult to briefly discuss these ideas
because they are, firstly, complex in their own right and, secondly, Aquinas’s own
writings shift in such a way that those who follow and interpret him in the field of
moral thought do not always have fixed agreement on some of the issues
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presented.392 As such, the infused and theological virtues are discussed here only in
general terms, but they nonetheless provide a valuable framework on how certain
aspects of prudence, as understood both in the virtue tradition broadly as well as in
Proverbs, can be more fully informed.
To unpack this we need to briefly revisit the concept of virtues more broadly.
Acknowledging that the ultimate good, that is the ultimate end of human goodness, is
found in God alone places a limit on the acquired cardinal virtues of prudence,
fortitude, justice and temperance. Given the fundamental idea that something from
outside the natural human experience is required to find that ultimate end (being
union with God himself), Aquinas recognises that the traditional cardinal virtues in
themselves are not sufficient. Though they perfect the human person, they do so only
in the ‘natural order’. This is articulated in a number of places in Thomistic thought,
but is perhaps made most clear in his discussion on the virtues in general in I-II, 5567 of the Summa Theologiae. Aquinas here draws the distinction between the
acquired moral virtues and infused virtues. The former, as the appellation suggests,
are virtues that can be acquired through the exercise of the human faculties,
including the intellect, and in the development of habits through human effort. The
latter are bestowed by God directly and are necessary if we are to attain our ultimate
end as articulated above. As Aquinas states:
Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to
happiness. Now man’s happiness is twofold … One is proportionate to
human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his
natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and
which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of
participation of the Godhead, about which it is written [2 Pet 1:4] that by
Christ we are made partakers of the Divine Nature. And because such
happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man’s natural
principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not
suffice to direct man to this same happiness.
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Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional
principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even
as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles,
albeit not without the Divine assistance. Suchlike principles are called
theological virtues: first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they
direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God
alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by
Divine revelation, contained in Holy Scripture.393
What this introduces is the notion of theological virtues, which are identified as faith,
hope and charity.394 As the above quote indicates, these virtues allow for the ultimate
telos, that being participation in God, to be realised and are termed theological
because they originate from God alone and are not able to be acquired any other way.
The term ‘bestowed’ was used earlier and this is apt as they are ‘gift’ in the fullest
sense; hence they are, in regard to the virtuous life, the essence of grace. Further, this
graced moral life is found in the gifts of the Holy Spirit which operate within human
experience to elevate the person to communion in the Godhead.
Two points need to be made regarding this. As alluded to in the above, the goals of
‘natural happiness’ served by acquired virtues are certainly goods. They are not to be
confused as being inherently immoral simply because they have as their object
human flourishing in the place of natural existence. To expand, the virtue of justice,
even as exercised with only the power of human reason for the sake of human good
in the natural order of things, will still properly be a good for the human individual
and the community in which they live. However, it may not be able to aid in the
ultimate good which is found in union with God. Nevertheless, assuming it is well
directed by prudence and is in concert with the other cardinal virtues, it will cause
both the agent and her actions to be genuinely good according to her nature. Having
said that, according to Aquinas at least, the effects of sin make the virtuous life apart
from grace difficult, but nonetheless it is, in principle at least, possible.395 For the
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sake of space, I simply note, as Aquinas does, that the ‘lower order’ of goods are still
sufficient in serving the ends in that order.396
Secondly and most importantly, the above mentioned theological virtues do not sit in
isolation. Also introduced above is the notion of ‘infused virtue’, that is, virtues
otherwise considered natural that are ‘infused’ with grace. This is a key notion for
this discussion. Not only is there a well-regarded understanding that for all the
virtues to be virtues, they need to work in concert in the person, Aquinas has taught
us that, similarly, the theological virtues and the gracious gifts of the Holy Spirt need
to operate in concert with all the other virtues if one is to live the ultimate fullness of
life.397 This does not involve a suppression of the naturally acquired cardinal virtues
with a replacement set of theologically shaped virtues. As such, the term ‘infusion’ is
apt in its imagery as it represents an infusion of grace within the human person; a
mixing with a capacity readily present. In this vein, the notion of the infused virtues
is not something that suppresses created reality, but elevates our moral activity
within it such that the ultimate telos can be realised. As Cessario describes it:
The infused moral virtues assume that God has acted in human history in
such a way as to make beatific fellowship with himself possible for every
member of the race. This elevation of human nature’s destiny requires a
proportionate elevation of human nature’s capacities.398
Nonetheless, it always remains a capacity within the created being operative within
creation.
Naturally in developed Christian theology, this notion of ‘God’s action in history’ is
captured in the image of Christ in which, through the Holy Spirit and his Church, we
are invited to participate in the life of the Trinity. However, as Cessario later states,
this power to live the ‘elevated life’ is premised in the Hebrew Scriptures:
Christ promises his disciples and, through them, his Church that the
power of the Holy Spirit – a divine power – will be bestowed
efficaciously on them, so that they and every member of Christ’s Body
396
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can fulfil man’s divinely appointed vocation to holiness of life. In the Old
Testament, this divine power is identified as divine wisdom, an active
principle in creation, which according to the Book of Wisdom399 abides
as the source of everything that man needs to pursue a complete human
life.400
Taken as a whole, this concept of the ultimate human good and the natural human
good echoes the discussion earlier on Proverbs. Relying on human wisdom alone is
problematic if the fullness of wisdom properly understood (which necessarily
includes the divine imagery) is to be grasped. As discussed to this point, this is well
established in both Proverbs and in Thomistic thought. However, there is a greater
depth to be had in this topic and this can be illuminated when we examine the key
theological virtue of charity as it relates to the other cardinal virtues and to prudence
in particular.
All three theological virtues of faith, hope and charity have their place, but charity is
particularly important in the Thomistic scheme for a number of reasons. Most
notably it is closely associated with the beatific end described above as it concerns
the love of God as the object directly.401 Further, the love of God that is captured in
the virtue of charity is an all-encompassing one. What is meant by this is, being a
love from and for God, charity is a love that, through God, extends to all for all. As
such, the virtue of charity, working through the infused moral virtues, concerns the
totality of human beings as they act within lived reality including with each other. As
Kent discusses, one might inaccurately regard a Christian life to be “mostly a private
relationship between the individual conscience and God—chiefly a matter of one’s
heart and mind, so that one’s everyday behavior might be hard to distinguish from
the behavior of non-Christians.” However, this is not in keeping with a complete
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understanding of the theological virtue of charity or the virtues in general.402 As has
been articulated throughout and is apparent especially in the current discussion, the
virtues, and virtuous activity included, are only virtues in an integrated mode and,
further, the human being is also necessarily communal and so any sense of the
virtuous life must account for such integration. As such, the virtue of charity, though
pertaining to one’s individual relationship with God, will have a necessary influence
on the day-to-day lives of human beings as they act with each other and within
created reality.
Given that, for all the virtues and their activity to realise the ultimate end (as opposed
to the connatural ends alone), it will need to be shaped by the ‘mother’ of all virtues,
charity.403 The question is how does this occur? Aquinas himself used the example of
fasting and temperance. 404 Balanced regular meals are considered a well-reasoned
approach to food, useful for human flourishing if approached in that way. It would
not be considered intemperate to eat as such at any given time. However, the
believer, infused with charity, with a love for the ultimate good would be exercising
the same virtue (temperance) but to a different end in the exercise of fasting. The
virtue does not change in its proximate object (that being a healthy exercise of bodily
appetite), nor does the activity in the general sense (it still pertains to eating food),
but the end (natural human fulfilment in the cardinal virtue compared to union with
God in the infused virtue) changes the virtue as it is exercised in the life of the
believer.405
The same reckoning is applied to our particular virtue of interest in prudence, in fact
even more so given that prudence is so central to coordinating the other virtues.406
Taking the above example, later in the Summa Theologiae Aquinas stresses that if we
were to fast to a point where we are harming our natural bodies, then it is a
perversion of the spiritual act and thus sinful.407 As such, infused prudence is one
that is able to direct temperance (in this case) towards an end that is true to one’s
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entire being – to find a fullness of life that draws our natural activity into right
relationship with our fullest end.
This brings another aspect of prudence into focus. Central to our understanding of
prudence is that it concerns the ability to see reality rightly (see the previous
discussion on ‘truthful vision’) and to use such vision to reason rightly in matters of
the particular and move the agent towards the telos of fullness of life. Charity as a
virtue, the cultivated gift of “friendship with God”408 necessarily changes the scope
of this vision. Further, it does this in the most substantial way. To expand, charity in
the Thomistic tradition is not simply associated with attaining knowledge of God in
the cognitive sense. As far as the theological virtues are concerned, for Aquinas, this
rests in the virtue of faith which is operative in the intellect; a virtue that allows one
to grasp the truth of God. Over both the theological virtues of faith and hope (and all
other virtues for that matter), Aquinas teaches that charity is primary as it grasps the
dynamism of God’s very being drawing humanity to God’s self – an operative for
and in God.409 Thus, in the virtue of charity, we come to know God; not simply to
know truths about God, but to know the place where our desires as human beings are
entirely satisfied. 410 Further, as Aquinas states it, charity is most important in
conceiving the virtue of prudence in its fullest capacity as illuminating means to
ultimate ends, i.e. charity works through infused prudence to provide it with a vision
of what the ultimate telos for the agent is:
For it has been stated that the other moral virtues cannot be without
prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, because
these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the
starting point of the procedure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed
aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed towards his
ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed
in respect of other ends, which is the effect of moral virtue … It is
therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without charity;
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nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without
prudence.411
In examining this concept Pinches describes the effect of infused prudence as
“adding more ‘realities’ to know.”412 Moreover, as he goes on to state:
Since we receive full knowledge of God in the communion of charity
rather than in the intellectual apprehension of faith, it follows that infused
prudence is the result not so much of apprehending but of communing. In
short, we know God and God’s world in communion, in friendship.413
As such, the elevated concept of infused prudence not only changes what we know in
the faculty of the intellect which is where prudence sits, but it allows the believer to
exercise truthful vision with a whole new perspective, one only found in God. As
Pieper puts it, “by grace-given love, man may become one with God to such an
extent that he receives, so to speak, the capacity and the right to see created things
from God’s point of view and to “relativize” them.”414 Pieper here is commentating
on I-II, 26.5 of the Summa where Aquinas writes that perfect prudence “sees nought
else but the things of God.” As Pieper well points out, it is only through infused
prudence that we see creation accurately as it is put in right perspective relative to
God’s self. Thus, one can have such a perspective “without at the same time
repudiating [created things] or doing injustice to their nature.” In contrast, contempt
for the world that “springs from man’s own judgments and opinions” is unfounded
arrogance and is unable to recognise created things rightly.415
4.2.1 Infused Prudence as a Hermeneutical Aid for Proverbs
If we hold such notions and step into our wider examination of wisdom in Proverbs,
a new depth of hermeneutical understanding is made available. It was noted above
that the theological imagery of Proverbs adds to how we might engage with
prudential wisdom. Throughout Proverbs there are admonitions and insights based
411
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not on revealed truths in the prophetic or covenantal mode but, rather, in the lived
experience of created reality. Nonetheless, prudential wisdom that is called to be
exercised within created reality is most fully conceived as a wisdom that is ultimately
found in God alone. Holding that in mind, the image of charity as it works with
prudence to build an infused prudence in the human experience gives a technical
shape to how we can more fully comprehend this theologically informed prudential
wisdom found in Proverbs. There is, as articulated above, an acquired prudence
operative that is virtuous, it will rightly recognise created goods as such and will lead
to a natural flourishing. That is not taken away, but the theological background in
Proverbs and the notion of infused prudence in Aquinas expands acquired prudence
to contemplate and engage in the lived experience of created reality with a
penetration that allows one to navigate life not only toward the good of the human in
nature and of itself, but for the good in totality. This is not to claim that sages who
wrote and redacted Proverbs had in mind the notion of infused virtues in the
technical sense. As with the discussion on natural law earlier, such technicality is
clearly not its mode and one is cautious that we do not ‘read into’ Proverbs that
which is not there. However, as demonstrated previously and developed further here,
there is an ‘ultimate vision’ of wisdom that is borne out in God alone yet invites
human participation such that the fullness of life, including life in God, can be found.
We recall from the earlier discussion that when Proverbs calls out and ties the
gaining of wisdom with a ‘fear of the Lord’, the call is not to suggest that prudential
wisdom necessarily requires pious activity for its own sake.416 It is, rather, to enter
into dwelling in God in both heart and action. The Thomistic vision of infused
virtues gives a greater shape as to why – because without such a development of
virtue, the ability to live virtuously to the ultimate end is frustrated. Moreover, it
harkens to the relational dimension necessary if one is to gain the fullness of vision
that prudential wisdom allows. Recall the invitation of Woman Wisdom (Prov 8);
imbued in it is a call to encounter a ‘creative force’ and gain the things of good
sense, deep understanding and prudence. But this invitation, with the above in mind,
is not simply a cognitive exercise. As is found by many interpreters, the call of
Woman Wisdom is couched in relational terms. 417 This is not simply a literary
416
417
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instrument, rather it is indicating the approach one is to have if one is going to
engage the fullness of life that is on offer. In short this approach is a dynamic of
love; to love and be loved (Prov 8:17).
This touches on a notion implied in the above discussion, and it pertains to the
importance of our desires and will. It is not a dimension that can be analysed
extensively here but it is useful to grasp the importance of desires of the will as it
operates with prudence in the virtuous life. 418 Cessario in his examination of
prudence notes that, “Christian prudence … combines both the intellectual emphasis
of classical philosophy, for example, Aristotle’s doctrine of phronesis, with the quest
of the Christian tradition – ‘amor meus, pondus meum,’ my love, my inclination.”419
He then goes on to quote Aquinas from the Summa Theologiae:
Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus even the
Philosopher [Aristotle] states that it is easy to do what a righteous man
does; but that to do it in the same way, viz., with pleasure and
promptitude, is difficult to a man who is not righteous. Accordingly we
read also [1 John 5:3] that His commandments are not heavy: which
words Augustine expounds by saying that they are not heavy to the man
that loves; whereas they are a burden to him that does not love.420
As Cessario discusses, this points to how a fuller comprehension of morality is found
in an integrated vision of the moral life and how prudence provides a “unitive
function.”421 Party to this is the importance of our appetitive makeup. Prudence (as
the ability to move from rational deliberation about what is to be done through a right
grasp of reality to moral activity) is necessarily shaped by what we desire as our
ultimate end. It is this which sits as a major plank in how charity (as a communing in
friendship) impacts the virtues, not only in its broadening of vision but by also
directing, through prudence, all the virtues to their fullest end. This is so because
prudence operates not only in deliberation about things, but by enacting our desire
for the good which is kernelled in us in creation and present in the natural law; to
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desire good and avoid evil. This includes what we would understand as our emotions,
and Aquinas recognises that our affective desires (what is included in notion of
appetitus) are essentially created to seek and find goodness, and the fullness of life is
thus possible only if our desires are ordered to their proper ends.422 The virtue of
charity is the ultimate expression of this. It allows our being to not only express our
desires rightly for proximate goods, but to desire the ultimate good at the same time.
These rightly ordered desires of the will, what Aquinas terms a rectitude of the
appetite (rectitude appetitus), allows prudence to integrate right desire into right
action.423 Cates captures the impact of Charity regarding our appetites well:
Charity is partly a change in one’s appetite that becomes possible when
one apprehends (by faith) that one stands in a fitting relationship to God
and to all that God loves. It is a change that becomes possible when one
realizes that one has been granted by God, a special capacity to relate to
God, not only as the first cause of one’s being and goodness (as evident
to natural reason) but as an intimate Friend with whom one shares one’s
life.424
The sage authors of Proverbs also seem to have had an awareness of the importance
of desires in shaping the character of one’s moral life. Prov 10:23 sates that;
Doing wrong is like sport to a fool,
but wise conduct is pleasure to a person of understanding.
The key term here is śāḥaq, what the NRSV translates as ‘sport’. It captures the idea
of delight and pleasurable desire and works elliptically with the second line (hence
NRSV inserts the word ‘pleasure’). A number of places in Proverbs points out that
fools and the immoral find pleasure in evil and their lack of ‘good sense’. For
example:
Folly is a joy to one who has no sense,
but a person of understanding walks straight ahead. (Prov 15:21).425
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What seems prevalent here is the understanding that what we love (desire) sets the
character and direction of moral formation. It is not simply a case of knowing ‘good
things’ as a faculty of the intellect which is the drive of prudence. Rather, it finds
fullness as a virtue in conjunction with our desires operating towards proper ends. It
is not surprising then that Prov 8:17 states, “I [divine Wisdom] love those who love
me, and those who seek me diligently find me.” This pertains to the type of
attitudinal stance (in the natural sense) one should have if they are to attain
wisdom,426 however, as the discussion had in 2.2.4 on Prov 8:22-36 indicates, there
is also a distinctly theological dimension that is required.427
4.2.2 The Natural and Supernatural in Proverbs
The above discussion allows one to bring into focus the commonly expressed notion
of ‘grace perfecting nature’. Proverbs does not literally articulate such an
understanding. However, as the examination had above attests, the pathway to
prudential wisdom found in its fullest is a meeting of two aspects, the created world
where we experience reality and the fullness of the creative force of wisdom found
ultimately in God alone. In the Thomistic language, the infused virtues (including the
infused virtue of prudence) are similarly a meeting of our commonly experienced
human nature, and the supernatural love of God - an elevation of creaturely activity
to its fullest end.
An issue for much of the Christian theological enterprise has been how these two
‘natures’ relate – and for many the articulation of the dictum gratia perficit naturam
has been less than satisfactory. As Cessario states, it has been “subject to countless
misinterpretations and, therefore, the beneficiary of unmerited deprecation.”428 Porter
also provides a discussion on how nature and grace as distinct concepts have
substantive value and critiques the tendency in modern Catholic theology in
particular to downplay the distinction. 429 The downplay is usually based on two
inaccuracies. The first pertains to over stressing the distinction of two natures. With
such an overstating, the human person is seen as being operative in either one state of
being or the other, or, moreover, can pursue only one eudaimonic nature or the other.
426
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It holds that grace and nature, in this sense, are mutually exclusive spheres of
existence and that the faculties of one does not necessitate engagement with the
other. This can result in a denigration of nature as something to be suppressed for the
sake of the moral life on the one hand or, on the other, a bifurcation of graced reality
from created nature such that ‘pure nature’ stands as a complete paradigm of the
moral life. Both ‘extremes’ have deficiencies particularly as far as the Christian faith
is concerned. More the point here, as has been repeatedly illustrated above, this
bifurcation is not necessary in utilising Aquinas. Rather, in Thomistic thought,
supernatural grace and nature are distinct but, in the human person, they share in the
very activity of being human, including the human faculties, wherever the human
may be. Grace perfects nature, it does not supplant it.
Secondly, and this is more the issue that Porter addresses, is the tendency by some to
recognise that the supernatural impacts the natural without destroying it, but they go
further and suggest that nature distinctively conceived is thus unnecessary. What we
experience in a graced existence is a subsumed nature that is, thus, entirely
supernatural. As such it is redundant to speak of distinctly natural faculties pursuing
natural ends including the natural good.430 Most notably this is a position held by
Karl Rahner.431 Porter contends that what is at stake if we collapse nature and grace
into a single and ubiquitous mode of existence is that nature loses its distinct
theological significance as an “independent witness to divine wisdom.” 432 The detail
of this argument is not vital here, except to note that maintaining a distinction
between grace and nature also allows scriptures such as Proverbs an avenue to speak
to the moral life.
Having said that, it is possible to interpret the theological and creative imagery of
Proverbs in a Rahnerian mode where all existence shares a supernatural order.
Roland Murphy is particularly persuasive in this regard. 433 However, this
interpretation in the Rahnerian mode is not necessarily the only approach available
and, in fact, it is the proposition here that the Thomistic notion that Porter defends
can be witnessed in Proverbs. As discussed at various points through this project, the
430
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experience of creation does bear revelatory significance when Proverbs is reflected
upon. Prudentially engaging it (as encouraged in Proverbs) is possible in its own
right and this does not inherently equate to a mode of operation that is necessarily
secular. Murphy’s reflections are most useful in drawing that into focus. However,
what is being proposed here is that Proverbs can legitimately be read in such a way
that the natural and supernatural are interrelated yet distinct and, further, that it might
be beneficial to its interpretation to do so. Certainly, as readily conceded, Proverbs
does not speak of grace perfecting nature in the same mode found in contemporary
theology. Such a notion is built on the corpus of Scriptures and the great doctors of
the Church and will not be found spelled out categorically in one book of the Old
Testament. However, there are certain aspects of such a notion that can be affirmed
by the examination of Proverbs undertaken in this project.
Firstly, despite the call for the human creature to share in the particular perspective
which only divine wisdom can provide, God and His complete perspective always
remain distinct. For example, God has the totality of ‘truthful vision’ for He alone
has eyes in every place (Prov 15:3). Not only is God the very source of creation
(8:22), the very mysteries of the underworld are exposed only to Him, much less the
depths of human existence (15:11; 20:27), and even in our moral conduct, what
might seem right by external measure and the place of human reckoning is weighed
accurately only before God who sees the very being of human activity (21:2-3).
Acquiring and adhering to wisdom, as a calling infused with Godself, will cause one
to live well, however the fullness of wisdom can only be found in God and, because
of this very fact, its sum and end will always remain beyond human experience. As
such, one needs something of God; that is to encounter God as God, to fully grasp
wisdom. To collapse the natural world into the supernatural risks elevating the
human experience to a place that it cannot possibly occupy; that is being able to hold
a perspective of complete knowing (or complete wisdom to remain true to Proverbs).
Proverbs seems determined to periodically remind the reader that such a perspective
is God’s alone. We are simply encouraged to share in it in some capacity, this
sharing we might term as a gift of grace (though Proverbs does not hold such
terminology).
Secondly, there seems to be within Proverbs a recognition of natural goods being
goods in their own right. Take for example the following:
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Better is a little with righteousness
than large income with injustice. (Prov 16:8)
and;
Better is a little with the fear of the Lord
than great treasure and trouble with it. (Prov 15:16)
Conceptually the verses are near identical except for the ‘fear of the Lord’ motif. The
first (16:8) can be plausibly read as concerning the good of the human being and the
society in which she lives for her own ends. More specifically, a large income made
by unjust activity might fill one’s treasure house, but it is immoral and, therefore, it
is better to have less but secure one’s moral health. It is also necessary for a
functioning society that its members operate justly, so such an approach points to
contributing to a stable and flourishing society. One can make such claims with no
theological input. The second reference (15:16) is the same principle but with a more
overt theological implication. A humble and engaged respect of the Lord, is better
than great material wealth. In fact Prov 15:16 sits in a section held together by word
repetitions (15:13-17). 434 It lists a catalogue of goods (glad heart, prudential
knowledge, a loving dinner table), but has at its centre the image of right relationship
with God. The theological imagery in one does not take away from the natural good
attested in the other, though it can be argued that it does add to it.
Thus, and by way of conclusion, it is possible in Proverbs to witness a sense of the
natural good that is a good in that order. The many modern interpretations that
suggest a secular reading of large parts of Proverbs attests to that point.435 However,
Proverbs does not stop there. There is, in addition to natural goods, a distinctly
theological dimension (and one pertaining to the God of Israel to be more specific)
that, while not taking anything away from the former, tunes the prudential wisdom
being imparted toward that ‘higher’ order of wisdom that is found in God alone.
Such reflections on the Book of Proverbs recognises those goods that might be
termed ‘secular’ as goods but, equally, seems to hold an elevated and higher
perspective of wisdom that escapes human natural capacity which, nonetheless, can
be drawn upon in the natural and, further, elevates natural virtues to the goodness of
life in its theologically informed fullest. As such, the prudential wisdom that is
434
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esteemed in Proverbs can very much imaged as an infused virtue; necessarily
theologically sourced but operative in the human natural order for the sake of his
good.
What this demonstrates is that a Thomistic understanding of the infused virtues
provides an approach to understanding how the ‘natural goods’ of wisdom expressed
in Proverbs maintains theological relevance. Likewise, Proverbs itself can help us
reconcile the theological issues that can arise in certain readings of gratia perficit
naturam. Proverbs and its commitment to theological prudential wisdom attests that
one order does not need to collapse into the other, that a distinction of both is
possible without undermining either. As discussed, there is a theme throughout
Proverbs that navigating life prudentially will inherently be aided by a dynamic
engagement with God. Such an engagement elevates what are goods in the sphere of
human activity and gives them an end that satisfies both the human good and the
good in toto. The wisdom of Proverbs attests (though clearly does not describe in
full) that, to the believer, all natural daily activity has supernatural implications and
so an appropriate stance toward, and provision in response from God, allows the
means to fulfilling those implications completely.
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Concluding Remarks
The aim of this project was to form a correlative dialogue between the virtue of
prudence especially as it is informed by Thomas and his interpreters on the one hand,
and the wisdom teaching of Proverbs on the other. Sitting behind this aim was the
call, highlighted in the documents of Vatican II, for modern scholarship to draw on
the Scriptures to more readily inform moral thought. In response to this, the approach
in this study was not simply to use Scripture in passing, but to engage it in such a
manner that utilises the varying tools of modern biblical scholarship where at all
possible. As such, it is an engagement between two modern theological traditions –
biblical study on the one hand and moral theology on the other. The aim has been to
remain true to the scholarly standards demanded of both traditions where possible.
The challenge has been to offer enough scholarly depth on the one hand to be
thorough, but to do so without becoming lost in the finer detail where it does not
serve the overall project on the other. A balance of sorts has been the aim, but
undoubtedly certain aspects from one area of study or another could have been more
fully explored were space available.
With that in mind, the boundaries of what has been examined were set by where one
scholarly tradition has been able to speak to the other in the aim of illuminating a
certain field of moral thought – that being, the virtue of prudence and related
concepts. For that reason, it should be pointed out that this was not an exhaustive
study of either Proverbs or the virtue of prudence. Neither Proverbs nor what the
Thomistic tradition has to say about the virtue of prudence exhausts all that there is
to say.
Despite these limitations, the project has unpacked some useful points of reflection.
Firstly, Proverbs helps to critique the notion that natural law, as informed by
Thomistic thought, is non-biblical or non-theological. The opening section, in
particular, laid this groundwork by explaining how a more fruitful understanding of
natural law (in Aquinas) and created order (in Proverbs) can be had and also set the
context in which the virtue of prudence and Proverbial wisdom can be more fully
grasped. Then the closer examination of Proverbs brought to the fore various modes
where prudential wisdom is expressed. This also brought into greater focus elements
such as the communal dimension and the theological imagery of prudential wisdom
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found in Proverbs. Party to this is a recognition of the importance of ‘truthful vision’
which is so vital to living the prudent life at any time, but particularly so in our
modern context where seeing reality rightly is arguably becoming more difficult
despite our advancements in the accumulation and access to information.
The final section brought to the fore two aspects where Proverbs is able to illuminate
and add depth to Thomistic teaching. The first is the importance of the socio-political
dimension of prudence – that the moral life is never an individuating activity in its
entirety. We are shapers of and shaped by the societies we live in. The second drew
into sharper focus the theological imagery of the virtues and, while drawing on
reflections in Proverbs, unpacked the notion of the theological virtues and infused
prudence. By drawing on the notion of ‘grace perfecting nature’, which is so
important to the Thomistic imagery of the infused virtues, it subsequently gives
avenue for the interpretation of Proverbs to inform a more complete image of the
virtue of prudence; a fuller image of prudence that is able to direct human activity
not only to the good in the natural (or ‘secular’, as often applied to Proverbs) order of
things, but to the fullness of life in its theological informed capacity.
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